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 Abstract 
 
Part 1 of the thesis questions the traditional relation model of intentionality. 
After fixing reference on the target phenomenon, intentionality, and 
explaining my interest in it, I ask what sorts of things intentionality might be 
a relation to.  I consider ordinary objects, properties, propositions and 
hybrid views, and conclude all make the intentional relation appear rather 
mysterious.  From there, I move on to examine the relation view’s most 
prominent proponents, the tracking theorists—pointing out some 
challenges such views face, and concluding that it might be worthwhile 
looking into alternatives to the relation view.  
 
Part 2 asks whether the newly emerging phenomenal intentionality 
movement can provide a viable alternative to the relation model of 
intentionality.  After focusing on a specific kind of phenomenal 
intentionality theory—something I call modificationism—I examine three 
such accounts. From there I go on to discuss some common 
complaints/challenges these kinds of views face, and consider how they 
might be addressed within the modificationist framework. 
 
In Part 3, I address what I call the problem of cognitive contact: how do 
our contentful mental states manage to make cognitive contact with the 
ordinary objects (e.g. tables and chairs) that they appear to.  The problem 
is particularly acute for any version of phenomenal intentionality that 
denies the relation view, and has been given very little attention in the 
literature. I consider how a modificationist might address this problem, and 
conclude that though some avenues appear promising, there is 
nevertheless a great deal of work to be done if modificationism, and 
phenomenal intentionality theory, is to overcome this problem.   
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Part 1 
Introduction 
 
The focus of Part 1 is the phenomenon of intentionality—the aboutness, or 
directedness, that some things, systems, or objects display. In particular, I am 
interested in the species of aboutness displayed by minds/mental states.  
Traditionally, this phenomenon is thought to be, or involve, a relation 
between mental states and the items that such states are, or appear to be, 
about, or directed at. In Part 1, I attempt to raise some concerns about this 
traditional view.   My plan is as follows: In chapter 1, I attempt to distinguish 
the kind of intentionality I am interested in from other possible forms of 
aboutness. I then describe two different conceptions of intentional content, 
and give a description of content that I think is consistent with both.  
 
If we assume that intentionality is indeed some sort of relation between 
minds/mental states and distinctly existing things, then two questions arise: 
1) What kinds of things does intentionality relate us to? 2) What kind of 
relation is intentionality?    
 
Chapter 2 addresses the first question—namely, what kinds of things does 
intentionality relate us to. I consider what I take to be some of the most 
popular contenders: everyday objects, such as tables, chairs and states of 
affairs; and abstract objects, such as propositions and properties. I raise 
concerns for both options. 
 
In chapter 3, I set aside the issue of what kinds of things contents are, 
assuming a kind of content agnosticism, focusing instead on the most 
influential attempts at spelling out the nature of the intentional relation.  
These are the tracking based accounts found in the writings of authors such 
  
2 
as Fodor (1988, 1992), Dretske (1997), and Millikan (2002).  With the 
exception of Millikan’s consumer-based theory, tracking theories are almost 
unanimously causal.  I therefore sort these causal theories according to how 
they attempt to supplement the causal relation so as to allow for 
misrepresentation.  I consider appeals to normal conditions, natural 
selection, learning and asymmetric dependence—all of which face some 
concerns. 
  
Part 1 ends with a summary of the results of this foray into what I hereafter 
will call intentional relationalism.  My conclusion will be that though 
intentional relationalism has been the most widely accepted stance on 
intentionality, the concerns raised make a search for an alternative view 
understandable.    
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1. Intentionality: Fixing Reference 
 
When you read the words on this page, when you wonder whether spring 
will ever come, when you crave extremely hot chicken wings, you are 
enjoying mental states that appear to be about, or directed at, things.  This 
aboutness/directedness is intentionality.  This part of the thesis is about the 
nature of that phenomenon.  In particular, this chapter asks whether 
intentionality is, or consists in, a relation.    
 
Intentionality is sometimes referred to as mental representation.  Neither 
‘intentionality’ nor ‘representation’ is without its difficulties, nor do the 
words themselves appear synonymous: While it sounds acceptable to say 
that smoke represents fire, it sounds odd to say that smoke is about fire.  In 
my view, the distinction between intentionality and representationality is 
terminological rather than substantive.  All the same, in what follows I will 
primarily talk about intentionality when trying to describe the aboutness 
that certain mental states exhibit. 
 
1.1 Original/Derived Intentionality 
 
On the other hand, there is an important distinction between two forms of 
intentionality, namely intrinsic/original intentionality, and derived 
intentionality.  While this distinction is not uncontroversial,1 I nonetheless 
follow a large number of theorists in accepting a real distinction here, and 
allowing that there are indeed cases of both derived and original 
                                                        
1 See (Dennett, 1987, pp. 288-297), who argues that all intentionality is 
derived. 
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intentionality.  See, for instance, (Fodor, 1988, pp. 99), (Dretske, 1997, pp. 7-
8), (Searle, 1983).    
 
An extremely helpful way of articulating this distinction can be found in 
(Bourget, 2010): Things have derived intentionality when they “have their 
contents or representational properties, at least in part in virtue of 
intentional states distinct from themselves, or relations to such states 
(Bourget, 2010, pp.33).”   Natural language, street signs, and paintings all 
count as having derived intentionality in this sense: they are about what they 
are about in virtue of intentional states distinct from themselves—namely 
our thoughts. 2  On the other hand, some mental states have their 
intentionality originally. We do not, for instance, decide (as we do in the case 
                                                        
2 One problem that emerges for this way of cutting the original/derived distinction is that it 
implies that intentional mental states that have their contents in virtue of being related to 
other mental states turn out to be derived.  If we take holism—the thesis that something is 
about what it is about, or means what it means, only relative to the entire (representational) 
system of which it is a part—seriously, then it looks like the majority of intentionality is 
dervied.  Perhaps this is not such a concern: holism is certainly not a unanimous view.  Fodor 
is a particularly vociferous opponent (see Fodor & Lepore, 1992).  However, at the outset, I 
do not wish to preclude any theory for merely definitional reasons.  On the other hand, I 
think Bourget’s way of articulating the distinction accurately distinguishes between different 
species of intentionality.  For holists, I propose the following: Something has derived 
intentionality when it has its aboutness, at least in part, in virtue of the aboutness of things 
disitinct from itself.  Something has original intentionality if its intentionality is not derived.  
How exactly does this amended formulation of the original/derived distinction avoid the 
holism problem?  Holism can be understood as a thesis about how representational things 
get to be about what they are about, rather than a thesis about how things get their 
aboutness. One can thus be a holist about what exactly thoughts are about—namely they are 
about what they are about in virtue of their relation to the entire representaitonal system—
without denying that said thoughts have their aboutness originally.  To be as transperent as 
possible: I am not hereby endorsing a view on which the aboutness of some mental state, and 
what that state is about, come cleanly apart.  For instance, perhaps words get their aboutness 
in virtue of our deciding what they are about.  What I am saying is that if you accept some 
form of holism, you could take the line that there is a real disitnction between a) a mental 
state’s aboutness, and b) what it is about, hold that original/derived disitnction concerns 
only a) and that holism concerns only b), and thereby save the disitnction from holism or 
vice versa.  Holists, and anyone else who thinks intentional mental things have their contents 
in part because of relations they bear to other intentional things, can follow me this far. 
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of words) that our thoughts have intentionality: they come, as it were, 
prefurnished.  
 
All that being said, I am willing to concede this formulation of the 
original/derived distinction, if needs be, and fall back on just citing paradigm 
cases.  Paradigm things that have derived intentionality are words, street 
signs and pictures.  Paradigm things that have original intentionality are 
mental states. My concern in what follows is original intentionality. 
 
1.2 Introspection and Intentionality 
 
One thing to note about original intentionality is that it is, at least, sometimes 
observable.  We are often able to notice that our thoughts, perceptions, 
memories, desires, and so on, have the aboutness in question. This is good 
news, since it allows observation and experience to count among the tools we 
can use in our account of this phenomenon (see Mendelovici, 2010, pp. 2-7).  
I am not alone in thinking this (see, for instance, Mendelovici, 2010; Kriegel, 
2011).3 
 
Of course, the kind of observation appealed to here is a form of introspection, 
and introspective accuracy is a controversial topic.4  To forestall worries 
here, I note the following: When I silently pick a number between one and 
twenty, there are certain features of my thought that are transparent to me.  
First, it is clear that my thought, at the very least, purports to have aboutness.  
Second, I need only look to my own thoughts to observe which number I 
picked.  That is, there is a perfectly clear sense in which what number I 
picked is transparent to me. It is this kind of introspection, that my proposal 
                                                        
3 Kriegel offers an extensive argument that our concept of intentionality is experiential 
(2011, pp. 3-47).    
4 See (Schitzgebel, 2012), (Smithies & Stoljar, 2012). 
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will appeal to. What is not transparent to me is why, exactly, I chose the 
number 19.  As I understand it, we are pretty bad at this latter form of 
introspection: It might, for instance, turn out that a repressed longing to be 
19 again caused me to choose an odd number; and this despite the fact that, if 
asked, I might confabulate some story about a mathematical penchant for 
primes.   
 
1.3 Intentionality and Content 
 
On the surface, the concept of intentional content might seem clear enough.  
Intentional states display the phenomenon of aboutness, and what they are 
about is their content.  Upon closer inspection, however, things get a bit 
muddy.  If I ask you what the content of your thought is, it seems like I am 
asking you what your thought is about. Or, if I ask you what you are thinking 
about, it seems like I am asking you for the content of your thoughts. But how 
exactly are we to understand this? On one reading, intentional states are 
about their contents.  But this seems like an odd way of speaking: My thought 
that the grass is green seems to be about the grass, not about this thing called 
a content.  I find the following kind of answer unhelpful: “in describing what 
one’s thought is about, namely the grass, one gives the content of one’s 
thought.” Perhaps less confusing, but still slightly cryptic, one might say that 
intentional states have contents.  It is in virtue of your thought’s being about 
the grass that it has the content it does.   
 
What is it then, to have content?  One answer here is that content arises in 
virtue of a relation—one that holds between mental states and something 
else. In virtue of A’s bearing a particular spatial relation to B, A is said to be x 
distance from B.  But, at least on the present line of thinking, there is not 
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some thing that both A and B are related to—namely this thing called a 
distance.5  
 
There is something very intuitive about parts of this view, which goes back as 
far as Thomas Reid (Reid, 1983, pp. 129-150).6  More recently, Davidson has 
argued against what he calls the “meanings as entities” (contents as things) 
view (Davidson, 1967/2001, p. 20).7 Something about the idea that contents 
are not things, rings true with me.8 However, the question of whether 
contents arise in virtue of being related to things is an additional claim that I 
will not endorse so early on.  For now, I will just note that there is this view of 
content, and that in what follows, I will try to be sensitive to it.   
 
On the other hand, there are several examples that indicate many theorists 
have a view of contents on which they are (distinctly existing9) things.  Here 
is David Pitt: 
 
The contents of mental representations are typically taken to be abstract 
objects (properties, relations, propositions, sets, etc.) (Pitt, 2013).  
 
Likewise, Fodor too seems to think contents are things in the relevant sense.  
In his canonical formulation of the representational theory of mind, Fodor 
writes: 
 
For any organism O, and for any proposition P, there is a relation R and a 
mental representation MP such that: MP means (expresses the 
                                                        
5 Thank you to Rob Stainton for this useful analogy. 
6 Thank you again to Rob Stainton for pointing me in Reid’s direction.  It should, however, be 
noted that Reid’s attack on Locke is most plausibly taken to be an attack not just on the view 
that contents are things, but on the representational theory of mind in general.   
7 Davidson is interested in linguistic meaning, not (underived) intentional contents.   
8 I discuss this in much further detail in Part 2. 
9 This is Mendelovici’s terminology (see her MS, ch. 8)  
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proposition that) P; and O believes that P iff O bears R to MP (Fodor, 
1992, p. 16). 
 
 Diagrammatically, Fodor’s view can be represented thus: 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It seems pretty clear what the content is supposed to be here, and that the 
mental representation bears the expresses relation to it.  In this case, it looks 
like the content of the mental representation is the proposition.  And as 
Fodor is a realist about abstract entities such as propositions,10 it would 
seem that he takes intentionality (mental representation) to be a relation to 
independently existing things that play the role of contents.  
 
This is important for what follows, since I will be questioning whether or not 
intentionality is a relation.  The way I propose to go about questioning this 
relational view of intentionality is by first examining what kinds of things 
intentionality relates us to.  And I follow several theorists (Mendelovici, 
2010; Pitt, 2009; Kriegel, 2011a,b) in understanding this examination as an 
examination of what kinds of things can play the role of contents. If the above 
examples are any indication, I think this way of describing things is not too 
                                                        
10 See (Fodor, 1992, pp. 132 n. 6). 
Organism Proposition 
Mental 
Representation 
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far off base.  However, if the reader dislikes this particular way of speaking, 
then s/he is free to understand what follows thus:  The relational view of 
intentionality has it that intentionality is a relation.  Relations have relata.  
One of the relata in the intentional relation is our mental states.  Chapter 2 is 
concerned with what exactly the other relatum is.  
 
All that said, I have still not provided even a tentative, reference fixing, 
account of content. Along with (Kriegel, 2011, pp. 151-152), and (Pitt, 2009), 
I start by noting that among other things, we often invoke or appeal to 
content in order to distinguish one intentional state from another.  One of the 
differences between imagining a Labrador and a Pug is a difference in 
content.  We might thus approach content by saying that intentional content 
is one way that an intentional state differs from another, or something that 
distinguishes one intentional state from another. Though rather thin, this 
initial way of approaching content is silent about the nature and mechanics of 
intentionality.  On this view, intentionality could turn out to be essentially a 
relation between mental states and distinctly existing items (e.g. ordinary 
objects, propositions, property instances) that serve as contents.  On such a 
view the difference between imagining a Labrador and a Pug would be that in 
the former case, one’s intentional state is related to the, e.g., the property of 
being a Labrador, and in the latter, the property of being a Pug.  On the other 
hand, taking content to be one way intentional states can differ is also 
compatible with the view that contents are not distinctly existing things.  For 
instance, quickly and slowly are ways that runnings can differ, but quickly is 
not a distinctly existing thing. 
 
1.4 A brief Recap 
 
  
10 
So far, I have explained that my target phenomenon is a species of 
intentionality, or aboutness—namely, original intentionality.  Something has 
original intentionality if its intentionality does not derive from other 
intentional things distinct from itself. Words, street signs and pictures fail to 
have original intentionality, and therefore fall outside the focus of this thesis.  
I have also noted two possible ways of understanding the concept of 
intentional content, and provided the reader with two possible ways of 
understanding the project of investigating what sorts of things intentionality 
relates us to.  Finally, I proposed an encompassing conception of intentional 
content.     
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2: The Objects of Intentionality 
 
Any view that takes intentionality to be a relation between minds and 
distinctly existing things is a relation view. Different relation views disagree 
about what items play the role of contents; and, depending on the particulars 
of the view, there may be a second relation between contents and the things 
to which they refer.11  In this chapter, I look at the various options for 
specifying the objects to which we are related via intentionality. 
 
2.1 Intentionality and the DR-relation view 
 
Pre-theoretically, intentionality looks like a phenomenon that relates us to 
items and states of affairs in the world beyond our skins—most often 
everyday items.12 When I say of someone that she often thinks about her 
Labrador, Buddy, it looks like I am saying that she often bears a relation to 
Buddy.  Pre-theoretically then, it looks like when we say X is about Y (where 
X is some intentional mental state), the ‘is about’ locution names a relation 
between the mental state X and some ordinary object, Y, such as a cup of 
coffee or a Labrador.   
 
Because this pre-theoretical view enjoys a strong kinship with direct realist 
theories of perception—indeed it is basically direct realism writ large enough 
to encompass all forms of intentionality (perceptual, cognitive, etc.)—I will 
call it the DR-relation view. The DR-relation view takes intentionality to be 
a relation between mental states (or subjects) and everyday items.   
                                                        
11 I am speaking, of course, about views that take contents to be something like abstract, 
perhaps universal, properties.   
12 ‘Items’ should be read to mean not only artefacts, but also states of affairs.  Thus, Barak 
Obama, a coffee cup, and the dog being on the couch all count as items.   
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Several challenges emerge for what I am calling the DR-relation view:    
 
1) I can think about something that does not exist.  Often referred to as 
the problem of intentional inexistence (Brentano, 1887/1995), this 
worry has probably been around as long as philosophy.  More 
recently, the worry has been raised by (Mendelovici, 2010; Kriegel, 
2007, 2008, 2011; Crane, 2001).   
2) I can think about something under one aspect, or description but not 
another.  Lois Lane can hope to see Superman tonight, without 
thereby hoping to see Clark Kent (Mendelovici, MS) 
3) I can think about indistinct things. (see Mendelovici, MS; Kriegel 
2008).  I can desire a sloop without desiring any particular sloop 
(Quine W. , 1966, pp. 185-186), I can think of a man without thinking 
of a man of any particular height (Anscombe, 2002, p. 58), and I 
visualize a tiger without visualizing a tiger with a particular number of 
stripes (Dennett, 1969/1986, pp. 136-137).13  But I cannot feed an 
Anscombian man to a Dennettian tiger while sailing on a Quinean 
sloop. 
 
In what follows, I focus on 1) and 2)—though more time will be spent on 1) 
since I take it to be the most important.  
 
2.1.1 Intentional Inexistence and the DR-relation View 
 
Above, I said that the DR-relation view takes intentionality to be a relation to 
ordinary/everyday objects. Among the ordinary objects I have in mind are 
                                                        
13 It should be noted here that Quine, Anscombe and Dennett do not raise the above 
examples in the context in which I am putting them to use.  I use these examples because 
they are relatively famous.   
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tables and chairs, people, and so on.  So, the DR-relation view holds that for 
me to think about my kitchen table is for me to stand in a relation to my table.  
Of course, I doubt very much whether anyone thinks that all intentionality is 
a relation to ordinary objects.  This would imply, for instance, that I cannot 
have thoughts about numbers, which are plausibly taken to be abstract 
objects.   However, the concerns that I shall discuss below apply equally to 
more restricted DR-relation views—ones that take only certain forms of 
intentionality to be relations to ordinary objects. For instance, one might hold 
that singular thoughts—thoughts about J.K. Rowling, thoughts about your 
kitchen table—have these objects as constituents.  Or, someone might hold 
that all those thoughts that purport to be about ordinary objects are relations 
to those ordinary objects.   
 
The problem of intentional inexistence is that I can entertain thoughts about 
unicorns, Bigfoot, Pegasus, thestrals, Santa Claus, and so on.  If thinking about 
something involves being related to it, how can I think about something that 
does not exist?  In what follows I will focus almost exclusively on the example 
of unicorns.  However, for a DR-relation view whose scope covers only 
singular thoughts, just replace every instance of ‘unicorn’ with ‘Pegasus’.   
 
A useful way to think about this problem is in terms of an inconsistent triad 
of sentences (see Kriegel, 2007, pp. 307-308): 
 
1) I can think about things that do not exist. 
2) I cannot be related to something that does not exist. 
3) Thinking about something = being related to it. 
 
  
14 
The question is how to resolve the inconsistency of the triad.  To deny 3) 
would be to abandon the DR-relation view, or any other relation view for that 
matter.  The options for the DR-relation view are thus to deny 1) or 2). 
 
A denial of 1) could take several forms, most of which are vetted and 
ultimately rejected in (Kriegel, 2007, pp. 310-311). Considered first is the 
view that when we take ourselves to be thinking of unicorns, we are actually 
not thinking at all (Kriegel, 2007, p. 310). Though Kriegel finds this view 
highly implausible, one might take this line because of other theoretical 
commitments.  For instance, someone who accepts a purely referentialist 
theory of content (see Fodor, 2008), and who accepts semantic externalism 
about natural kind concepts (see Putnam, 1975), might argue that ‘unicorn’ is 
a natural kind concept whose content is therefore its external world 
referent.14  Since no such referent exists, ‘unicorn’ is contentless.   Unicorn 
thoughts, on such a view, are not bonafide thoughts at all.  Whether or not 
such a view is plausible, Kriegel insists that it simply pushes the problem 
back: 
 
“…the problem will resurface for the activity of seeming to oneself to be 
thinking of something (in the relevant sense of “seeming,” where an 
intentional mental state is actually attributed).  That is, we can devise a 
new inconsistent triad: one can seem-to-think of non-existents; one 
cannot bear relations to non-existent; yet seeming-to-think of something 
involves (constitutively) a relation to it.” (Kriegel, 2007, p. 310) 
  
One way of denying 1) that Kriegel does not discuss is to argue that when we 
seem to ourselves to be thinking about, for instance, unicorns, we are actually 
                                                        
14 However, see (Kripke, 1972, pp. 156-157) for an argument that ‘unicorn’ cannot be a 
natural kind concept.   
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entertaining a composite thought that bears several relations to distinct 
things.  In the unicorn case, the things we are related to are horses, and 
horned animals.  
 
This composite line has two parts: a) A negative thesis about what we take 
ourselves to be thinking of:  When we take ourselves to be thinking of 
unicorns, we are not thinking of what we take ourselves to be thinking of.  
And b), a positive thesis about what we are in fact thinking in such cases: 
When we take ourselves to be thinking of unicorns, we are actually thinking 
of the composite horses + horned animals.  I have concerns about both a) and 
b).  
 
A) Appears to imply that there are some thoughts—thoughts that seem to us 
to be about unicorns—that are never about what we take them to be about. 
As Kriegel points out, any approach that makes such a claim seems to imply a 
second-order error theory about intentional states (Kriegel, 2007, p. 310). 
While I follow Kriegel in finding such a view highly counter–intuitive, it is an 
option.  To avoid the counter-intuitiveness, one would have to devise some 
principle whereby we could distinguish cases of accurately taking oneself to 
be thinking of x, from inaccurate cases, such as taking oneself to be thinking 
of y, where y does not exist.   
 
Perhaps this could be done, but the relevant principle would have to 
distinguish such cases on grounds other than the existence or lack thereof of 
the entities in question. That is, it would seem circular to say that when you 
take yourself to be thinking of unicorns, you have to be mistaken (about what 
you are thinking about) because unicorns do not exist.  Recall that we are 
here considering how someone who holds the DR-relation view might deal 
with the inconsistent triad of sentences above.  In particular, we are 
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considering whether someone might reasonably deny that we can think of 
things that do not exist.  The present proposal is that when we take ourselves 
to be thinking of unicorns, we are mistaken. Unless someone keen on such a 
proposal is ready to bite the bullet and accept a full-blown second-order 
error theory about intentional states—a theory that says we are 
often/always wrong about what we take ourselves to be thinking about (viz. 
what we take ourselves to be thinking is rarely, if ever, what we are in fact 
thinking)—then some principle whereby we might distinguish the bad cases 
from the good ones seems required.  But the relevant principle cannot be 
simply that the bad cases are those where what one takes oneself to be 
thinking about does not actually exist. Otherwise, the explanation is circular.  
Again, divining such a principle might be possible, but I think the burden of 
evidence is on those who deny that we can think about things that do not 
exist.   
 
2.1.2 A Word on Externalism   
 
On the other hand, one of the central lessons (or consequences) of 
externalism is that what we are in fact thinking of is determined, in part, by 
external factors—factors that can be quite outside a subject’s epistemic 
reach, yet no less determinative of what s/he is thinking.  Hence, it should 
come as no surprise that we can and often are mistaken about what we take 
ourselves to be thinking of.  I cannot say everything I want to about 
externalism at this point.  However, I will note that a great deal of ink has 
been spilled, by a great many important thinkers, trying to reconcile some 
form of externalism with self-knowledge (see Davidson, 1996; Burge, 1996; 
McKinsey, 1996; Bilgrami, 1996).  Indeed, that in his seminal paper (Putnam, 
1975) Putnam himself opted for a narrow/wide bifurcation of content has 
seemed to some as an attempt to allow for self-knowledge (see Bilgrami, 
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1996). This alone suggests that throwing out self-knowledge with the 
internalist bathwater is a consequence that even the most ardent externalists 
(e.g. Putnam, Burge) are wary of.  And to incur such a loss just to account for 
thoughts about things that do not exist seems worse.   
 
An interesting worry for the externalist in this context can be found in 
(Boghossian, 1998).  In order to bring Boghossian’s point to bear on the 
present concern, I adapt his insights in the following brief thought 
experiment: Ed and Ted are internal duplicate unicorn thinkers, living on 
earth and twin earth respectively. The difference between earth and twin 
earth is that the latter contains unicorns.  According to the present line, when 
Ed takes himself to be thinking of unicorns, he is actually entertaining a 
composite thought. Let us assume that having a composite thought is a 
matter of tokening a molecular concept: ‘horses with horns’.  On the other 
hand, when Ted takes himself to be thinking of unicorns, he is tokening the 
atomic concept ‘unicorn’.   The problem is that the external factors that are 
supposed to determine content—the relations or lack thereof between 
Ed/Ted and unicorns—are not just having an effect on content; they are 
having an effect on syntactic form.  That is, Ed’s unicorn concept is molecular, 
and Ted’s is atomic.   And this appears to be a rather serious consequence for 
any view that takes syntactic form to be a matter of internal constitution: It is 
part of any twin earth thought experiment to hold internal states constant.  
Therefore, syntactic form is not (wholly) internal in the same sense that 
meaning and content are not.   It might be objected that I am incorrectly 
assuming ‘unicorn’ to be atomic on Twin Earth, and that this argument 
depends on that assumption.  On the contrary, take any earthly atomic 
concept, ‘A’, and have it be tokened by Ed.  Now assume a Twin earth where 
whatever normally causes the tokening of ‘A’ on Earth does not exist.  The 
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composite line holds that because there are no A-s on Twin Earth, when Ted 
tokens ‘A’ he is tokening a composite/molecular concept.   
 
In a similar vein, Segal (2000, pp. 54) raises concerns about how an 
externalist might spell out the extension conditions for the concept ‘unicorn’.  
There are two options according to Segal: 
 
“The first is that such concepts are modally empty: they do not apply to 
anything any possible world.  The other is that they are motley concepts, 
applying, roughly speaking, to anything satisfying the core descriptions 
associated with them” (Segal, A Slim Book About Narrow Content, 2000, 
p. 54).   
 
While we are considering the latter possibility—namely that unicorn 
thoughts are actually composite thoughts about horses and horns—it is 
worthwhile noting that the former option entails that unicorn thoughts are 
on par with thoughts about round squares and Penrose triangles.  No 
extension conditions = modally empty = impossible.  I suppose this is a live 
option, but further argument would be required.  Returning to the second 
option—the motley, or composite, concept view—I begin by noting that 
fixing extension conditions by way of core descriptions seems like it would 
be an uncomfortable prospect for an externalist.  The more pressing point, 
according to Segal, is that any extension fixing core description will pick out 
the same things across worlds, pace externalism (see Segal, 2000). 
 
Again, the point here is not to mount a full scaled examination of the merits 
of externalism.  Rather, it is to discover whether externalism can quickly and 
decisively come to the aid of the DR-relation theorist who seeks to account 
for our seeming ability to think about things that do not exist by denying that 
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we can think about such things.  The proposal is that when we think about 
unicorns, we are actually thinking a composite thought about horses and 
horns.  The initial worry was that this involves unicorn thinkers in a kind of 
second order error about what they take themselves to be thinking about. 
The appeal to externalism is supposed to temper this consequence because 
externalism—a widely excepted view—implies that we can and often are 
mistaken (or otherwise lacking complete knowledge) about what we take 
ourselves to be thinking about.  The first point I made was that the rejection 
of self-knowledge is not taken to be unanimously unproblematic, even by the 
most ardent externalists.  It is clear from the works of (Davidson, Knowing 
One's Own Mind, 1996), (Burge, Individualism and Self-Knowledge, 1996), 
(McKinsey, 1996), (Bilgrami, 1996), (Kriegel, 2007) and (Putnam, 1975) that 
self-knowledge is not something to be discarded lightly. The second point 
was that authors like Segal (2000) and Boghossian (1998) have provided 
some powerful reasons to think that externalism has problems accounting 
for empty concepts.  Hence, an appeal to externalism in the present context 
might not be appropriate.  At the very least, externalism does not supply a 
quick and decisive way of denying that we can think about things that do not 
exist. 
  
To come back to the issue at hand, the view we are examining is one on 
which intentionality is a relation our mental states bear to ordinary objects 
such as tables and chairs—a view I have called the DR-relation view.  From 
this, and the fact that we can think about things that do not exist, we have the 
following inconsistent set of sentences: 
 
1) I can think of things that do not exist. 
2) I cannot be related to something that does not exist. 
3) Thinking about something is a way of being related to it. 
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I have raised some concerns about different ways of denying 1); but might 
someone deny 2)? There have been several theorists, both historical and 
recent, who have sought to do so (see Parsons, 1975; Meinong, 1960); but 
none take the view that intentionality is a relation to ordinary objects: The 
objects in question are construed as having being, but not existence 
(Meinong, 1960), which makes them extraordinary.    
 
On the other hand, it is possible to argue that I can be related to an ordinary 
object that does not exist in this world, but does in another.  The thinking 
here would be to accept a strong modal realism along the lines of David 
Lewis (1986); allow that things like unicorns, and bigfoot, number among the 
ordinary objects in some possible world; and construe the intentional 
relation to hold between you in this world—where unicorns do not exist—
and said things in the world in which they do exist.  Whether or not this view 
is ultimately plausible, I leave to the reader.  However, it should be noted that 
this makes the intentional relation look rather fantastical—able to stretch 
between worlds.  Certainly it makes the intentional relation different from 
some other relations such as causation.    
 
2.1.3 The DR-relation View and Thinking About Things Under an Aspect 
or Description 
 
Relations between ordinary objects are not sensitive to description in the 
way intentionality is.  I cannot kick Superman without thereby kicking Clark 
Kent.  Likewise, I cannot be taller than Superman without thereby being 
taller than Clark Kent.  I can, however, hope to see Superman without hoping 
to see Clark Kent.  There are several arguments in the literature that raise 
this point (see Mendelovici, MS; Kriegel, 2011).   
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Consider the following: Assume that I am unaware that the morning star is 
the evening star, so that I can think about the latter without thinking about 
the former (for instance, I can hope to see the one without hoping to see the 
other). For any other (non-intentional) relation I bear to the evening star I 
also bear it to the morning star.  I cannot point to the evening star without 
pointing at the morning star; I cannot shoot at the evening star tonight 
without shooting at the morning star;  I cannot be less massive than the 
evening star without being less massive than the morning star, and so on. If 
thinking about the evening star is a matter of bearing the thinking-about 
relation to the evening star, then the thinking-about relation is unlike any 
other non-intentional relation: It relates me to the ordinary object (the 
evening/morning star) under one description/aspect, but not another (see 
Mendelovici MS, Kriegel 2011, pp. 127 – 132).   
 
2.1.4 Summary 
 
There is undoubtedly more one could say about the DR-relation view and 
intentional inexistence, but I think I have raised some fair concerns for the 
view.  At the very least, the DR-relation view must choose to: 1) Deny that 
intentionality is like any other relation that holds between everyday objects.  
Call this the mysterious relation view.  2) Allow that in some cases (e.g. non-
existent objects, objects under a particular description) intentionality does 
not relate us to ordinary objects, but rather to abstract properties, universals, 
propositions, or some other non-everyday item.  Presumably, the mysterious 
relation view—being a species of what Kriegel (2007, pp. 311) calls 
“intentionality exceptionalism”—is something to be avoided: It sounds odd to 
say that certain facts hold of every relation between ordinary objects except 
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for one (see Kriegel, 2007, pp. 311).15  However, on 2) the DR-relation view is 
no longer, as it were, pure: In some cases, intentionality relates us to 
something other than ordinary objects.  Call this second line the Impure DR-
relation view.  I will address the Impure DR-relation view below, but I will 
first examine whether abstracta are good candidates for the things 
intentionality relates us to.  
 
 
2.2 Abstracta as Intentional Contents 
 
There are, of course, alternatives to the DR-relation view.  Indeed, advocates 
of DR-relation views are in the minority.  More common is the view that 
intentionality is a relation between mental states and abstract objects such as 
properties or propositions.  Before examining the merits of views that take 
intentionality to be a relation to such things, it should be noted that the 
literature concerning properties, propositions, abstract objects, and so on, is 
vast. For instance, it has been held that the particular/property (universal) 
distinction might not be as clear as it is often thought (see Ramsey, 1997). 
This would make any examination of the purported relation between 
intentional states and the properties they are about that presupposes a clear 
distinction between particulars and properties wrong-footed from the get go. 
There are also views of properties on which properties are classes or sets 
(Lewis, 1997, p. 190).  On such view, the pre-theoretical sense that properties 
are things that particulars have—or parts of particulars—is turned on its 
head:  
 
“Far from the property being part of the [particular], it is closer to the 
truth to say that the [particular] is part of the property.  But the precise 
                                                        
15 I will consider the possibility that intentionality is a unique relation below.   
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truth, rather, is that the [particular] is a member of the property (Lewis, 
1997, p. 190).” 
 
Propositions are sometimes thought to be particular kinds of properties—
namely, “those that are instantiated only by entire possible worlds (Lewis, 
1997, p. 175).”  It is also sometimes held that properties are not all that 
abstract—at least not as abstract as say Platonic universals.  Trope theory, 
for instance, can be seen as denying the kind of full out abstractness to 
properties that Platonism ascribes them.  Though theorists like (Campbell, 
1997), (Williams, 1997) call tropes “abstract particulars,” it is clear that the 
degree of abstractness such entities are said to have is significantly less than 
universal properties.  Universals of the Platonic kind exist outside of time and 
space; tropes do not.  What makes tropes abstract—at least on views like 
Campbell’s (1997, pp. 136-137), is that they can contemporaneously occupy 
the same space as other tropes: My Pyrenees’ whiteness is present in the 
same place as my Pyrenees’ furriness.    
 
Even if we could settle on one plausible view of the nature of abstract 
entities—that they are universals, tropes, sets, or something else, other 
problems arise. Numbers are often considered abstract, as are propositions, 
the average taxpayer, the 2004 Kia Sorento, tallness, redness, and so on.  But 
to group all of these things into one category—abstracta—seems 
problematic. For instance, in reading the owner’s manual, I discover that the 
2004 Kia Sorento comes equipped with four airbags, but no proposition can 
be equipped with such things.  Likewise, the number four is the product of 
primes, but the average taxpayer is not. More importantly, abstracta are not 
members of one causal kind; some are thought to have obvious causal 
influences in the realm of concreta; others do (may) not.  Since causal powers 
are one way to type objects, it seems that abstracta do not form a single type.  
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With such disparate views on the nature of abstracta, the only hope of 
providing an adequate examination of the suitability of abstracta to be that to 
which we are related via intentionality, is to stay focused on precisely that.  
Note also, that the suitability, or lack thereof, of abstracta to be one of the 
relata of the intentional relation does not entail anything about the truth of 
any given theory of properties, universals, tropes, and so on.  It could, for 
instance, turn out that though tropes are poor candidates for being that to 
which we are related via intentionality, the trope theory of properties is 
nevertheless true.  Only theories that invoke the relevant abstracta in order 
to account for the intentional relation would be impugned/vindicated by 
what follows.   
 
What I propose to do in this section is examine three views of abstract 
entities: as Platonic properties, as Aristotelian properties and as 
propositions.  Before going on, I should explain why I choose not to address 
the view that takes the relevant abstracta to be tropes: I will be raising 
concerns about the suitability of properties that depend on instantiation (a-
properties) to be one of the relata in the intentional relation.  The concerns I 
raise there apply equally to tropes. 
 
2.2.1 Intentionality as a Relation to the Forms 
 
Following (Armstrong, 1997, pp. 108) and (Kriegel, 2011b, pp. 252), we can 
call properties that exist outside of space and time, ante rem, and properties 
that depend on instantiation, properties in re.  The former are what Plato 
calls the forms, and have more recently been invoked by philosophers such 
as Russell (Russell, The World of Universals, 1967/1997) to account for 
similarity (or dissimilarity) between concrete particulars.   
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Several metaphysical/ontological challenges arise for those who posit what I 
will hereafter call Platonic properties—p-properties for short.  Quine is 
notoriously anti-ante rem, so to speak (Quine W.V.O., 1953), as is (Devitt, 
1997).  Both argue against ontological commitment to such things.  Indeed, 
from a physicalist point of view, it would seem that p-properties cannot be 
tolerated. From (Shoemaker, 1997), one might construct an indirect 
argument against p-properties.  Shoemaker notes that observing something 
is one way to be causally affected by it (Shoemaker, 1997).  If we assume that 
some properties are observable—not such a stretch given that observed 
similarities/differences is one of the chief purposes of invoking properties—
then some properties are causal.  However, if properties are p-properties and 
exist outside of space and time, then it is difficult to see how they could exert 
a causal influence in the realm of spatiotemporal concreta.  But I digress; 
what is important here is whether or not p-properties can be one of the 
relata in the intentional relation. 
 
To be sure, the problem of intentional inexistence disappears with the 
positing of p-properties: When I think about unicorns, I bear the thinking-
about relation to the abstract p-property of unicorness, or perhaps the 
abstract properties of horseness and hornedness, or some such. Likewise, 
when I think about the morning star, I bear the thinking-about relation to 
some p-properties; and when I think about the evening star, I bear the 
relation to others.   
 
So far, so good.  However, a number of issues arise here.  First—stemming 
from the argument we adduced on Shoemaker’s behalf just above—the 
causal impotency of p-properties in the spatiotemporal realm would appear 
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to preclude providing a causal theory of intentionality (Kriegel, 2011b).16  
Second, one might reasonably ask what kind of relation intentionality is such 
that it can traverse the divide between the realm of spatiotemporal concreta, 
and Plato’s realm of the forms, a fantastical one to be sure.17  Of course, 
Plato’s own story is that before we take corporeal form (before we are born), 
we are in direct contact with this posited realm, and that our thoughts are 
recollections of the p-properties we encountered there.  However, I am not 
sure whether this would satisfy many current theorists.  For one thing, it is 
patently dualistic.18  For another, it ties the intentional relation essentially to 
memory.  All thoughts turn out to be species of recollection.  Russell’s 
account of how exactly we become acquainted with p-properties is by 
abstraction: 
 
“When we see a white patch, we are acquainted, in the first instance, 
with the particular patch; but by seeing many white patches, we easily 
learn to abstract the whiteness which they all have in common, and in 
learning to do this we are learning to be acquainted with [the universal] 
whiteness (Russell, The World of Universals, 1967/1997, p. 51).”  
 
Of course, Russell was not focused on the same issue I am; but nevertheless, 
it is unclear whether this kind of answer is adequate to account for how 
intentionality relates mental states to p-properties. For one thing, this kind of 
answer seems to require contact with instances of the relevant property.  
And there again, we seem to run into difficulties with properties that are 
                                                        
16 I do not hold a causal theory, but for those who do, p-properties might not be suitable 
candidates for intentional contents.   
17  Mendelovici (2010; MS) raises similar complaints.  Her arguments focus on the 
mysteriousness of saying when two things from different ontological categories belong 
together.   
18 Being dualistic does not necessarily condemn a view.  It is just that contemporary 
philosophical orthodoxy is not dualistic.  Hence a theory that implies dualism would 
undoubtedly enjoy a less than enthusiastic reception.    
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never instantiated, and so are not the kinds of things that we may abstract 
from. 
 
Third, whether I am thinking about unicorns, dogs, tables or chairs, the 
intuitive answer as to what kind of thing I am thinking about is that I am 
thinking about ordinary concrete objects, not abstracta.  As Kriegel notes, 
phenomenologically, these things present themselves in thought as ordinary 
concrete things (Kriegel, 2007, p. 310).  So this view too appears to imply 
fairly widespread error about what we take ourselves to be thinking about.   
 
Fourth, Kriegel explains that on such a view, there emerges a “veil of 
abstracta” over the realm of ordinary concrete objects (Kriegel, 2007).  His 
argument focuses on perception and proceeds in several steps.  First, he 
distinguishes between two models of the relation that holds between 
perceptual experiences and perceptual beliefs: the inference model, and the 
endorsement model.  On the inference model, we infer beliefs about the 
objects of perception from our perceptual experiences.  On the endorsement 
model, “some perceptual beliefs are justified simply by taking at face value 
one’s current perceptual experience” (Kriegel, 2011b, p. 247).  According to 
Kriegel, for most perceptually based beliefs,19 the correct model is the 
endorsement model (Kriegel, 2011b, p. 247).  
 
While Kriegel does not offer much in the way of argument for favouring the 
endorsement model, reasons are not hard to divine.  First, inference requires 
a level of intellectual sophistication that certainly eludes animals, small 
children, and probably some adults.  Hence, the inference model implies that 
the way animals, small children and some adults form perceptually based 
beliefs is different in kind from the way the rest of us do.  Second, inference is 
                                                        
19 Kriegel recognizes certain instances where the inference model is probably better 
equipped: e.g. scientific beliefs about sub-atomic particles, etc.   
  
28 
more temporally expensive than endorsement, and so is rather a hindrance 
both evolutionarily, and in our day-to-day lives: imagine how the inference 
model would account for driving a car.  For most of our perceptually based 
beliefs, such beliefs are acquired by endorsement of our perceptual 
experiences.  
 
The second step is the veil thesis: 
 
“There is a class of entities X1,…,Xn, such that for any perceptual 
experience E and some perceptual belief B, (i) E does not bear an 
epistemically and subjectively relevant intentional relation to a member 
of X1,…,Xn, and (ii) B does bear an intentional relation to a member of X1-
,…,Xn (Kriegel, 2011b, p. 249).”  
 
Kriegel adds that a relation is epistemically irrelevant “if the experience 
would justify the same beliefs even if it did not bear it,” and subjectively 
irrelevant “if the subject could not tell the experience apart from another, 
otherwise similar experience” (Kriegel, 2011b, p. 249).  The problem with the 
veil thesis is that it denies that the objects about which we have perceptually 
based beliefs—the ordinary objects that furnish our surroundings—are the 
same objects that we perceive.  It therefore mandates the inference model: 
we infer our beliefs about the concrete objects around us from the objects we 
perceive, where the former is different from the latter.  This, as Kriegel notes, 
is one of the central concerns for the sense data theory (Kriegel, 2011b, p. 
248).  
 
But notice that the veil of abstracta only arises when the property theory of 
perceptual intentionality is paired with the view that perceptually based 
beliefs are not about the relevant properties.  But why would someone who 
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seeks to account for intentionality in terms of relations to p-properties not 
think that beliefs are such relations?  That is, why would someone construe 
the perception relation as obtaining between perceptions and p-properties, 
but the belief relation as holding between beliefs and the ordinary concrete 
objects that furnish our surroundings? Taking one’s beliefs about tables and 
chairs to actually be beliefs about p-properties is a live option, and one that 
would undermine Kriegel’s argument.  The so-called veil emerges because 
one’s perceptions are of p-properties and one’s perceptually based beliefs are 
not; hence the justification for one’s perceptually based beliefs must be by 
inference, not by endorsement; and that is the wrong model. But the veil 
would not emerge for someone who thinks perceptually based beliefs are 
about p-properties.  
 
Of course, this may be a moot point, since I doubt anyone thinks that one’s 
beliefs about the ordinary objects in her surroundings are actually about p-
properties.  But that alone would count as yet another concern for the p-
property theory of intentionality.  At any rate, if you assume that your 
perceptually based beliefs are beliefs about the ordinary concrete objects in 
your surroundings, and that perception is a relation to p-properties, then the 
veil of abstracta does arise.   
 
To summarize, the view we have been considering is that intentionality is 
relation to p-properties—universals that exist outside of space and time.  
Setting aside whatever metaphysical/ontological issues arise by positing 
such things, there are several reasons why p-properties are not good 
candidates for being that to which we are related by intentionality.  First, the 
causal impotency of non-spatiotemporal entities (e.g. p-properties) would 
seem to preclude giving a causal account of intentionality.   Second, this view 
makes the intentional relation look a bit fantastical—able to cross between 
  
30 
the realm of ordinary spatiotemporal concreta and the realm of the forms.  
Third, the view conflicts with the phenomenality of intentional episodes 
about ordinary concrete objects: such things present themselves in 
experience as ordinary spatiotemporal concreta, not abstracta.  Hence, this 
view too threatens introspective knowledge—probably not something to be 
given up just to allow for our representational contact with the realm of the 
forms.  Fourth, if we assume our perceptually based beliefs are beliefs about 
the ordinary concrete objects in our surroundings, but that perception is a 
relation to p-properties, then Kriegel’s veil of abstracta arises.  On the other 
hand, the alternative to erecting the veil—denying that our perceptually 
based beliefs are about the concrete ordinary objects we think they are, but 
are instead about the very p-properties the perceptions are about—seems 
worse.  It seems fair to say that p-properties are not unproblematic 
candidates for one of the relata in the intentional relation.   
 
 
2.2.2 Intentionality and properties In Re 
 
Properties In Re do not exist outside of space and time, but instead are 
dependent on the concrete objects that instantiate them.  In this sense, they 
are akin to Aristotelian universals; and I will thus henceforth call them a-
properties.  The metaphysical/ontological virtues of a-properties over p-
properties seem obvious.  Metaphysically, because a-properties exist within 
the spatiotemporal realm, their causal efficacy seems less problematic than 
that of p-properties.  Ontologically, we need not posit a distinct realm in 
which to put a-properties; they are already somewhere: here.  Among the 
most well known proponents of a-properties over p-properties is Armstrong 
(Armstrong, 1997, 1997b, 1999).  The question is whether a-properties can 
serve as one of the relata in the intentional relation.  Certainly, the fact that a-
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properties exist in the very things that instantiate them appears to favour 
them as plausible intentional relata.  
 
One concern about the a-property theory of intentionality concerns the 
relation of a-properties to the concrete things that instantiate them.  One 
might reasonably ask whether, if stripped of all its a-properties, the concrete 
particular would remain?  Armstrong calls such a stripped down particular a 
“blob” (Armstrong, 1999, p. 199), and argues against the “blob” view—which 
he claims arises for the p-property view—by having “a thing’s properties as 
constituents of the thing” (Armstrong, 1999, p. 199).  This raises the question 
of whether the concrete objects whose constituents are a-properties are sets 
of a-properties, or sums of a-properties (see Kriegel, 2011b, pp. 257).  I 
realize that there are some tremendously difficult metaphysical questions 
concerning this issue; but again, my focus is on the view that takes a-
properties to be one of the relata in the intentional relation.   Admittedly, on 
either the set or sum view, the intentional relation to the relevant a-
properties gets us to the right object—be it a set or a sum of a-properties. 
However, I agree with Kriegel that the a-property theory should opt for sums 
over sets:  
 
“Given that sets are non-spatial entities,…if…beliefs were intentionally 
related to sets of i-universals [a-properties], they would be intentionally 
related to non-spatial entities” (Kriegel, 2011b, p. 257).20   
 
On the other hand, both the set and sum views appear vulnerable to 
extensions of the arguments for content determinacy found in (Horgan & 
Graham, 2012).  I will not rehearse their arguments here, but will note that if 
                                                        
20 In note 37 (Kriegel, 2011b, pp. 265), Kriegel cites (Van Cleve, 1985).  Van Cleve’s article is 
both forceful and illuminating in its vetting and rejecting of both the set and sum views of 
particulars.   
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certain forms of intentionality can determine that a rabbit-thought is not 
about the set of undetached rabbit parts, then perhaps it can also determine 
that rabbit thoughts are not about sets or sums of rabbit a-properties.   
 
However, my main concern about the a-property theory is that, unlike the p-
property theory, it reintroduces the problem of intentional inexistence—not 
for ordinary concrete objects, but for a-properties. A-properties depend on 
instantiation in a way that p-properties do not. On the a-property view, there 
can be no uninstantiated properties.  However, I can think about unicorns 
even though the property of unicorness is not instantiated, and that appears 
to tell against the view that intentionality is a relation to a-properties.  I have 
already discussed the plausibility of explaining away apparent unicorn-
thoughts in terms of horses and horns, and will not rehearse my concerns 
again.  
 
Perhaps, however, you are unsatisfied about properties such as unicorness 
counting as genuine properties.  That is, perhaps you think that as unicorness 
is not a genuine property, it is not an appropriate example of the 
shortcomings of the a-property theory of intentionality. While I disagree, the 
concern can be raised about other, more conventional properties.  Take 
colors, for instance.  Colors seem to be properties par excellence.  On some 
views of color (see Hardin, 1988; Mendelovici 2010; Boghossian & Velleman, 
1997), color properties are never instantiated and so stand as counter- 
examples to the view that intentionality is a relation to a-properties 
(assuming that we have intentional episodes of color).  However, the example 
need not rest on the truth of color irrealism.  Kriegel (2011b) points to an 
article by Churchland, who discusses experiences of certain “chimerical 
colors” that are not just uninstantiated, but are nomologically impossible 
(Churchland, 2005).  The crucial point is that a-properties depend on 
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instantiation; there are no unistantiated a-properties.  But since I can have 
thoughts, beliefs, perceptual experiences, and so on, of uninstantiated 
properties (e.g. chimerical colors), a-properties seem ill-equipped to be the 
relata of these purported intentional relations.   
 
In summary, there are several worries about the suitability of a-properties to 
serve as relata in the intentional relation.  Positing a-properties involves the 
theorist in taking a stance on the nature of the relation between the a-
properties and the concrete things that have them.  Neither the set, nor the 
sum view of this relation is ideal: The former turns ordinary concrete objects 
into abstracta by identifying them with sets. And both appear to be 
phenomenologically inadequate: When I think about a rabbit, I take myself to 
be thinking about an ordinary concrete object, not a set or a sum of abstract 
(though instantiated) properties.  Finally, and most importantly, the fact that 
the a-properties depend on instantiation raises, once again, the problem of 
intentional inexistence.   
  
2.2.3 Intentionality and Propositions21 
 
In what follows in this section on propositions, I will be assuming that there 
is an intuitive sense in which propositions are distinct from properties, pace 
Lewis (1997, p. 175).22  Once again, my goal here is to examine the suitability 
                                                        
21 I am here concerned with propositions as the things we (our mental states) are related to 
via intentionality. Propositions have been assigned a variety of roles outside of the 
philosophy of mind, but those are not my primary concern here. 
22 If propositions were not distinct from properties—if propositions were, as Lewis 
would have it, properties “instantiated only by entire possible worlds,” (Lewis, 1986, p. 
53)—then on the view under consideration intentionality would be a relation to such 
properties.  But, as Lewis says, propositions, on such a view, would just be the set of 
possible worlds where the proposition is true.  And that means that intentionality is a 
relation to sets of possible worlds, which, according to Lewis, looks to be false: It 
precludes certain de se thoughts on account of failing to discriminate between 
individuals at the same world (Lewis, 1986, pp. 55).   So, though propositions are 
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of propositions to be one of the relata in the intentional relation.  In 
particular, my focus is on whether propositions can serve as the X of the 
intentional relation thought to hold between non-derived intentional states 
and X.  It could turn out that the intentionality of words/sentences, for 
instance, cannot be accounted for without invoking propositions.  But my 
focus is not on words/sentences.   
 
That being said, the first question to ask is whether propositions are concrete 
or abstract. Lewis, though sceptical about the clarity of the concrete/abstract 
distinction, takes possible worlds to be as concrete as the actual world.  But 
as “the objects of thought in general are not sets of possible worlds,” (Lewis, 
1986, pp.55) taking propositions to be concrete in this sense precludes them 
from consideration in the present context.23  Might there be other ways of 
construing propositions to be concrete?  Dummett notes that a subset of 
propositions—the true ones—are sometimes identified with facts (Dummett, 
2006).  If we take a fact to be concrete—as, perhaps, a state of affairs (see 
Wittgenstein, 1922/1961)—then at least some propositions are concrete.24  
The issues here run deep, but this brief sketch of how some propositions (the 
true ones) can be conceived of as concrete leaves precisely half of all 
propositions (the false ones) hanging in the balance. On the other hand, there 
might be a class of propositions that are concrete in virtue of having concreta 
as constituents.  Singular propositions, for instance, might be thought of as 
inheriting concreteness from that of their concrete constituents.  Again, 
however, since not all propositions are singular, not all propositions are 
                                                                                                                                                       
properties on Lewis’ view, they are not generally the objects of thought, since the objects 
of thought are not sets of possible worlds.   
23 Assuming, that is, that Lewis is right.   
24 Although this may conflict with the desideratum that propositions be bearers of 
truth/falsity.  Concrete states of affairs do not seem like the kinds of things capable of truth 
and falsity.   
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concrete in this sense.  In any event, any view that admits of propositions, 
will, it seems, have to allow that some are abstract.   
 
Returning to the question at hand: Is intentionality a relation to 
propositions?  If the answer is an unqualified ‘yes’, then it follows 
straightforwardly that we cannot have sub-propositional intentional states. 
This view, call it propositionalism, seems problematic (see, for instance, 
Montague, 2007).  For one thing, it seems to rule out anything incapable of 
propositional thought from having intentionality.  Small children, certain 
mammals, and so on, will all be incapable of aboutness.   Second, it seems to 
deny that we can merely entertain a thought about X without thinking 
anything in particular about X.   But this kind of thing seems to happen all the 
time.  Sometimes, random thoughts about a person/object just pop in and out 
of my mind, without my thinking anything more about that person or object.  
Just now, I thought to myself ‘Spring’, smiled, and then refocused my 
attention on writing.  Perhaps someone will object that what I actually 
thought to myself was something like ‘spring is coming…great’, hence the 
smile. However, regardless of the plausibility of this particular propositional 
reconstruction, I think the burden of proof is on the propositionalist, if her 
claim is that all such seemingly simple intentional states can be 
reconstructed propositionally.25  
 
What is required here is some account of propositions such that the 
intentionality of some mental states could be a relation to propositions, 
whereas the intentionality of other simpler intentional states need not be.  
This will allow that when I think to myself that spring is finally here I am 
bearing the thinking about relation to the proposition ‘that spring is here’; 
and when I merely think spring, I am bearing the thinking about relation to 
                                                        
25 See (Montague, 2007) for extended discussion on the merits/flaws of propositionalism. 
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something simpler than an entire proposition. An added bonus would be for 
such an account to show how my mere spring thoughts are somehow related 
to my propositional thought that spring is here.  And indeed, the two most 
famous accounts of propositions—the Fregean account and the Russellian 
account—have sought to do that. 
 
Before looking at each, a caveat: My purpose here is to examine whether 
propositions—be they Fregean or Russellian—are unproblematic candidates 
for being one of the relata in the intentional relation.  My characterizations of 
each of their respective views will therefore be partly a function of this 
purpose. That is, if one were to make a list of all the things the Fregean or 
Russellian holds about propositions, only some of those things will be 
relevant to the question ‘are propositions what the intentionality of mental 
states relates us to?'.  Others will undoubtedly be relevant to questions in 
epistemology, the philosophy of language, mathematics, logic etc.  My 
characterization of their respective views will focus on those things I take to 
be relevant to the former question.  
 
Though Fregean propositions are often contrasted with Russellian 
propositions, the two have more in common than the standard juxtaposition 
would seem to imply.26  Both Frege and Russell took propositions to be 
timeless, abstract, unchanging, mind-independent entities that served as the 
objects of the propositional attitudes, and were accessible by multiple 
thinkers at the same time.27 Both also took propositions to be complexes, the 
nature of the simpler parts of which is partly what distinguishes their 
respective views.   
                                                        
26 See (Makin, 2000, pp. 135 – 178) for an excellent chapter on the similarities and 
differences between Russell and Frege.    
27 I am not alone in interpreting Frege and Russell as Platonists in this way.  See, for instance 
(Dummett, 1991, pp. 249-262), (Dummett, 2006, pp. 8 - 12), (Soames, 2014, pp. 25 - 33) 
(Makin, 2000, pp. 139 - 150) 
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For Frege, propositions  (“thoughts”, see Frege, 1997c) are complex sinn, 
made up of simpler sinn.  The proposition ‘that spring is warm’ is made up of 
the sinn of ‘spring’, ‘warm’, and so on, and is itself the sinn of the expression 
‘spring is warm’.  In short, the simpler parts of a propositional sinn are 
themselves sinn (Frege, 1892/1997).  On the other hand, the constituents of 
Russellian propositions could be concrete objects/people, relations, 
properties and so on.28   Notice, however, that both views can accommodate 
sub-propositional intentionality: On Frege’s view, my intentional state as of 
Spring turns out to be a relation to the sinn of Spring, and that very sinn 
figures in the sinn of the proposition ‘that Spring is coming’. On Russell’s view 
my simple Spring-thought bears a relation to the actual season, and that 
actual season is a constituent of the proposition ‘that spring is coming’.   
 
Minimal though this account of the two classical theories of propositions 
undoubtedly is, we have enough here to pose the question I am interested in: 
Could Fregean or Russellian propositions be that to which we are related via 
intentionality?  If propositions are Fregean in the sense that their constituent 
parts are other sinn that—along with the propositions of which they are 
constituents—occupy what Dummett calls a “third realm” (Dummett, 1991), 
then the concerns I raised in the context of discussing the p-property theory 
would seem to arise here as well.   
 
First, it is not entirely clear how items that occupy a distinct ontological 
realm can have a causal influence on the realm of concreta.  Frege’s answer is 
                                                        
28 In what follows, I will do my utmost to avoid directly addressing the problem of the unity 
of the proposition.  What it means to be a constituent of a proposition, and how a 
proposition’s constituents are bound together, are difficult and important questions, but far 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  Where the topic is broached, I will not focus on the merits of 
anyone’s account of unity.  Instead, I will be examining what a particular account of unity 
implies about the suitability of propositions to be one of the relata in the intentional relation.    
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that propositions can have causal effects on the external (to the mind) world 
of concreta in virtue of being grasped by competent cognizers, who then give 
the proposition a causal voice: 
 
“If…I grasp the thought [proposition] we express by the theorem of 
Pythagoras, the consequence may be that I recognize it to be true, and 
further that I apply it in making a decision, which brings about the 
acceleration of masses (Frege, 1918/1997, p. 344)” 
 
This seems fairly intuitive.  But how exactly does the proposition affect the 
cognizer in the first place?  How does grasping a proposition “bring about 
changes in the inner world of the one who grasps it” (Frege, 1918/1997, p. 
345)?  Certainly the cognitive act of grasping the proposition will bring about 
inner changes in the same way that the physical act of grasping my rum will 
bring about inner changes in my arm muscles.  But this is presumably not 
what Frege has in mind:  The fact that it is rum that I grasp, rather than 
vodka, orange juice, or water makes no difference to these internal changes.  I 
take it that what Frege is after here is an account of grasping that makes 
relevant the fact that it is a grasping of Pythagoras’, rather than Fermat’s, 
theorem.  To put things another way, I take it that in addition to the 
properties of the grasping, Frege wants the properties of what is grasped to 
be relevant to the inner changes.  And this seems more problematic since 
propositions and their constituents exist outside of the spatiotemporal realm. 
 
In a similar vein, how does intentionality29 relate concrete mental states to 
entities in the third realm? For Frege, “the thought [proposition]…gets 
                                                        
29 I realize that Frege, and probably Russell, would most likely reject this way of speaking, if 
not the entire line of questioning. Both took propositions to be the primary bearers of 
intentionality, and the act of grasping said propositions is what imbues mental states with 
intentionality.  The intentionality of propositions is conceptually prior to that of mental 
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clothed in the perceptible garb of a sentence, and thereby we are enabled to 
grasp it” (Frege, 1918/1997, p. 328).  I find this clothing metaphor a bit 
cryptic.  Does this make our grasping of a proposition dependent on 
language?  However, just a few pages later, Frege says, “[a]lthough the 
thought [proposition] does not belong with the contents of the thinker’s 
consciousness, there must be something in the consciousness that is aimed at 
the thought [proposition]” (Frege, 1918/1997, p. 340).  While these two 
quotes are not obviously inconsistent, I am not sure whether the grasping 
relation in the former is the same as the aiming relation in the latter.  On a 
plausible interpretation—one on which the two relations are distinct—
Frege’s claim is that we are first able to grasp a proposition via that sentence 
that expresses it.  Then, once the grasping has occurred, our consciousness 
gets appropriately aimed at the relevant proposition. There are probably any 
number of ways this might be developed, but again, my concern here is how 
(or whether) the intentionality of our mental states is a relation to 
propositions.  The worry is that if propositions occupy this third realm, then 
the relation appears a bit mysterious.  The story that propositions are clothed 
in sentences and thereby serve to aim one’s consciousness, is certainly 
coherent, but it does not alleviate much of the mystery.  
 
On the other hand, though Russellian propositions also occupy a third realm, 
they can have concrete things as constituents: 
 
“…[I]n spite of all its snowfields Mont Blanc is a component of what is 
actually asserted in the proposition ‘Mont Blanc is more than 4,000 
                                                                                                                                                       
states, or particular acts of grasping/acquainting  (see Soames, 2014, pp. 33).  But this, 
according to Soames, is precisely the source of the so called problem of the unity of the 
propositon.  Roughly: You cannot get unity without the act of unifying—an act that we 
perform (by predicating, or some such).  But this is precisely the answer that an account that 
takes propositonal intentionality (and therefore unity) to be conceptually prior to the 
cognitive acts of grasping cannot give.  We (or our cognitive acts) unify propositions 
(Soames, 2014).    
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meters high’.  We do not assert the thought, for this is a private 
psychological matter: we assert the object of the thought, and this is, to 
my mind, a certain complex (an objective proposition, one might say) in 
which Mont Blanc is itself a component part” (Russell, 1904/1988, p. 57).   
 
Again, what I am interested in here is whether propositions can be that to 
which we are related via intentionality.  The main concern about Fregean 
propositions is that it is a bit mysterious how abstract entities composed of 
other abstract entities, all of which exist in a third realm, can play this role: 
how does intentionality relate concrete mental states to these kinds of 
propositions.  On the other hand, because Russellian propositions can take 
concrete things as constituents, the relation might seem initially more 
plausible: intentionality might be a relation between concrete mental states 
and abstracta, but these abstracta can have concreta as constituents.  
However, it is this very feature of Russellian propositions that raises some 
concerns in the present context.  
 
One question that arises for Russellian propositions is whether they can 
adequately cope with intentional inexistence.  How can a term for something 
non-existent contribute what it is supposed to—namely, the thing itself—to 
the proposition in which it occurs?  Russell’s view appears to change 
significantly between 1903 and 1905:30 
 
“Whatever may be an object of thought, or may occur in any true or false 
proposition, or can be counted as one, I call a term…I shall use as 
synonymous with it the words unit, individual, and entity.  The first two 
emphasize the fact that every term is one, while the third is derived from 
the fact that every term has being, i.e. is in some sense.  A man, a 
                                                        
30 Principles of Mathematics was originally published in 1903, and On Denoting in 1905. 
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moment, a number, a class, a relation, a chimera, or anything else that 
can be mentioned, is sure to be a term…” (Russell, 1903/1996, p. 43). 
 
After distinguishing two kinds of terms, things and concepts, Russell 
continues: 
 
“Points, instants, bits of matter, particular states of mind, and particular 
existents generally, are things, and so are many terms which do not exist, 
for example,…the pseudo-existents of a novel” (Russell, 1903/1996, p. 
45). 
 
This suggests that Russell endorsed a kind of Meinongianism (see Quine, 
1966) at the time (i.e. in 1903), and that his views shifted significantly by 
1905.31  If this is the correct interpretation of (early) Russell, then his answer 
to the problem of intentional existence would be to deny 1) below. 
 
1) I can think about things that do not exist. 
2) I cannot be related to something that does not exist. 
3) Thinking about something = being related to it. 
 
Again, we are assuming that Russellian propositions take terms (in the sense 
above) as constituents.   Therefore, if intentionality is a relation to 
propositions, and propositions have terms as constituents, then 
intentionality is also a relation to the terms of a proposition.  If I think to 
myself that chimeras are green, then I bear an intentional relation to 
chimeras. (Early) Russell’s (and Meinong’s) solution to this is to deny that 
chimeras do not exist, and therefore deny 1).  While this is a possibility we 
did not consider in the section on intentional inexistence, the problems with 
                                                        
31 However, see Makin (2000, pp. 52 – 57) for arguments to the contrary.   
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such a view have been well documented (by Russell himself, see Russell, 
1905/2008).  I will not rehearse these here, as they focus mainly on the 
ontological/logical problems that follow from countenancing such things, and 
my concern is what sorts of things intentionality relates us to.  Instead, I will 
simply note that on such a line, intentionality appears to be a rather 
fantastical relation: in one instance it relates us to quite ordinary things 
(propositional constituents) such as people, and in the other it relates us to 
quite extraordinary things like chimeras. At the very least, that seems like a 
rather unusual kind of relation.   
 
In any event, the theory of descriptions that first emerges in (Russell, 
1905/2008), changes tack (Makin, 2000, ch. 3 notwithstanding) on the 
existence of chimeras, unicorns and the like.  Perhaps from a semantics of 
natural language point of view the theory of descriptions appears promising, 
from a phenomenological point of view, it appears less so.  When I think 
about Pegasus, my thoughts appear to be about the concrete, flesh and blood 
(though non-existent) Pegasus.  What they do not seem to be about are 
descriptions.  I certainly do not intend this to be an argument against 
Russell’s theory of descriptions.  My point is merely that if intentionality is a 
relation to Russellian propositions, and if the occurrence of ‘Pegasus’ in such 
propositions is to be analysed away by the theory of descriptions, then this 
account of intentionality appears phenomenologically inadequate.   
 
Finally, I want to discuss a feature of Russellian propositions that I find 
troubling in the present context of trying to find the right relatum in the 
intentionality relation.  However, to bring out the concern I cannot avoid 
broaching the issue of the unity of the proposition.  Soames (2010, pp. 11-
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32)32 notwithstanding, the problem of the unity of the proposition is the 
problem of saying how the constituents that make up a proposition manage 
to adhere together, and thereby make it a proposition at all.  For Frege, the 
glue that binds the constituent sinn into a cohesive complex sinn 
(thought/proposition) is the saturation, or lack thereof, of the constituent 
sinn (Frege, 1892/1997).  It is the unsaturatedness of certain sinn that draw 
the saturatedness of other sinn towards them, therefore binding the 
proposition. 33   For Russell, the relation indicated by the verb binds 
propositions: 
 
“Consider, for example, the proposition “A differs from B”.  The 
constituents of this proposition, if we analyze it, appear to be only A, 
difference, B.  Yet these constituents, thus placed side by side, do not 
reconstitute the proposition.  The difference which occurs in the 
proposition actually relates A and B, whereas the difference after analysis 
is a notion which has no connection with A and B…A proposition, in fact, is 
essentially a unity, and when analysis has destroyed the unity, no 
enumeration of constituents will restore the proposition…The verb, when 
used as a verb embodies the unity of the proposition…” (Russell, 
1903/1996, pp. 49-50).   
 
Along with King, (King, 2007, p. 23), I take this passage to indicate that the 
relation that the verb contributes to the proposition is what does all the 
work.  Remember that on the Russellian view, the constituents of the 
proposition ‘Mount Gugu differs from Mount Kilimanjaro’ are the actual 
                                                        
32 See n. 28 above.  In fact, I take Soames’ point to be that there is a deeper source of the 
problem of unity, not that the problem of unity is not the real problem.   
33 Please excuse my rather crude explication of Frege here.  I have always thought of the 
binding of saturated and unsaturated sinn to be a process similar to the osmotic activity of 
roots.  When the amount of mineral salts in the roots of plants is less than that of the 
surrounding soil, the roots draw in the water containing the salts.   
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mountains and the actual relation of difference that holds between them.  It is 
this relation that unifies Gugu with Kilimanjaro into the proposition ‘Mount 
Gugu differs from Mount Kilimanjaro’.  King has his own concerns with 
Russell’s account, the most pressing of which is that this appears to collapse 
the distinction between propositions and the facts that make them true, 
which in turn, makes problems for the possibility of false propositions (see 
King, 2007, p. 23).  
 
My concern is different.  Recall that the question I am concerned with is 
whether Russellian propositions can be that to which we are related via 
intentionality.  This detour into Russell’s account of the unity of the 
proposition has shown that what makes a proposition a proposition—i.e. 
what unifies its constituents so as to form the proposition—is the relation 
that the verb contributes. If propositions are the things to which we are 
related via intentionality, then what makes something a proposition, what 
unifies its parts into a whole, is extremely important.  For Russell, what 
makes ‘Mount Gugu differs from Mount Kilimanjaro’ a proposition is the 
relation that holds between Mount Gugu and Mount Kilimanjaro—the 
relation that the verb ‘differs’ contributes to the proposition.  And that is 
what gives me pause.  A relation that holds between two things on the other 
side of the world makes the proposition ‘Mount Gugu differs from Mount 
Kilimanjaro’ a possible relatum of my intentional mental states.  How can a 
relation between two things on the other side of the world have this kind of 
effect on what I am intentionally related to?  At least on a view like Frege’s, 
where it is the (unsaturated) sinn of ‘differs’ that creates the proposition that 
acts as the relata of my intentional state, I need only grasp the proposition’s 
constituent sinn.  But on Russell’s view, the relation indicated by the verb 
‘differs’ unifies the proposition by relating its other constituents, namely 
Gugu and Kilimanjaro.  But how can such a relation accomplish this; how 
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does a relation that holds between two things on the other side of the world 
make possible my thinking the proposition ‘Mount Gugu differs from Mount 
Kilimanjaro’?  To put things another way, if Gugu and Kilimanjaro do not 
stand in the difference relation, then there is no proposition, and it therefore 
cannot be that to which I am intentionally related.       
 
To summarize, the view we have been considering is whether propositions 
can be that to which we are related via intentionality.  After pointing out that 
what Montague calls propositionalism (Montague, Against Propositionalism, 
2007), seems too exclusive for an exhaustive theory of intentionality, we 
examined both the Fregean and the Russellian views of propositions.  As 
occupants of what Dummett calls the third realm, Fregean propositions faced 
similar challenges to the p-properties view discussed in section 2.2.1.: How 
can items that occupy a distinct ontological domain have a causal influence 
on the realm of concreta?  Frege’s answer is that they can have such influence 
in virtue of the causal input of competent cognizers/graspers.  But this raised 
the question of how exactly the propositions affect the cognizers in the first 
place, and whether the changes in the “inner world” of those who grasp the 
relevant propositions would be the kind of changes Frege is after (see p. 37 
above).  We also raised some concerns about how intentionality could make 
contact with this third realm, and suggested that the idea that propositions 
get clothed in sentences does not help resolve the mysteriousness of the 
view.  Prima facie, Russellian propositions seem less mysterious candidates 
for relata of the intentional relation on the count of (sometimes) having 
concreta as constituents.  We raised the problem of intentional inexistence 
for the constituents of Russellian propositions, and noted that both of 
Russell’s solutions—Meinongianism and the theory of descriptions—were 
not without difficulties, though for different reasons.  Finally, I suggested that 
Russell’s account of the unity of the proposition makes propositions less than 
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ideal candidates for that to which we are related via intentionality (see p. 42 
above).   
 
To be sure, I have not provided any knock down arguments against the 
possibility of Fregean or Russellian propositions being that to which we are 
related via intentionality.  What I have tried to do is to explain that on the two 
most prominent views of propositions, propositions are not unproblematic 
candidates for playing this role. 
  
2.3 Hybrid views 
 
What I have considered so far are cases where the intentional relation relates 
us to one sort of thing, or another (but not both).  I have not considered 
hybrid views, on which intentionality is sometimes a relation to, for instance, 
ordinary concrete objects, and other times, abstracta such as properties or 
propositions.  The Impure DR-relation view, mentioned above (section 2.1.4), 
would count as one such view.  Briefly, on the most encompassing hybrid 
view, my Sibyll-thoughts bear the intentional relation to my flesh-blood 
Pyrenees, my square-root-of-pi thoughts bear the intentional relation to an 
abstract number, my belief that spring is right around the corner to a 
Russellian proposition, and my belief that unicorns have horns to a Fregean 
proposition. Undoubtedly, this is the most pretheoretically plausible relation 
view: Pretheoretically, it seems like I can indeed bear the thinking about 
relation to all sorts of things, such as numbers, properties, propositions, and 
so on.  However, one wonders how to decide when intentionality is relating 
us to one sort of thing and when it is relating us to another.  Obviously, there 
will be unproblematic cases, such as when I am thinking about my left hand, 
and when I am thinking about the lowest prime number.  But to handle cases 
of intentional inexistence, representation under an aspect/description, and 
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so on, by arbitrarily stipulating that such cases are all ones where the 
intentional relation is a relation to some entity of an ontological category that 
can countenance such things, seems a bit like a cheat.   
 
More importantly, one wonders whether a single relation can play all these 
roles.  Causation, for instance, appears only to hold between entities of the 
same ontological category.  Being taller than also appears incapable of 
relating something concrete to something abstract.  Perhaps there is a class 
of relations that can traverse the divide between ontological categories, such 
as relations to numbers.  If x is an ordinary concrete object, then it seems 
inoffensive to say that x bears a relation to an abstract object—namely the 
number corresponding to its mass. However, the central concern here is not 
the possibility of there being relations between entities of different 
ontological categories—though, as the previous few sections point out, this 
may indeed be problematic—but the possibility that a single relation could 
hold between a mental state and a p-property in one instance, an a-property 
in another, a proposition in another, and so on, seems like a lot of work for 
said relation. Perhaps intentionality is a unique relation that can play all 
these roles.  I have not considered such a view, and I think that for someone 
genuinely intent on providing a hybrid view, this is probably the best option.  
On the other hand, for someone intent on one of the views we have already 
considered, I think the most plausible option is a Fregean type view.  At least 
on such a view intentionality is a univocal relation in the sense that it is 
always a relation to one ontological realm—namely the realm of sinn.   
 
At this point, a brief summary is in order.  We began by noting that if 
intentionality is a relation, then two questions emerge: 1) What kinds of 
things does intentionality relate us to, 2) What kind of relation is 
intentionality.  This chapter has focused on 1). I do not pretend to have 
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proven or disproven anything.  Rather, what I take myself as having 
accomplished is raising concerns that arise for many of the most popular 
answers to 1).  I have examined some concerns that crop up for views that 
take intentionality to be a relation to ordinary objects—these stemming 
mainly from problems about intentional inexistence.  I have also mentioned 
some worries for views that take intentionality to be a relation to 
properties—be they Platonic or Aristotelian.  I considered the possibility that 
propositions, whether Fregean or Russellian, are one of the relata in the 
intentional relation, and found some difficulties with both construals.  Finally, 
I considered the possibility of providing a hybrid view, but noted that such a 
view demands quite a lot of a single relation.   
 
In the end, many of the concerns I raised for the various views I considered 
revolved around the slightly mysterious nature of the relation that would be 
required to relate mental states to the favoured entity, or entities.  I thus set 
aside the issue what kinds of things intentionality relates us to, and focus 
instead on the nature of the intentional relation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
49 
Chapter 3: The Intentional Relation 
 
At this point, I propose to set to one side the issue of what kinds of things we 
are related to via intentionality, and look instead at several attempts to 
specify the intentional relation.  The goal, once again, is to raise some 
concerns about the relational view. I mentioned earlier that if we assume the 
relation view, then two questions emerge: 1) What sorts of things does 
intentionality relate us to, and 2) how exactly are we to understand the 
intentional relation? The former was the focus of the preceding chapter.  The 
latter is the focus of the present chapter.  The idea is that if there are 
concerns about the leading answers to both questions, then it might be 
worthwhile to look into alternatives to the view that prompted both 
questions—namely the relational view of intentionality.    
 
To the extent that the following various accounts avail themselves of 
everyday or abstract objects, the worries I raised in the last chapter apply 
here.  In what follows, I examine several leading views of the intentional 
relation, and raise familiar, sometimes perennial, problems that crop up for 
each.  None of the concerns I raise are intended to be conclusive refutations. 
Instead, I want simply to rehash some old complaints and raise a new one 
here and there.  My goal is to remind the reader of some concerns regarding 
the views under consideration, in the hopes of motivating an alternative 
thesis that I will examine in Part 2. 
 
By far the most popular and widespread relation views are tracking based 
accounts, e.g. (Dretske, 1981), (Dretske, 1997), (Fodor, 1992), (Millikan, 
Biosemantics, 2002).  Though they differ in the details, all share some basic 
features.  First, and most obviously, all take intentionality to be a kind of 
tracking relation, where tracking is something like keeping track of or 
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indicating something.34  Second, most aim at providing a naturalistic account 
of intentionality. While different theorists have different views about what 
naturalism amounts to, some common criteria include the requirement that 
intentionality be the kind of thing that could be had by a purely physical 
entity; and that no semantic/intentional terms be invoked in the analysis.35  
Third, with few exceptions, e.g. (Millikan, 2002), the majority of tracking 
views take causation to figure centrally in tracking.   
 
3.1 Causal Based Tracking Theories: 
 
The initial impetus for causal based tracking theories can be traced back to 
Dennis Stampe (Stampe, 1977).  Stampe considers a case of photographic 
representation.  Why, asks Stampe, is a picture of one identical twin a 
representation of that particular twin and not her sibling?  Resemblance 
cannot help us here: the twins are identical in appearance. According to 
Stampe, the reason is that one twin figures in the causal history of the 
picture, whereas the other does not.  Causation, it appears, plays a central 
role in the representation relation.   
 
We might thus construct a crude theory36 of intentionality based on Stampe’s 
observation: Mental state type, M, is about some external world item, X, 
because tokens of X cause tokens of M.  Let us assume that M is the mental 
representation, concept, or mental picture of a dog; and X is a dog, the 
property of being a dog, or etc.  The reason, according to this crude theory, 
that M is about dogs is that dogs (or the property of being a dog) cause it. 
However, the above view suffers from a well-known defect, and looking at 
                                                        
34 A compass tracks magnetic north, radar tracks flying objects, and thermometers track the 
temperature in the room. 
35 This one is especially evident in (Fodor, 1988, ch. 4).   
36 A “crude causal theory” in Fodor’s parlance (see Fodor, 1988). 
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how various theorists have sought to rectify it will help further sort causal-
based tracking theories.   
 
The defect is this: There are all sorts of things that can cause me to have 
thoughts about dogs.37 Blows to the head, hallucinogenic drugs, coyotes and 
veterinarians numbers on caller ID can all cause me to have dog-thoughts.  
Thus, according to this simple theory, my dog-thoughts are not just about 
dogs, but also about blows to the head, hallucinogenic drugs, coyotes and 
caller IDs.  Moreover, the theory would seem to preclude the possibility of 
misrepresentation: How can I possibly get things wrong if everything that 
causes a particular thought in me counts among the items in the thought’s 
extension (Fodor, 1988)?38 Causation seems insufficient to distinguish the 
kinds of causes that count as the contents of our dog-thoughts from those 
that do not.  What is needed here is some principle whereby we can sort 
content fixing causes (hereafter content causes) from other causes—a 
theoretical supplementation that allows us to rule out bad causes, and say in 
such cases that one is misrepresenting. 
  
3.2 Normal Conditions: 
 
One such attempt to supplement the causal relation is to specify conditions 
under which X causing M would suffice for M’s being about/meaning X, and 
holding that these conditions are “normal”.  Here too, Stampe (1977, sect. 8) 
seems to be among the first to invoke such conditions within the context of a 
causal theory.39,40 If, for instance, we want to specify the normal conditions 
                                                        
37 I use ‘thought’ here fairly loosely.  E.g. I count tokening the mental symbol/concept DOG as 
a dog thought.   
38 This is a very cursory explanation of what Fodor calls the disjunction problem, but a great 
deal will be said about it in what follows.   
39 Stampe calls them “fidelity conditions”. 
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under which we represent horses accurately, we would look at the occasions 
in which horses cause us to have horse-thoughts and specify the conditions 
that obtain in those occasions as normal. Then, when something other than 
horses causes us to have horse thoughts, we would find that one or more of 
the conditions that we have dubbed normal failed to obtain, provided our list 
of normal conditions was good.  Hence, though a cow on a dark night can 
sometimes cause a horse thought, the fact that the normal conditions failed to 
obtain allows us to rule out cow from the content of our horse thought, thus 
delivering a verdict of misrepresentation in such instances.  
 
With respect to intentionality, the normal conditions can be things such as 
proper lighting, an unobscured view, the absence of an evil genius 
manipulating your neurons, etc.  To use our previous example, your dog 
thoughts are about dogs because, under normal conditions, dogs cause them. 
The intentionality of your dog thoughts is explicated in terms of the causal 
relation that holds between your representing a dog and the presence of dogs 
under normal conditions. 
 
3.3 Objections and Responses 
 
3.3.1 A Worry About Too Long a List 
 
First, there is a general worry about how to specify all the normal conditions, 
and what such a list would look like.  Recall that it is these normal conditions 
that are supposed to do the work of weeding out bad causes from content 
causes so as to allow for misrepresentation.  So, with every possible bad-
cause, the list of normal conditions would need to include, or be expanded to 
                                                                                                                                                       
40 Color theorists, in the realist camp, often appeal to such conditions as well (see, for 
instance, Tye, 2002). 
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include, some condition—deemed normal—that failed to obtain.  The idea 
here is that the list of normal conditions would not just specify good lighting, 
proper distance, etc.  It would also have to include that the representer is not 
wearing obscuring lenses, is not under the influence of psychedelic drugs, is 
not seeing a distorted reflection, is not subject to the experiments of an evil 
genius, is not color-blind, is not pathologically obsessed with seeing cows so 
as to be suffering from some sort of perceptual self-deception, etc.   
 
3.3.2 The Distinction Between Normal Conditions and Content  
 
Another concern here comes from Fodor (1992, pp. 42 - 43), who asks what 
exactly keeps the proposed normal conditions from being part of the content, 
rather than mere determinants thereof.   That is, if my dog thoughts are about 
dogs because under normal conditions dogs cause them, then what makes 
the content of my dog thoughts dogs rather than dogs-under-normal-
conditions?  
 
3.3.3 Do Non-Existents Have Causal Powers? 
 
Fourth, recall that the normal conditions line is still a causal theory. There is 
thus a question about what to say about things that do not exist. I can have 
thoughts about thestrals, dragons, Penrose triangles and Golden Mountains. 
With respect to mere non-existent things, an appeal to counterfactuals might 
help here: I can represent or misrepresent thestrals because at the nearest 
possible world where thestrals exist, the normal conditions for the tokening 
of thestral-thoughts would be thus and so. However, it is not immediately 
clear how this line would work for impossible objects/properties.  Is there 
some possible world wherein Penrose triangles and round squares are 
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instantiated such that we could glean the normal conditions for the tokening 
of the relevant thoughts (see Kriegel, 2011, p. 138)?  
 
3.3.5 An Unnatural Worry 
 
A fifth, more technical objection comes from Fodor (1992, p. 44), who argues 
that there is a strong teleological factor underpinning normal condition 
accounts.  Writes Fodor: 
 
Thermometers are OK; given normalcy conditions…the nomic covariance 
between the length of the column and the temperature of the ambient air 
determines what the device represents.  Violate the normalcy conditions 
and, intuition reports, you get wild readings; i.e., misrepresentations of 
the temperature.  But, of course, thermometers are for measuring 
something, and precisely what they’re for measuring…is what the present 
analysis treats as a causal (rather than a normalcy) condition.  Compare, 
by way of contrast, the diameter of the coin in my pocket.  Fix my body 
temperature and it covaries with the temperature of the ambient air; fix 
the temperature of the ambient air, and it covaries with temperature of 
my body.  I see no grounds for saying that one of these things is what 
really represents and the other is a normalcy condition (1992, p. 44).   
 
According to Fodor, what accounts for the difference in the two cases, is that 
in the case of the thermometer, we have a sense of what it is for.  And since 
“being “for” something is surely a matter of being intended for something 
(Fodor, 1992, p. 43)”, the normal conditions line seems to be smuggling in the 
intentional, pace naturalism.  However, if you find yourself within the 
naturalist-causal-tracking camp, then the thing to do here would be to specify 
some naturalistically kosher form of teleology.   
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3.3.6 Intentional Perfection 
 
All that being said, the most pressing concern for the normal conditions line 
is that it deems it impossible to misrepresent when conditions are normal.  
That is, if all the normal conditions obtain, then we cannot misrepresent. 
With respect to this point, I direct the reader to Mendelovici (2010, pp. 28 – 
38, MS).  I will not rehearse her entire argument here, but I will note that 
there are several plausible examples (e.g. color and pain representation) 
where we consistently, and reliably, misrepresent things.  And while some of 
these cases might be ones where normal conditions fail to obtain, it does not 
seem likely they all are.  Otherwise, in virtue of what should we say that the 
conditions that always fail to obtain in these problematic cases are normal?  
That is, if the normal conditions that are required for accurate color/pain 
representations never obtain, then in what sense are they normal? See also 
(Mendelovici, 2013), who argues that the mere possibility of cases of reliable 
misrepresentation is problematic for tracking theories such as the normal 
conditions view. 
 
3.4 Teleology: Evolution and Education  
 
A second41 way to supplement the causal relation is by appeal to teleology.  
Again, what I have to say here pertains to causal-teleological theories (e.g. 
Dretske, , 1981, 1997).  Millikan’s (Millikan, Biosemantics, 2002) non-causal 
teleological view will be addressed later. While causal teleological theories 
are varied, at the core of most is some common ground.  Recall our initial 
                                                        
41 I say second here, but a normal conditions advocate might specify the normal 
teleologically: The normal conditions are those that instantiate a design conditions type—
where design conditions are those under which a particular causal-intentional relation was 
selected for by natural selection.   
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crude causal theory: intentional states track (viz. are about) their causes.  
This turned out to be problematic because causation alone is insufficient to 
distinguish between content causes, and other causes.  Whereas the normal 
conditions advocate contended that my dog-thoughts are about dogs (rather 
than convincing dog statues) because, under normal conditions, they are 
caused by dogs, the teleological theorist contends that my dog-thoughts are 
about dogs because it is their job to track, indicate, or provide information 
about dogs.  To be as straightforward as possible, the question is: Given that 
intentionality is a causal relation, how do we sort out good causes from bad 
ones?  The teleological theorist says that the good causes are those that occur 
when the thing doing the representing is functioning properly.  The causal 
relation is supplemented by an appeal to proper functioning.  The challenge 
now is to say in virtue of what a particular representation has the particular 
job/function it does: Why is it my dog thoughts’ job to be about, track, 
indicate or carry information about dogs?   
 
3.4.1 Natural Selection 
 
One prominent answer here is that natural selection determines what job a 
particular representation has.  For example, a rabbit’s dog-thoughts have the 
job of tracking dogs because it was this function that helped its ancestors 
survive and reproduce.  That is, nature favored those rabbits whose dog 
thoughts preformed this function.   
 
3.4.2 Which Cause? 
 
A set of related concerns here stem from the fact that natural selection does 
not appear to deliver the kind of content determinacy we might want for our 
theory of intentionality.  For instance, it seems perfectly plausible that 
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rabbits whose dog thoughts were caused by not only dogs, but also wolves, 
wolverines, etc., would have been equally favoured by the forces of evolution.  
In which case, the function of a rabbit’s dog thoughts (as determined by 
natural selection) would be to track not only dogs, but also all these other 
dog-looking creatures.   
 
Relatedly, for any causal relation between a dog and a dog thought, there is a 
host of intermediaries in the causal chain.  In the case of vision, light reflected 
off the dog must stimulate the rabbit’s retina, and so on.  In olfaction, scent 
particles must travel from the dog through the air and be received and 
processed by the rabbit’s olfactory system.  The problem is that any selection 
for dog caused dog-thoughts is equally a selection for these causal 
intermediaries. So natural selection appears inadequate to determine that 
the function of a dog thought is to track dogs rather than reflected light, scent 
particles, etc.  Moreover, natural selection would seem to favour the set of 
undetached dog partsdog thought connection every bit as much as the 
dogdog thought connection, so there might be an additional worry about 
determinacy here.42 
 
3.4.3 Naturally Selecting Error 
 
A similar concern involves the possibility of naturally selecting for error. 
Imagine that a small subset of the early humanoids were visually constituted 
such that upon encountering berries that others would see as red and ripe, 
they see the berries a sickly yellow color—quite unappetizing.  As hunter-
gatherers, berries figure importantly in the diet of early humanoids.  Now 
imagine that due to some rare climatic conditions, one particular species of 
                                                        
42For extended arguments that only a particular kind of intentionality (or a particular point 
of view on a given content) can deliver determinacy, in the above sense, see (Searle, 1987), 
(Horgan & Graham, 2012). 
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plant, whose red berries are highly toxic, has proliferated and outcompeted 
its evolutionary rivals. In this case, it seems as though evolution would favour 
the misrepresenters. 
 
3.5 Learning 
 
Another influential answer to the question of what makes something the 
function of a representation is Dretske’s learning model (Dretske, 1981).   
 
In teaching someone the concept red, we show the pupil variously colored 
objects at reasonably close range and under normal illumination.  That is, 
we exhibit the colored objects under conditions in which information 
about their color is transmitted…This is why we cannot teach someone 
the colors if we put the objects 400 yards away…This is why we do not 
carry out such training in the dark, or under abnormal illumination…In the 
learning situation special care is taken to see that the incoming signals 
have an intensity, a strength, sufficient unto delivering the required piece 
of information to the learning subject.  If the lights are too dim, they are 
turned up.  If the objects…are too far away, they are brought closer.  If the 
subject needs his glasses, they are provided (1981, pp. 194-195). 
 
According to this model, an M thought has the function of indicating Ms 
because of a learning period wherein the representer is trained to token M-
thoughts in M instances.  The crucial part here is that during the learning 
period, a teacher ensures that the causal correlation of M thoughts to Ms in 
the fledgling representer becomes increasingly robust by ensuring optimal 
conditions obtain during the learning period.   
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3.5.1 Normal Conditions Again? 
 
One worry about this account is its seeming reliance on normal conditions.  It 
is the teacher’s job to ensure that e.g. the lighting is good and the relevant 
objects are not too far way, etc.  If these teacher-insured normal conditions 
do any theoretical lifting, worries similar to the ones raised above (about 
normal conditions) apply.  One worry was that the list of normal conditions 
would turn out to be rather long, and this would mean a lot of work on the 
part of the teacher—ensuring all conditions are met during the learning 
process.  Fodor’s concerns (1992, pp. 42 - 44) about finding some principled 
means of excluding the set of normal conditions from the content of a given 
representation (sect. 3.3.3 above), and about finding some non-arbitrary 
means of saying what counts as the normal condition versus the content 
(sect. 3.3.5 above) apply here too. Moreover, the learning model would need 
to say something about how we come to have concepts with no worldly 
extension.  For instance, how exactly do we determine the normal conditions 
for the correct learning of the concept dragon?   
 
3.5.2 A Worry About Naturalism 
 
Relatedly, one might ask how the teacher goes about determining what 
conditions are optimal for learning a particular concept. That is, why would 
the teacher think that a particular lighting condition would be most 
conducive to producing content causes of red thoughts?  Presumably, the 
teacher surveys the conditions under which s/he has red caused red 
thoughts and duplicates them for the student. The problem here is that this 
move appears to put things backwards. Rather than getting representations 
from normal conditions, we are constructing normal conditions from 
representations. What was sought here was a naturalistic theory of 
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intentionality/representation—a theory that explained the target 
phenomenon without appeal to semantic/intentional terms.  The hope was 
that by invoking the notion of the function of a representation, and having 
this function be determined by a learning period in which a teacher ensures 
the conditions are conducive to learning a particular concept, we could sort 
out genuine content causes from misrepresentations.  The problem, however, 
is that the conducive conditions appealed to in our explanation are derived 
from the representations of the teacher, and so we have not done away with 
semantic/intentional terms after all.  
 
3.5.3 A Worry About Intentional Smuggling 
 
In a similar vein, Fodor too charges this account with smuggling in 
intentional items (Fodor, 1992, pp. 41-42). Fodor’s objection runs thus:  
Assume the learning period is over, and the new graduate tokens a dog 
thought as a result of encountering a fox.  Given that the learning period has 
established a law-like connection between dogs and dog thoughts, and this 
instance is one that fails to instantiate the law, we have a case of 
misrepresentation: the new graduate has mistaken a fox for a dog.  So far, so 
good.  However, given that a fox caused a dog thought at time T (where T=the 
moment after graduation), it seems likely that it would have caused the same 
thought at time T-1 (i.e. right before graduation).  But then what licenses our 
classifying this event as a misrepresentation?  That is, if a fox would have 
caused a dog thought during the learning period, why is the content of a dog 
thought dog rather than (dog or fox)?   
 
One response here, on behalf of the causal teleological theorist, is that had 
this event occurred during the learning period, the teacher would have 
corrected the student.  But such a response is not open to the naturalist: As 
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mentioned above, Fodor’s point about invoking the intentions of the teacher 
as an essential part of the explanation of how representations get their 
content appears to apply.  
 
3.5.4 Evolution as an Inappropriate Tool 
 
While highly implausible, someone determined on the learning model might 
argue that rather than relying on his/her own representations in order to 
glean the conditions most conducive to learning, the teacher actually gets 
these conditions by appeal to something like design conditions.43  On this 
line, the teacher tries to replicate the conditions under which a particular 
causal-intentional relation was selected for by natural selection.   
 
Or, as in the case with Dretske’s later work (see Dretske, 1997, p. ch.1), we 
might dispense with the notion of a teacher, allowing that there is a perfectly 
clear sense in which being designed for (i.e. designed to indicate, represent) 
does not imply a designer.  In other words, perhaps evolution alone can do 
the job of determining the function of X.  Dretske seems to think so, at least 
with respect to what he calls “natural representation” (1997, pp. 7-8).  For 
Dretske, the senses, for instance “…have information-providing functions, 
biological functions, they derive from their evolutionary history (1997, p. 7).” 
Evolution has imbued the senses with the function of carrying information to 
the organism whose senses they are. Olfaction, for instance, has the function 
of carrying chemical information about the environment in which an 
organism finds itself.   
 
The worry here is an extension of those I raised in the context of natural 
selection theories.  Because natural selection can confer a survival advantage 
                                                        
43 This is not, of course, Dretske’s view.  I am merely trying to tick off the possibilities.   
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on misrepresenters, it can likewise determine that the design conditions are 
those under which the misrepresentation takes place.  To use our previous 
example, the design conditions under which our ancestors were caused to 
have their cougar thoughts may be precisely those conditions under which 
they were caused to have cougar thoughts by bears on dark nights.  So, 
design conditions may be ill equipped to establish the law-like correlation 
between cougar thoughts and cougars required.  Again, there are probably a 
whole host of possible responses here, and I cannot hope to address them all. 
 
However, abstracting a bit, we might say that evolution, as a system designer, 
does not carve out the evolutionary history of an organism along semantic 
lines such as satisfaction, accuracy, or truth; it is blind to failures such as 
misrepresentation and falsity.  Evolution is a process concerned solely with 
continuation and adaptation.  If getting things representationally wrong 
ensures the continuation of a species, then evolution rewards falsity.  I am 
not saying that we could not construct a theory that takes evolutionary 
success as the mark of veracity, but such a theory would imply a pseudo-
Machiavellian semantics—taking evolutionary success as the only 
justification for our attributions of truth, falsity, accuracy, etc.  And I doubt 
that any of the theories under discussion would endorse such a move.  The 
point, to repeat, is that evolution seems like a tool better equipped to reward 
adaptability than veracity.   
 
3.6 Asymmetric Dependence 
 
A third and widely discussed proposal for supplementing the causal theory is 
asymmetric dependence (Fodor, 1992, 1988).  Importantly, asymmetric 
dependence represents a departure from the accounts we have so far 
considered.  While the previous theories tended to look for what goes wrong 
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in cases of misrepresentation—e.g. the conditions weren’t right for good 
causings, or there was a malfunctioning—asymmetric dependence focuses on 
the relationship between misrepresentation and representation.  The core 
idea behind the theory is that getting things wrong somehow depends on it 
being possible to get things right, but not the other way around. Non-content 
causes thus depend on content causes in a way that content causes do not 
depend on non-content causes.  What does the work of weeding out non-
content causes is their asymmetric dependence on content causes.  And what 
makes a content cause the content of a representation is (among other 
things) its being that upon which non-content causes are asymmetrically 
dependent.  
 
3.6.1 The Theory  
 
Setting this last point aside, I want to look a little more closely at Fodor’s 
account.  According to Fodor my X-thoughts are about Xs if: 
1) ‘Xs cause X thoughts’ is a law. 
2)  Some X thoughts are actually caused by Xs 
3) For any Y such that Y ≠ X, if Ys sometimes cause X thoughts, then Ys 
causing X thoughts is asymmetrically dependent on Xs causing X 
thoughts (Fodor, 1988, p. 109).44 
 
A brief example will perhaps be helpful here.  The reason why horse thoughts 
are about horses is because horses cause them.  And any non-horse, (say) a 
cow on a dark night, that causes horse thoughts does so in virtue of horses 
causing horse thoughts.  If you break the connection between horses and 
                                                        
44 For reasons of terminological consistency, I have continued to speak of X thoughts, rather 
than tokens of ‘X’, concepts, or mental symbols.  Also, there are two points Fodor bids us to 
keep in mind.  First, these conditions are meant to apply synchronically (1988 pg. 109).  
Second, the theory is to be understood in terms of the nomic relations among properties 
(1992 pg. 102).  Nothing I will have to say rides on confusing either of these points.    
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horse thoughts, the connection between cows on dark nights and horses 
thoughts would also be broken.  But break this latter connection and the 
horse-horse thought connection remains; hence the asymmetry.   
  
3.6.2 A Worry About Scope 
 
First, and foremost, it should be noted that these are meant only as sufficient 
conditions for aboutness.  Unicorns and Penrose Triangles would not, for 
instance, be objections here on account of failing to satisfy 1) and 2).  That 
said, condition 1) seems to make the theory problematically limited. Since 
Fodor is adamant that the theory be understood in terms of the nomic 
relations among properties (1992 pg. 102), and since laws range over 
properties, not individuals, there will be a lot more than theoretical, logical 
and vacuous concepts that the theory cannot account for: Thoughts that 
appear to involve an individual such as singular thoughts about my father, or 
proper name thoughts, will also fail to fall under the purview of asymmetric 
dependence. The concern here is thus that the theory might be too narrow in 
scope to be the full story of my intentional mental life.   
 
3.6.4 A Concern About Exclusivity 
 
There appear to be some difficulties that arise for Conditions 1) & 2). 
Conditions 1) requires that X’s cause X thoughts be a law, and condition 2) 
requires that at least some X-thoughts be actually caused by Xs.  Given this, 
the theory cannot allow for situations where an X-thought is always caused 
by something other than X.  As I mentioned in section 2.1.1, Mendelovici 
(2010) has argued convincingly that color-thoughts are precisely the kind of 
thoughts deemed impossible by condition 2): Our color representations 
always represent something other than their causes.  Color thoughts are most 
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plausibly caused by light reflectance profiles, but these are not what I 
represent when I represent color.45   
 
Of course, someone might argue that in light of such arguments we should be 
color realists; but this seems backwards.  We would not, for instance, argue 
that because our theory of intentionality requires the existence of unicorns 
that we ought to be realists about unicorns.  That said, comparing colors to 
unicorns does seem slightly unfair.  In fact, however, the problem for 
condition 2) is not that color realism is false, it is that condition 2) requires 
that it cannot be. In effect, condition 2) rules out the possibility of our 
consistently misrepresenting something (Mendelovici, 2010). Though it 
would lose some of its literary effect, the point about unicorn realism could 
be turned around: a theory of intentionality should not require us to deny the 
existence of unicorns either (See also Mendelovici, 2013, section 6.2). 
 
For clarity’s sake: The worry I am trying to raise here is not that asymmetric 
dependence cannot countenance unicorn thoughts.  It patently can.  The story 
about unicorns is that the property of being a unicorn would cause unicorn 
thoughts in the nearest world where unicorns exist.46  “There can, of course, 
be a nomic connection between properties one or more of which is de facto 
uninstantiated…[U]nicorns…would be nomically sufficient for ‘unicorn’-
tokenings if there were any (Fodor, 1988, pp. 163-164 n.5)”. In other words, 
there is a law-like connection between the property of being a unicorn and 
the thought it would cause were there any unicorns. No, the concern raised 
by Mendelovici, that I am here echoing, is that as stated, the theory rules out 
the possibility of there being nomic connection between Ys and X-
                                                        
45 For arguments that color realism is false, I direct the reader to C.L. Hardin (Hardin, 1988).  
For arguments to the contrary see (Byrne & Hilbert, 2003). 
46 In the addenda to Naming and Necessity, Kripke offers interesting insights about the 
possibility of unicorns.  However, as endorsing his argument requires the acceptance of 
essential properties, I chose not to rely on it.    
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representations that is not dependent on any other nomic connection 
between Xs and X-representations—where Y are not Xs, that is, where X-
thoughts always misrepresent Ys.   
 
Again, perhaps this is not so devastating; perhaps, as it turns out, there just 
aren’t any cases of what can be called nomic misrepresentation.47  However, 
blunted though the objection might be, there is still something concerning 
about excluding the possibility of such cases apriori.  What exactly is 
concerning about such an exclusion?  It seems like the existence, or lack 
thereof, of cases of this kind of misrepresentation is an empirical matter, to 
be sorted out by investigation not stipulation (see Mendelovici, 2013).  
 
Condition 3) is the asymmetric dependence clause:  For any Y such that Y ≠ 
X, if Ys sometimes cause X-thoughts, then Ys causing X-thoughts is 
asymmetrically dependent on Xs causing X-thoughts. To use one of our 
previous examples: Though horses sometimes cause me to have cow 
thoughts, my cow thoughts are about cows and not horses because horses 
causing cow-thoughts is asymmetrically dependent on cows causing cow-
thoughts.  Break the cow cow-thought connection, and you thereby break the 
horse cow-thought connection; but break the horse cow-thought connection, 
and the cow cow-thought connection remains.  It is this condition that is 
supposed to do the work of weeding out bad causes from content causes.  
 
3.6.5 Pathological Misrepresentation 
 
In (Adams & Aizawa, 1992), a host of pathological cases are submitted as 
putative counter examples to Asymmetric Dependence. The following can be 
                                                        
47 Nomic misrepresentation = misrepresentation that occurs in a law-like 
manner.   
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seen as raising the same sort of concern: Assume that ‘dogs cause dog 
thoughts’ is a law, and that some dog-thoughts are in fact caused by dogs, so 
that conditions 1) and 2) are satisfied.  Now, imagine that we find some 
artificial means of producing dog thought tokens, say a particularly refined 
blow to the head. The question is whether this artificial means of producing 
dog-thoughts asymmetrically depends on a law like connection between dogs 
and dog thoughts.  We might even push the example further and say that we 
have become such accomplished head hitters that we are able to produce, 
with law-like consistency, dog-thoughts by this means.  The question is 
whether the blow to the headdog-thought connection depends, in any way, 
on the dogdog-thought connection.  In other words, and at the very least, it 
does not appear that the reason why the blow to the head causes dog-
thoughts is that dogs do.   
 
Someone keen on asymmetric dependence might argue that extraordinary 
though it seems, breaking the dog dog-thought connection would in fact 
break the blow-to-the-head dog-thought connection: If dogs do not cause 
dog-thoughts, then in virtue of what should we call such thoughts dog-
thoughts.  The idea, I take it, is that it only makes sense to call a painting a 
dog painting because of its connection (in this case similarity) to dogs.  If this 
connection is broken, say, because dogs look a lot like ants, then in virtue of 
what should we call this painting of a large furry animal a dog painting?   
 
The problem with this kind of response is that it seems circular, assuming 
that concepts are individuated by their referents, which on Fodor’s view are 
their contents. Asymmetric dependence is supposed to give us an account of 
the aboutness of our X-thoughts—viz. why this particular thought is about Xs. 
In the process of explaining the relation in virtue of which X-thoughts are 
about Xs, it seems circular to assume that the thoughts in question are the 
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thoughts they are in virtue of the relation you are attempting to explain.  If 
my dog thought is the thought it is in virtue of its connection to dogs, then it 
follows trivially that it is no longer a dog thought if this connection is broken. 
And if the relevant thought is no longer a dog thought, then it follows trivially 
that anything else connected to it (say, a blow to the head) will also fail to be 
connected to a dog thought.   
 
Of course, Fodor does not argue this way.  For Fodor, concepts and their ilk 
are not wholly individuated by their contents, but partially by their form 
(2008, p. 75).48  This is how a purely referentialist semantics avoids 
Paderewski cases:49 It is because John has two concepts—Paderewski1 and 
Paderewski2—that he can wonder (coherently) whether Paderewski is 
Paderewski.  And, this being the case, our blow-to-the-head problem 
remains: Assume that dog-thoughts have the form F, and that the power of 
dogs to cause dog-thoughts is reducible to their power to produce thought 
tokens with the form F.  A blow to the head’s power to produce thoughts with 
the form F does not appear to asymmetrically depend on the power of dogs 
to cause such thoughts.   
Again, someone keen on asymmetric dependence will undoubtedly be able to 
add to the theory to blunt some or all of the above objections.  That is, I do 
not think I have provided any knockdown arguments here.  What I have tried 
to do was show that, as a means of supplementing the causal relation in order 
to allow for misrepresentation, asymmetric dependence is not without some 
challenges.   
 
3.3.6 Teleology without Causation 
 
                                                        
48 A similar line is taken by Fodor in his reply to Block (see Fodor 1992 pp.111-112). 
49 Cases, that is, where the same man, Paderewski, is known by some for being an 
accomplished musician, and by others as a politician. 
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In her Biosemantics (Millikan, 2002), Ruth Millikan proposes a non-causal 
based teleological theory.  For Millikan, intentionality is still a kind of 
tracking relation that holds between intentional states and their contents.  
What is different on her account is that contents are not causally determined.  
An intentional state is about whatever item/state of affairs in a 
representation consumer’s environment is required for said consumer to 
function properly—where functioning properly is evolutionarily determined.  
It is how a consumer uses the representation to function properly that 
determines the content; and it is how a consumer’s ancestors used 
representations of that type to survive and reproduce that determines what 
it is to function properly. A consumer, on this view, is a system that exploits 
the representation in the performance of its proper function.   In what 
follows I will focus on organisms as consumers, rather than distinct 
subsystems of said organisms.  The distinction will not make much difference 
to what I have to say.   
 
The well-worn case of the frog snapping at flies will be useful here.  To find 
out the content of the frog’s representational state when it snaps at a fly, we 
first ask how ancestral frogs would have used such a representation to 
survive and reproduce.  Presumably, the representation would have been 
used for the acquisition of energy/nutrition.  So the proper function of the 
frog’s representational state is to track sources of energy/nutrition.  When a 
modern day frog snaps at a fly, the content of its representational state is 
‘source of energy/nutrition’.  Notice how well this account avoids the kinds of 
bad-cause problems associated with causal theories.  A causal theory has to 
avail itself of the kinds of causes that can, in this case, figure in visual 
representations—e.g. things like shape and color.  And it is because of this 
that a causal theory has a hard time ruling out BB’s from the content of the 
frog’s fly representations.  On the other hand, Millikan can grant that all sorts 
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of things can cause a frog to token a fly-thought, because on her view, causes 
are irrelevant to content. For Millikan, what matters for the determination of 
content is how the representation is/was used to contribute to the survival 
and reproduction of frogs.  
 
3.7.1 Why Jack and Jill went up the hill 
 
A set of concerns here stems from the implausible intentional explanations 
this account seems to deliver in certain cases. In his famous tale of the kimu 
and the snorf, Pietroski too stresses the implausible nature of the intentional 
explanations the consumer-based account appears to deliver (Pietroski, 
1992).  The kimu are a docile species of herbivore that live near a large hill.  
Their only predators are the carnivorous snorfs, who roam past the hill each 
morning.  At some point in the evolutionary history of the kimu, a particular 
kimu, Jack, underwent a genetic mutation that caused him to token a 
particularly pleasant mental state, M, in the presence of the rising sun. Each 
morning when the sun came up over the hill, Jack tokened M, and ascended 
the slopes in pursuit of the pleasant light of the early morning sun.  As time 
passed, those of Jack’s descendants who inherited the gene flourished as a 
result of being at the top of the hill, pursuing the pleasant red light, when the 
hungry snorfs past each morning to consume their non-M-tokening kin. 
 
The rub is that according to Millikan’s account, the content of the kimus M-
thoughts turns out to be something like ‘snorf-free zone’, or ‘safety this way’. 
All the ingredients are here: We have some representation consumers (Jack’s 
descendants), who have some intentional mechanism whose production of R-
thoughts co-varies with the presence of some environmental feature. Some 
ancestral kimus were able to survive and reproduce in virtue of using the 
thought tokens of the M-type to avoid being preyed upon.  This determines 
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that the proper function of this intentional mechanism is to direct kimus out 
of harm’s way.  Thus the content of the kimus’ R-thoughts is ‘snorf free zone’. 
 
However, according to Pietroski, though there are several plausible 
candidates for the contents of the kimus’ R-thoughts—e.g. ‘sun over there’, 
‘pleasant light that way’, etc.—R-thoughts are certainly not about snorfs.  
Millikan’s account delivers the wrong intentional explanation; namely that 
the kimus are thinking about snorfs when they token M.  We are invited to 
test this by imagining how the kimu would react if a herd of snorfs who had 
undergone a genetic mutation so as to cause M-tokenings passed by the hill 
(Pietroski, 1992, p. 276).  The intuitive answer here is that the kimus would 
head on over to the M source.  Worse still, it is not so far fetched to think that 
after several generations of climbing the hill before the immanent arrival of 
the snorfs, the red loving kimus would have no idea what snorfs are, having 
never encountered them.  And yet Millikan’s theory still predicts that the 
content of the kimus R-thoughts is ‘snorf free zone’. 
 
The big picture here is that Millikan’s account does seem to capture an 
important relation between an organism’s mental states and items in the 
environment.  After all, the co-variation of M-thoughts with snorf-free zones 
is certainly useful in explaining the evolutionary success of the kimus.  The 
problem is that this relation looks like a poor candidate with which to 
identify intentionality.  The chief task of any relation view is to specify a 
relation that explains why a mental state has the content it does.  The 
problem with Millikan’s account is that the relation it homes in on does not 
explain why a given mental state has the content it does, but rather, why a 
given mental state was of an evolutionary advantage.  And though the two 
explanations can appear to converge—hence why consumer based theories 
look plausible in some cases—their target phenomena are distinct.   
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The kimu survived and reproduced because their R-thoughts led them out of 
harm’s way.  The proper function of the consumers of M-thoughts, in this 
evolutionary sense, is to keep kimus from being eaten. This proper function 
relation is the one Millikan’s theory identifies.  However, the present case 
shows that this cannot be the intentional relation, since the content of the 
kimus’ M-thoughts is not ‘snorf-free zone’.  Kimus could have M-thoughts, 
and thereby pursue M-ly things, in a world without snorfs.       
 
3.8 Concluding Remarks 
 
We began with two questions that emerged as a result of assuming that 
intentionality is a relation: 1) what kinds of things does intentionality relate 
us to? And 2) what kind of relation is intentionality?  I considered some of the 
most popular answers to 1): Ordinary concrete objects, abstract properties 
and propositions.  Ultimately, I concluded that there are concerns about each, 
and that taking intentionality to be a relation to one, several, or all of these 
things can make the intentional relation appear a bit mysterious.  As said, I 
do not take myself as having conclusively ruled out any particular view, but 
merely as having raised some concerns about the most popular views.  
 
Setting the question of what objects might serve as contents aside, I went on 
to look at a prominent family of views about the nature of the intentional 
relation.  Each attempted to account for intentionality in terms of a list of 
relational ingredients.  These included evolution, learning, asymmetric 
dependence, and biological proper functioning.  The hope of the various 
theorists considered was that the correct assembly of some of these 
relational ingredients could transform the favoured relation into 
intentionality.  
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The majority of the views considered were causal theories, which I 
taxonomized by how each attempted to handle the problem of error. 
Causation is, as it were, blind to semantic-like notions such as truth, falsity, 
accuracy and error.  Intentionality, on the other hand, is a phenomenon for 
which such semantic notions appear to matter.  So the challenge for the 
causal theorist was to specify some supplemental element, X, that when 
combined with causation, delivered a semantic relation. My conclusion was 
that no theory was without its difficulties.  
 
The last view I considered was Millikan’s teleological, consumer-based, 
account.  In general, theories that appeal to evolution in their attempts to 
spell out the intentional relation may seem to have an advantage over rival 
theories.  To repeat, the common goal of all the theories we have considered 
is to specify how the right combination of non-intentional elements could 
give rise to intentionality; and the problem is that it is difficult to see how we 
could get a semantic phenomenon out of a non-semantic relation such as 
causation.  The advantage of evolutionary theories is that the concept of 
evolution comes, as it were, pre-furnished with normative notions such as 
success and failure.  And because normativity is also a property of those 
troublesome semantic notions such as truth and falsity, perhaps evolution is 
precisely the ingredient needed to get intentionality from non-intentional 
elements.  Perhaps we could cash out truth and falsity, or accuracy and error, 
in terms of evolutionary success and/or failure.    
 
The concern I raised is that the mapping between the concepts of 
evolutionary success/failure on the one hand, and accuracy and error on the 
other is not without its difficulties. The Kimus enjoyed evolutionary success 
because their R-thoughts led them to snorf-free areas.  But this evolutionary 
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success does not translate unproblematically into truth or accuracy.  If the 
snorfs somehow learned to climb the hill, then the very same R-thoughts 
would spell evolutionary failure for the kimus.  But in both cases, the kimus’ 
thoughts were plausibly taken to be about red things.   
 
To reiterate, I do not pretend to have refuted any particular theory about the 
objects of intentionality, or the intentional relation.  What I have done is 
raised some concerns about many of the most popular answers to questions 
1) and 2) above.  This prompts the question: Is there an alternative to the 
assumption that gave rise to 1) and 2)—namely, that intentionality is a 
relation?  It is to this that I now turn. 
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Part 2 Intentionality and Phenomenality 
 
4. Introduction: Phenomenality and Intentionality 
 
I ended part 1 on an anticipatory note, suggesting that it is worthwhile 
looking at alternatives to what I called the relational view of intentionality.  
In this part of the thesis, I plan to do exactly that.   
 
Employing Kriegel’s terminology of intentionality being “injected into the 
world” (Kriegel, 2011, p. 17), we might take the view we are setting aside—
the relational view—as claiming that intentionality is injected into the world 
by a relation to one or more types of things, a causal relation in most cases. In 
this section, I will explore the alternative view that intentionality is injected 
into the world in virtue of its close connection to phenomenal 
consciousness.50  
 
As I will use it, ‘consciousness’ denotes the same phenomenon as expressions 
such as ‘what-it-is-like’, ‘phenomenality’, ‘how things are for me-ness’, ‘how it 
is for me-ness’, ‘what it is like for me-ness’, ‘phenomenal consciousness’, 
‘phenomenal character’, ‘experience’ and ‘qualitative character’.  With such a 
myriad of terms, it would be useful to pick one and stick with it; and, as far as 
I can do that, I will.  My preference is for ‘phenomenality’, but there will be 
times when it will serve practical purposes to employ the slightly more 
clumsy expressions ‘what-it-is-like’ and ‘how things are for me’ (and their 
cognates). In any case, all such instances should be taken as denoting one and 
the same phenomenon, namely phenomenality.  
 
                                                        
50 The vagueness of idioms such as “close connection to” is deliberate.  The 
view I will examine will become more definite in what follows.   
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Why is it that I think the intentional and the phenomenal are closely 
connected?  First, they are both aspects of mentality.  Both often happen 
together, and, perhaps slightly more contentiously, both appear to converge 
in several places: perception, olfaction, and so on. Representationalists 
(intentionalists) such as (Tye, 2002), (Lycan W. G., 1996) and (Dretske, 1997) 
have noted as much, arguing that at least some forms of phenomenality, such 
as perception, are intentional.  Additionally, it has been noted by several 
important historical thinkers that consciousness (phenomenality) is always 
consciousness of, where the ‘of’ is that of intentionality (Husserl, 1913/1998) 
(Brentano, 1887/1995).51   
For Husserl, phenomenological investigation involves bracketing off certain 
elements (a process called epoche) of an experience in order to describe the 
experience only in terms of what is available from the first person 
perspective. And while the phenomenological question to be addressed will 
partly determine what exactly gets bracketed off (Husserl, 1913/1998), the 
positing of the existence of the things to which an experience is purportedly 
directed always figures in (Husserl, 1900/2001).  That is, in 
phenomenological investigation, we are to refrain from “naively positing the 
existence of the objects,” or otherwise “going on to characterize them” 
(Husserl, 1900/2001, p. 170).52  This follows from Husserl’s requirement that 
the phenomenologist is to describe things exactly how they are from the first 
person perspective: According to Husserl, from the first person perspective, 
the existence, or lack thereof, of the purported objects of experience cannot 
be determined. 53   Assuming one has bracketed off the relevant 
                                                        
51 See (Searle, 1992) for a dissenting view.    
52 Excuse the rough-and-ready characterization of Husserllian 
phenomenology.   
53 Admittedly, this is a very rough characterization of Husserl’s 
phenomenological approach.  For a more thorough discussion of Husserl and 
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presuppositions, one arrives at an irreducible “abstract structure by virtue of 
which the mind is directed” (Dreyfus & Hall, 1984, p. 2).   
 
While my understanding of Husserl is rudimentary at best, the point here is 
not to deliver an exacting exegesis of Husserl, but rather to draw on what I 
take to be some of his insights.  First, both Husserl and Brentano assumed 
that phenomenality and intentionality were, at the very least, inseparably 
intertwined.  For Husserl, directedness just is a phenomenal feature 
(Gurwitsch, 1984) (Follesdal, 1984).    Second, regardless of whatever else he 
thought we could glean from phenomenal reduction, Husserl thought that 
this phenomenal directedness was certainly accessible in this way. That is 
not to say that Husserl thought phenomenal directedness was obvious and 
apparent to anyone who gave it a minute’s reflection.  That it required 
phenomenological reduction to bring out indicates that Husserl may have 
thought that the phenomenal directedness was introspectively unobtrusive, 
subtle. Finally, Husserl’s view locates the source of directedness 
(intentionality) in phenomenality.  For Husserl, it is consciousness that 
injects intentionality into the world.54     
 
Earlier, I listed several reasons for thinking that intentionality and 
phenomenality are closely connected.  Having mentioned what I take to be 
some important Husserllian insights, I want to suggest a final motivation I 
have for thinking that there is a close connection between intentionality and 
phenomenality.  Like Husserl, I think that careful reflection on some 
intentional experience can reveal a phenomenal feature of the experience 
                                                                                                                                                       
his contributions to contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science 
see (Dreyfus & Hall, 1984). 
54 Again, I am not hereby endorsing all of Husserl’s views.  I would not, for 
instance, follow Husserl in taking the noema—the entities in virtue of which 
we are phenomenally directed—to be abstract entities (see Follesdal, 1984).   
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that is best described as directedness, ofness or aboutness.  To avoid inviting 
talk of what this phenomenal feature directs us to, or is of/about, we can 
describe it as a phenomenal purporting-to-be-directed (of/about).  
Undoubtedly, this feature will be subtler in certain cases, yet no less present.  
Again, this is not intended as some form of argument, or as evidence for some 
further conclusion.  It is merely an account of one of my principal motivations 
for exploring views that accept a strong connection between intentionality 
and phenomenality.  
 
The proposal that intentionality and phenomenality are closely connected 
stands in need of clarification. First, as a reminder, I am interested in whether 
original 55  intentionality is closely connected to phenomenality.  More 
importantly, what exactly is the nature of this close connection?  
Undoubtedly there are any number of ways the connection might be 
construed. It might turn out that phenomenality is identical to, reducible to, 
or in some way dependent on intentionality.  This kind of view is typically 
associated with representationalists such as Tye (1995), Lycan (1996) and 
Dretske (1997). However, most representationalists take intentionality to be 
the kind of causal/covariational relation we discussed in chapter 3 (see, for 
instance, Tye 2002; Dretske, 1997).  The thinking is that intentionality is 
reducible to some naturalistically acceptable causal/covariational tracking 
relation; phenomenality is reducible to intentionality; therefore 
phenomenality is reducible to some form of naturalistically acceptable 
causal/covariational tracking relation.  As one of our central purposes here is 
to investigate non-relational alternatives to the relation view of 
                                                        
55 Hereafter, all uses of ‘intentionality’ (and its cognates) are to be 
understood as elliptical for ‘original intentionality’. 
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intentionality, the representationalism espoused by Tye, Lycan and Dretske, 
do not fit the bill.56 
 
On the other hand, it might turn out that intentionality stands in a 
dependence relation to phenomenality—perhaps supervening on it.  
Intentional content would then be determined (at least partly) by 
phenomenal character. Call this the supervenience view. Or, someone might 
take a very strong line on the relation between intentionality and 
phenomenality—one on which intentionality and phenomenality are type 
and token identical.  On such a view intentional content and phenomenal 
character name the same phenomenon.  Call this the strong identity view. 
Finally it might be that intentionality is a kind of phenomenality.  On such a 
proposal, intentional content would be a kind of phenomenal content. Call 
this the moderate identity view. 
 
In the next chapter, I will explore possible ways a theory of intentionality 
might be developed in accordance with what I take to be the most plausible 
of the three abovementioned views—the moderate identity view.  I set aside 
the supervenience view for the following reason:  It is not obvious to me that 
a relational phenomenon could not supervene on a non-relational 
phenomenon.  The grasping relation I bear to my coffee appears to supervene 
on the neuromuscular events in my arm.   If this is the case then, the view 
that intentionality supervenes on phenomenality may not be a non-relational 
view after all.  I also set aside the strong identity view. This is due mainly to 
the fact that the strong view has certain implications that stand in need of 
more time and space than I can reasonably allow for, given the time and 
                                                        
56 That is not to say that representationalism per se is inconsistent with a 
non-relational view of intentionality:  One might argue that phenomenality is 
reducible to intentionality, and that intentionality is not a relation.  I set this 
proposal aside for the time being.   
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space I devote to what I will later call the problem of cognitive contact. For 
clarity’s sake, the general view about the relationship between intentionality 
and phenomenality that we are going to explore is the moderate identity view: 
intentionality is identical to a kind of phenomenality.   
 
4.1 Phenomenality 
 
On a very plausible understanding of phenomenality, the phenomenality of 
some mental state is the way that state is for its subject—i.e. how that state 
is, or what it is like for that subject.  We might call the particular 
phenomenality of some mental state its phenomenal character.  Vague 
though such a definition undoubtedly seems, I take such an understanding of 
phenomenality to indicate that the phenomenal character of some mental 
state is in some sense a modifying feature of that state. That is not to say that 
there is the mental state M and then its phenomenal character P, and that P 
then modifies M to produce PM.  Rather, I take the relevant kind of 
modification to be more along the lines of how quickly, slowly, briskly, etc. 
can modify running.  It is not as if there can be unmodified runnings—
runnings that are neither fast, quick, slow, brisk, etc.  Sure, one can run 
without running quickly, but one cannot run without running in some way.  
And just as there are not empty runnings that are then modified to become 
quick runnings, there are not phenomenally empty mental states that are 
then modified to become phenomenal mental states. The phenomenality of 
some mental state is not something that can be stripped away from that state 
to yield the mental state minus its phenomenal character, although we can 
choose to bracket off, or focus on, some phenomenal features rather than 
others.  In the same way, we can focus on certain properties of the running 
rather than others.  Rather, the phenomenal character of some mental state is 
one way for that mental state to be, just as quickly, slowly, briskly, etc. are 
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ways runnings can be.  Moreover, just as slowly and quickly are ways 
runnings can differ from one another, so too can phenomenalities be ways 
mental states can differ from one another.  If this is a plausible understanding 
of phenomenality, then, given our goal of examining the moderate identity 
view above, it follows that the kind of views we are interested in exploring 
should construe intentionality as modifying features of some mental states.  
But are there any such views? 
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5 Phenomenal Intentionality Theory 
 
Since the mid to late nineties, a growing number of theorists have become 
increasingly unsatisfied by the standard picture of the mind that has it 
divided between the phenomenal and the intentional.  Among the first to 
complain were Searle (1992) and Loar (2003)57, who, in their own ways, 
contended that we really have no conception of intentionality/content as 
divorced from consciousness.  Siewert (1998) and Strawson (2010) too were 
among the view’s early advocates, each having made foundational 
contributions to what is now called Phenomenal Intentionality Theory 
(hereafter PIT).  More recent adherents include Kriegel (2013), Pitt (2009), 
Horgan and Tienson (2002), Mendelovici (2010), Farkas (2008) and 
Georgalis (2006). 58   
 
While a varied bunch, phenomenal intentionalists are generally agreed on 
several theses (see (Kriegel, 2013) for a more comprehensive list of the 
central tenets of phenomenal intentionalism).  One of the most central of 
these is that intentionality and phenomenality do not form two separate 
mental realms, but are instead inseparably intertwined (Horgan & Tienson, 
2002).  Many also take phenomenality to be the more basic or foundational of 
the two.  This latter point is what sets phenomenal intentionalism apart from 
representationalism, which also holds an inseparability thesis.  
Representationalists usually attempt to reduce phenomenality to 
intentionality, and then account for intentionality in terms of one of the 
tracking relations vetted in part 1 (see, for instance, Tye, 2002).  That being 
                                                        
57 However, both Searle and Loar seemed to have denied the separatist 
picture since at least the eighties; see (Searle, 1983) and (Loar, 1987). 
58 However, I think Georgalis would reject the name ‘Phenomenal 
Intentionality’. 
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said, phenomenal intentionality theory does not require a commitment to the 
basicness of phenomenality over intentionality.  Indeed, several phenomenal 
intentionalists, including Strawson (2004), Mendelovici (2010) and Pitt 
(2009), hold theories on which intentionality is identical to phenomenality.  
And if the two are identical, it does not make much sense to talk about the 
basicness of one over the other.  However, I take the ethos of phenomenal 
intentionality theory to be different from that of representationalism, even 
on identity views.59  
 
In rough outline, adherents of PIT generally acknowledge a kind of 
intentionality—phenomenal intentionality—that is in some way grounded in, 
determined by, or identical to phenomenality (Kriegel, 2013) (Horgan & 
Tienson, 2002) (Strawson, Mental Reality, 2010) (Siewert C. P., 1998).  As a 
corollary, the intentional content of a phenomenally intentional state is then 
held to be determined by, or identical, to that state’s phenomenal content 
(Horgan & Tienson, 2002).    For the most part, phenomenal intentionalists 
take phenomenal intentionality to be basic (Kriegel, 2013) or conceptually 
prior (Searle, 1992) to other kinds of intentionality.  Stronger views, such as 
Strawson’s (2010), hold that the only kind of real intentionality is 
phenomenal intentionality.   
 
5.1 Summary and Look Forward 
 
Here is where things stand.  I raised some concerns for some of the most 
popular relation views of intentionality (ch. 1 – 3)—concerns that I thought 
warranted exploring non-relational alternatives.  From the fact that there 
appears to be a close connection between phenomenality and intentionality 
(ch.4), I suggested that we might begin our investigations with this in mind.  
                                                        
59 However, see (Mendelovici, 2010), who disagrees.  
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What I proposed was that we explore a general view about the nature of the 
relationship between intentionality and phenomenality—namely the 
moderate identity view.  In the previous section (sec. 4.1), I suggested that 
phenomenality is plausibly construed as non-relational—a modifying feature 
of some mental states. Given that the moderate view identifies intentionality 
with a kind of phenomenality, it would seem to follow that we should be on 
the lookout for theories on which intentionality is construed as a modifying 
feature of mental states. On the face of it, phenomenal intentionality theory 
(or certain versions of it) seems like a promising avenue down which we 
might find one or more such theories.  In the remainder of this chapter, I will 
examine three versions of PIT that appear to fit the bill.   
 
5.2  A First Approach 
 
In the literature, there are different views about how to construe intentional 
contents in such a way that intentionality does not turn out to be a relation.60  
One such view, called type psychologism, comes to us from David Pitt (2009). 
Pitt argues that intentional contents are phenomenal types, of which 
particular phenomenal intentional episodes 61  are tokens. Intentional 
episodes are phenomenally constituted such that a particular thought is a 
token of some phenomenal type that just is that thought’s intentional 
content.  To illustrate the point, take the case of a prototypically sensational 
episode, such as having a pain.  For Pitt, one plausible way to understand 
such states is not as relations to contents, but as being tokens of a particular 
phenomenal type; namely, the painful type.  
 
                                                        
60 Hereafter, my use of ‘content’ should be taken as denoting phenomenal 
intentional content.   
61 Again, take ‘intentional episode’ broadly to include thoughts, perceptions, 
etc. 
  
85 
For states such as pain, such an analysis seems pretty intuitive.  The question, 
however, is how well will it work for prototypically cognitive states, such as 
believing that it will rain.  The concerns here are twofold.  First, if we take the 
claim that intentional contents are phenomenal types, to imply that they have 
phenomenality, then Pitt’s view implies there is something it is like to have 
the thought that it will rain.  Here, as Pitt claims in (2004), having the thought 
that it will rain can be distinguished from taking a particular propositional 
attitude towards the proposition ‘that it will rain’.  The idea is simply that one 
can entertain the proposition that it will rain without thereby believing, 
fearing, or remembering it.  However, even on this thin construal of what it is 
to think that it will rain, Pitt’s view is that the content ‘that it will rain’ is a 
phenomenal type.  Hence, there is something it is like to token the content 
‘that it will rain’.   
 
Though philosophical orthodoxy is, I think, still sceptical of any such 
phenomenality, there is a wealth of arguments (indeed, an entire volume 
(Bayne & Montague, Cognitive Phenomenology, 2011)) dedicated to what is 
called cognitive phenomenality.62 However, Pitt’s account does not merely 
need there to be cognitive phenomenality; Pitt’s account needs said 
phenomenality to, in some way, be constitutive of thought. If thinking that it 
will rain is a matter of tokening a phenomenal type that just is that thought’s 
content, then the content ‘that it will rain’ is a phenomenal type.  It is a 
phenomenal type of thing.  In short, Pitt’s account actually needs there to be 
enough phenomenality to the thought that it will rain to distinguish it from 
all other thoughts.  If there is just some generic phenomenality to cognition 
                                                        
62 For an early but especially convincing one, see Strawson (2010). 
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such that all conscious thoughts have it, then individuating63 thoughts by 
their phenomenal character would deliver a pretty short list of thoughts.   
 
Perhaps that was too fast.  The idea here is that on a very intuitive way of 
individuating thoughts—the way I suggested back in part 1—thoughts are 
individuated by their contents.  If contents are phenomenal types, as per 
Pitt’s account, then thoughts are individuated by phenomenal type.  That 
means either that there had better be a sufficiently distinct phenomenal type 
that can constitute a particular thought’s content, or else, that there are not 
very many types of thought.   If the thought that it will rain is the thought it is 
in virtue of its content, and this content is a phenomenal type, then either 
every thought is the same (the generic phenomenality view), or else the 
phenomenality of a particular thought is sufficiently distinct to distinguish it 
from all other thoughts.   
 
Presumably, Pitt does not want the former.  Hence, he needs some story 
about how the phenomenology of a thought is sufficient to distinguish it from 
all other thoughts—sufficient, that is, to individuate it.  Pitt has such a story, 
and I think it a good one (Pitt, 2004, pp. 7-14).  But rather than rehearsing his 
arguments, I provide three simpler arguments that I find persuasive, in what 
I take to be in order of increasing persuasiveness.  
5.3 Three Arguments for Distinctiveness: 
 
Assuming that there is cognitive phenomenality—something it is like to think 
that it will rain—the question before us is whether or not that phenomenality 
                                                        
63 The way I am using it here, to individuate X is to distinguish it from other 
Xs.  Of course, there are better and worse ways to do this: I can stick post-its 
on MRIs of my brain and therefore individuate my brain states with post-its.  
But individuating intentional states by their content does not seem like such 
an objectionable way of individuating them.   
  
87 
is sufficient to individuate that particular thought.  Struggle though you might 
to put into words what exactly it was like to think that it will rain, imagine 
that things are exactly that way, and ask yourself whether you could be 
thinking a different thought.  That is, if everything is phenomenally like what 
it is like when you think it will rain, could you possibly be thinking another 
thought? It is hard to deny that if how things are for you when you think that 
it will rain are precisely how things are for you now, then you just are 
thinking that it will rain.  The point?  If you accept what has so far been said, 
then you cannot be thinking that it will be sunny, if things are exactly as they 
are for you when you think that it will rain.  Nor could you be thinking that 
your dogs need supper, that your air conditioning is costing you a fortune, or 
that there are only 23 species of crocodilian.   
 
Perhaps the above did not convince you; let me try again: Think to yourself 
that 16 + 32 = 48.  Now, forget trying to describe how it was for you to think 
that thought, do not bother trying to remember how it was.  Simply ask 
yourself whether your thinking that thought differed in some real, palpable, 
phenomenally observable way, from a calculator’s computing it. The answer 
is clearly yes.  So, though you cannot describe it, there was something it was 
like for you to think the thought, something you had, but the calculator 
lacked.  Of course, the obvious objection here is that though there might have 
been some way it was to think that thought (that you had but the calculator 
lacked), it was a generic what-it-was-likeness—too muted and indistinct to 
do any work here.  But is this right?  That is, if how things are, is exactly how 
they were for you when you thought the thought you did, would you not just 
be thinking that thought.  If what it was like for you to think that 16 + 32 = 48 
is exactly what it is like for you right now, could you possibly be thinking 
anything else?  If the answer is no, then the what-it-is-likeness of thinking 
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that 16 + 32 = 48, though indescribable, is all that is needed to individuate 
the thought from all others.   
 
Final attempt: Imagine that you are omniscient and omnipotent with respect 
to the phenomenality of some subject.  Now, imagine that subject thinks 16 + 
32 = 48, and you pay close attention to what it was like for him to entertain 
that thought.  Now ask yourself the following: If you arranged things 
phenomenally for that subject such that he was exactly the same as he was 
when he thought that 16 + 32 = 48, what would he be thinking?64 Presumably 
he would be thinking precisely that 16 + 32 = 48.  In which case, fixing the 
phenomenal character, the how things are, is sufficient for fixing the content 
of 16 + 32 = 48-thoughts. 
 
The point is this: If these arguments are right, then cognitive phenomenality 
is indeed sufficient to deliver intentional individuation, and Pitt’s account is 
viable up to this point.  
 
5.4 Bonafide Thoughts and the Propositional Attitudes 
 
Earlier, I said that there were two possible concerns with Pitt’s account.  The 
first was that Pitt needed the phenomenal character of thoughts to be 
sufficient to individuate them.  I have considered what I take to be plausible 
reasons for thinking this might be possible.  The second concern has to do 
                                                        
64 The reason why I like this kind of argument is that it does not rely on 
actually describing, in distinct terms, the phenomenal character of the 
various thoughts.  Indeed, it need not even require that the phenomenal 
character be, in principle, describable—other than, of course, being 
describable as the phenomenal character of thinking that 2 + 2 = 4, or that it 
will rain.   
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with thoughts construed not thinly as mere occurrences of a particular 
content, but as full on propositional attitude states.  The problem, that is, is 
that when the thought that it will rain occurs, it rarely does so as a mere 
entertaining.  When the thought that it will rain occurs to me, it typically does 
so in the context of my believing, fearing, remembering or desiring that it will 
rain.  Remember that on Pitt’s account, contents are phenomenal types; so if 
the content of my belief that it will rain is that it will rain, and the content of 
my fear that it will rain is that it will rain, then it looks like we have two 
thoughts that token the same phenomenal type.  But then what resources 
does Pitt’s account have to distinguish the two thoughts?  I assume that we 
would all like the desire that it will rain to count as a different thought than 
the fear that it will.  But if token thoughts are individuated by their contents, 
which are phenomenal types, then what exactly distinguishes the desire that 
it will rain from the fear that it will?   
 
One option here is to recognize that the above is only a problem if you accept 
that thoughts are wholly individuated by their contents.  On one traditional 
view, thoughts (in this rather thicker sense) are individuated by their 
attitude + their content.  So though the desire that it will rain and the fear 
that it will have the same content, the two take a different attitude toward 
said content and so are different thoughts.  One move open to Pitt would be 
to tell some story about how each attitude type has a corresponding 
phenomenality such that this attitude + content schema could deliver the 
individuation of bonafide propositional attitude thoughts.  The idea here 
would be that belief states have the phenomenal character of believing, 
which, in conjunction with the phenomenal character of the content that it 
will rain, would yield a unique phenomenally individuated propositional 
attitude state (see Horgan & Tienson, 2002 for such an approach).   
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Another option here is to reject the attitude/content distinction and hold that 
propositional attitudes are part of the content of intentional states.  On this 
line the difference between believing that it will rain and fearing that it will is 
a difference in content.65  Personally, I think this is the better option, 
especially for a view like Pitt’s. After all, there does indeed seem to be 
something it is like to believe something that is different from what it is like 
to fear it.  Taking such attitudes to be part of the content of intentional states 
explains why believing that it will rain is a different thought than desiring 
that it will.  Each have different contents; each tokens a different phenomenal 
type that includes the attitude type.   
 
5.5 Two More Approaches 
 
Two other phenomenal intentionalists have provided similar alternative 
views.  According to Kriegel’s adverbialism (2011), and Mendelovici’s aspect 
view (MS.), intentional contents are not phenomenal types, but second order 
properties of intentional properties.  On Kriegel’s adverbialism, contents are 
taken to be adverbial modifications of intentional states.  Where this view 
differs from the adverbialism prominent in the writings of theorists such as 
Ducasse (1942), and Chisholm (1957), is in its scope, as well as its focus.  For 
the early adverbialists, the goal was to provide a plausible alternative to 
sense data theory, one that eschewed mind-dependent sense data for 
adverbial translations of our perceptual talk.  Rather than ‘I see red’ meaning 
that the speaker is in direct contact with a red sense datum, it means instead 
that the speaker perceives redly, or red-wise.  On Kriegel’s adverbialism, 
however, it is not just perceptual experiences that are adverbially construed, 
but all intentionality.  Also, the focus is not on providing adverbial 
                                                        
65 In his doctoral thesis, A Pure Representationalist Account of the Attitudes, 
Steve Pearce develops such a view in far greater detail than I do here.   
  
91 
translations, but on giving an account of being intentionally directed that is 
both phenomenally based, and able to cope with various issues arising from 
the relation view (see Mendelovici, MS, sec. 8.4.2).66 
 
5.6 Adverbialism and The Aspect View 
 
For Kriegel then, having a thought about a dog is a matter of instantiating an 
intentional property, the property of being intentionally directed, that has 
certain modifying properties that may be glossed as dog-wise.  Again, these 
properties of intentional properties are phenomenal properties:  If the 
adverbialist construal of contents takes them to be ways intentional 
properties are, and phenomenal characters are ways phenomenally 
intentional states are, we get a rather nice phenomenal construal of contents.    
 
On one version of Mendelovici’s aspect view (MS), contents also turn out to 
be second order properties of intentional properties.  Where this version of 
her account differs from Kriegel’s is in its understanding of the second order 
properties in question.  On Mendelovici’s view, the relevant second order 
properties are construed more along the lines of the second order properties 
of color; namely hue, saturation, etc.  (Mendelovici, MS).  Of course, the 
second order properties in question do much of the same modifying work as 
Kriegel’s adverbial properties—i.e. they are ways intentional properties are, 
or can be—but, as with the case of hue and saturation, thinking of them in 
adverbial terms is not the most natural way to conceive of them.  We do not, 
for instance, say that red2 has a 2-ly hue.   
 
A final important feature of both Kriegel’s and Mendelovici’s respective 
accounts is that the relevant second order properties do not compose—as 
                                                        
66 See Part 1 for some such issues.  
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distinct constituents—the intentional properties they modify.  While Kriegel 
does not argue for it explicitly, adverbial properties are not distinct 
constituents of what they modify.  Quickly, for instance, does not compose 
runnings.  On the other hand, and in keeping with the color analogy, 
Mendelovici explicitly says that just as we need not say that properties such 
as hue and saturation are distinct components that literally compose the 
color properties they modify, so too for second order intentional properties 
(Mendelovici, MS, ch. 8).  This is important because the whole idea of taking 
contents to be second order properties is to avoid giving them “independent 
existence” status—and therefore status as things we are related to via 
intentionality.  Taking the relevant properties to be of the first order would 
be to endorse the sense data theory.    
 
To reiterate: On the adverbial/aspect view, intentional contents are second 
order phenomenal properties of intentional properties; namely they are 
ways for those intentional properties to be rather than distinct constituents 
of said properties.  This differs from Pitt’s view that we looked at earlier.  On 
his view, contents are phenomenal types of which particular intentional 
episodes are tokens.  As we saw, the problem for Pitt’s view was that it had 
the rather troublesome consequence that I cannot desire what you fear.  This 
resulted from the combination of several points.  The first was that Pitt’s 
account is a non-relational account, and therefore rejects the relational view 
of propositional attitudes.  The second was that in order to avoid positing 
things such as empty believings, Pitt’s account would have to reject the 
attitude/content distinction, and say that the attitudes are part of the 
content.  But since contents are phenomenal types, on Pitt’s view, this would 
mean that my desire that it will rain is of a different type than your fear that 
it will.  And this seemed to imply that my desire and your fear share no 
content.   
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Does adverbialism or the aspect view fare any better here?  Indeed, I think 
both do.  The reason why I desire what you fear is that our respective 
intentional states share some second order properties; namely, rain-wise (as 
per Kriegel), or of-rain-ness (as per Mendelovici).  Of course, where Kriegel 
and Mendelovici stand on rejecting the attitude/content distinction I do not 
know.  Perhaps one or either would say that the attitudes are the first order 
properties that the second order properties modify.  My believing it is raining 
is a matter of my having a belief state that occurs rain-wise, or that has of-
rain-ness.   And just as there are no runnings that are not quick, slow, etc. 
runnings, so too are there no beliefs that are not rain-wise, or of-redness, etc.  
This seems like a win/win: We need not reject the age old attitude/content 
distinction, and we get a non-relational view on which distinct subjects can 
be said to share some contentful commonality.     
 
There is, however, a worry that emerges for the views under consideration. 
The theorists we are considering take themselves to be espousing 
phenomenal intentionality theories—theories that, we might say, tie 
intentional content to phenomenal character in an essential way.  If we 
accept that intentional content is a kind of phenomenal character, there 
ought not to be any phenomenal difference without a corresponding 
contentful difference.  But how it is for me to desire that it rain is quite 
different from how it is for me to fear it.  That is, there is a phenomenal 
difference between the two.  But the content, on a view that accepts the 
attitude/content distinction is the same.  In particular, the second order 
properties of rain-wise, or of-rain-ness, seem to be the same in both the case 
of desiring that it rain and fearing that it will.  
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Of course, the solution here is obvious.  The views we are considering ought 
to reject the attitude/content distinction.  They ought, that is, to take 
propositional attitudes to be contents like any other; namely, second order 
properties of intentional properties.  In this case, desiring that it will rain is 
more accurately understood as being intentionally directed in a desiring, 
rain-wise way.  And fearing that it will rain is a matter of being intentionally 
directed in a fearing, rain-wise way.  
 
5.7 Summary 
 
I began part 2 by suggesting that we explore views on which the intentional 
and the phenomenal are closely connected.  In particular, I said that I wanted 
to examine what I called the moderate identity view. This led me to 
phenomenal intentionality theory, and I examined three different theories 
that I take to be consistent with this view. I began with Pitt’s type-
psychologism, but I concluded that Pitt’s account had some consequences 
that I find unpalatable. I then looked at two similar alternative accounts and 
argued that the unpalatable consequences of Pitt’s view do not arise for 
them, provided some conceptual fine-tuning.  What is more, the latter two 
views—Kriegel’s adverbialism, and Mendelovici’s aspect view—accord well 
with what I called a plausible understanding of phenomenality; namely, that 
phenomenality is a modifying feature of mental states.  Both adverbialism 
and the aspect view take intentional contents to be modifying in this way.   
 
Hereafter, I refer to both Kriegel’s adverbialism and Mendelovici’s aspect 
view as versions of modificationism.  Modificationism combines the moderate 
identity view (call this moderate modificationism) with the thesis that 
phenomenal character is a way for a mental state to be—a modification of 
that state.  Hence, intentional content is a way for a mental state to be—a 
  
95 
modification of that state.  In the next chapter, I will highlight some 
challenges that modificationism faces.  
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6. Challenges to Modificationism 
 
In this chapter, I highlight some challenges to modificationism.  The goal of 
this chapter is not to provide decisive arguments either in favour of or 
against modificationism, but rather to see how far it can be pushed, with the 
purpose of identifying its weaknesses, in order to see how a sympathizer 
might reasonably seek to overcome those weaknesses. 
 
The first family of challenges for modificationism arises from cases where the 
intentionality of an experience appears to outstrip its phenomenality.  Such 
worries generally emerge in discussions of cognitive phenomenology.  For 
instance, is there anything it is like to think that 2 + 2 = 4? 
  
A second set of concerns surrounds the fact that modificationism is a version 
of phenomenal intentionality theory, and phenomenal intentionality 
is…well…phenomenal. Assuming that phenomenal intentionalists are agreed 
that it is phenomenal intentionality that is, in some sense, the most basic 
form of intentionality, the view seems incompatible with the very possibility 
of unconscious intentionality.  More specifically, phenomenal intentionality 
theory, and therefore modificationism, seems unable to accommodate 
unconscious, yet seemingly contentful, mental states. Worries here differ 
according to the nature of the relevant unconscious states.  Standing states 
such as the standing belief that the Eiffel Tower is in France pose one set of 
difficulties, while states of the early visual processing system pose another.  
Concerns also abound about the content of subconscious states—the ones 
that, according to some, figure crucially in how we behave. 
 
A third concern that is specific to modificationism has to do with the 
compositional structure of thought. In Jackson (1977, pp. 64 – 72), some 
serious challenges are lodged against adverbial theories of perception.  As a 
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form of adverbialism, modificationism would appear vulnerable to these 
same challenges.   
 
Finally, there is the rather large concern that the views we are considering 
leave us all trapped inside our own heads.  Deprived of the relation that was 
once thought to constitute intentionality, one might worry that our cognitive 
contact with the world—the contact secured by that very relation—has gone 
the way of the dodo.  In effect, it looks like the present views do not have the 
resources to connect us, our minds, our thoughts, etc. to the world of 
ordinary objects that we inhabit.  
 
In summary, we have four sets of concerns that need to be addressed: 
 
1) There seem to be cases where the intentionality of some experience 
outstrips its phenomenality. 
2) Phenomenal intentionality theory (and therefore modificationism) 
appears inconsistent with the existence of unconscious, yet contentful, 
mental states states. 
3) Modificationism seems inconsistent with the idea that thoughts are 
structured in a particular way.    
4) Modificationism appears unable to deliver cognitive contact. 
 
In the remainder of part 2, I will try to enumerate some options a 
sympathizer might have with respect to concerns 1) – 3). 4) Will occupy the 
entirety of part 3, so I will not address it here. 
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6.1 Cognitive Phenomenology 
 
As mentioned, the concern here is that certain intentional states have an 
intentionality that outstrips their phenomenality.  In effect, this concern is 
about both the existence and the distinctiveness of cognitive phenomenology.  
This is a popular topic as of late, garnering an entire anthology (see Bayne & 
Montague, 2011). The question is whether there is anything it is like to 
undergo prototypically cognitive states such as believing that it will rain, or 
wondering what the square root of pi is.   
 
In Pitt (2004, p. 2) an initial—albeit trivial (or so Pitt claims)—argument for 
the existence of cognitive phenomenology runs thus: 
 
1) If a mental state is conscious, then it has phenomenal properties. 
2) Conscious thoughts are conscious mental states; therefore, 
3) Conscious thoughts have phenomenal properties. 
 
The argument looks to be valid, and therefore to argue against it will involve 
arguing against its premises. While most will admit that there is often a what-
it-is-like-ness that accompanies such states, those sceptical of a 
phenomenality distinctive of cognition typically try to account for this in 
terms of sensory phenomenality (see Prinz, 2011).  The idea is to deny 1) by 
arguing that just because a conscious mental state occurs 
contemporaneously with certain phenomenal properties does not mean the 
latter are properties of the former.  I can, for instance, be doing long division 
while listening to Mozart, but the phenomenal character of that episode is not 
distinctive of long division, but of listening to Mozart.  On this view, in other 
words, there can be a phenomenal character with cognition, but there is no 
phenomenal character of cognition.   
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It follows that many of the arguments for cognitive phenomenology focus on 
cases where there is a phenomenal difference that cannot be accounted for in 
terms of sensory phenomenology.  In Galen Strawson’s famous example, two 
subjects—one of whom does not speak French—listen to a French news 
broadcast (Strawson, 2010, pp. 5 -13).  By hypothesis, both have identical 
perceptual/sensory experiences; yet their phenomenal experiences differ.  
According to Strawson, the difference is a difference in the phenomenality of 
understanding, or understanding experience.  Since understanding is 
precisely the kind of cognitive state at issue, there must be something it is 
like to think.  Other such examples include the what-it-is-like of having 
something on the tip of one’s tongue, the experience of grasping what ‘dogs 
dogs dog dog dogs’ (Horgan & Tienson, 2002, p. 523) means, and of suddenly 
remembering what you forgot.   
 
Such examples at least establish a plausible case for the existence of cognitive 
phenomenology.  However, something more is required before we can 
conclude that a cognitive state’s phenomenality can be sufficient for its 
intentionality.   More precisely, what modificationism requires is some 
account of how some mental state’s intentional content can be constituted or 
individuated by its phenomenal character.   
 
That being said, Strawson’s example might be construed (or suitably 
tweaked) to establish as much.  Kriegel, for instance, suggests a case where: 
 
 “two languages are so similar graphically and phonetically that the very 
same passage can express a news report about a faraway war in one of 
them, and a children’s bedtime story in the other.  We can envisage two 
subjects listening to a reading of the passage and each understanding it in 
a different language.  Here there would be an overall experiential 
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difference that is best explained by supposing that one subject’s cognitive 
experience had one intentional content while the other’s had another 
intentional content” (Kriegel, 2011, p. 49). 
 
Pitt, on the other hand, takes a different approach—taking as his starting 
point the fact that we can consciously, introspectively and non-inferentially 
know about our phenomenal states, and that it is only conscious experiences 
that are so knowable. But this is precisely the kind of knowledge we have of 
our thoughts, and  “it would be impossible to introspectively distinguish 
conscious thoughts with respect to their content, if there weren’t something 
it is like to think them” (Pitt, 2004): 
 
Normally—that is, barring confusion, inattention, impaired functioning, 
and the like—one is able, consciously, introspectively and non-
inferentially (henceforth, “Immediately”) to do three distinct (but closely 
related things): (a) to distinguish one’s occurrent conscious thoughts from 
one’s other occurrent conscious mental states; (b) to distinguish one’s 
occurent conscious thoughts each from the others; and (c) to identify 
each of one’s occurrent conscious thoughts as the thought it is (i.e., as 
having the content it does).  But…one would not be able to do these 
things unless each (type of) occurrent conscious thought had a 
phenomenology that is (1) different from that of any other type of 
conscious mental state (proprietary), (2) different from any other type of 
conscious thought (distinct), and (3) constitutive of its (representational) 
content (individuative) (Pitt, 2004, pp. 7-8). 
 
To be sure, this kind of self-knowledge argument is open to several possible 
counter-arguments  (see for instance Tye & Wright, 2011), some of which are 
addressed in (Pitt, 2011).  For instance, one might flat out deny that we have 
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any such knowledge of our mental states, be they intentional, phenomenal, or 
phenomenal intentional.  However, the point here is not to provide an 
extended argument in favour of cognitive phenomenology, but to lay out 
several options a modificationist might reasonably pursue.  Pitt’s view, if 
successful, would certainly give the modificationist what she needs.   
 
From Horgan and Graham (2012) and Horgan and Tienson (2002), we find 
another possible avenue for securing the kind of cognitive phenomenology 
the modificationist needs.  According to them, it is the phenomenal character 
of thinking that rabbits are furry that makes the content of that thought that 
rabbits are furry, rather than that the set of undetached rabbit parts is. 
Horgan, Graham and Tienson seem to think it obvious that there is something 
it is like to think that rabbits are furry, and that that is quite different from 
what it is like to think that the set of undetached rabbit parts is.    If they are 
correct, then phenomenality delivers determinate content.   
 
For my part, I too take it that what is at issue between friends and foes of 
cognitive phenomenology is not the existence of certain phenomenal features 
during episodes of cognition.  All sides grant that I can do long division while 
enjoying the phenomenal experience of listening to Mozart.  What is in 
dispute is whether there is a purely cognitive phenomenality—
phenomenality that is proper to cognition and not reducible to sensory (or 
otherwise) phenomenality, and that may or may not occur simultaneously 
with cognition.  Siewert  (2011, pp. 262 - 267) offers a useful way to 
understand this point by dividing phenomenality into derived and non-
derived.  The phenomenality of doing long division while listening to Mozart 
is different from doing it while listening to your favourite Punk band.  Notice 
too that the difference need not just be in the phenomenality of the aural 
perceptual experience: it really seems like the phenomenality of the aural 
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perceptual experience somehow bleeds through into the task of doing long 
division, so that the cognitive exercise of doing long division is coloured by 
the former.  But this would still not count as cognitive phenomenality proper 
because the phenomenality of the cognitive task is derived from that of the 
sensory experience.   
 
Siewert uses other examples to try and bring out a kind of non-derivative 
cognitive phenomenality, and goes on to argue that this phenomenality is 
constitutive of content (2011, pp. 262 - 267).  However, even if Siewert is 
mistaken and all phenomenality does in fact derive from the sensory, I am 
not sure that that constitutes a huge problem.  For argument’s sake, let me 
grant that all phenomenality is in some way sensory, so that any 
phenomenality that accompanies cognition is derived in Siewert’s sense.  
Using Siewert’s example of reading with comprehension versus reading 
without comprehension, we get a case of phenomenal contrast.  There is 
something it is like to read with comprehension—something different from 
what it is like not to comprehend what you are reading.  Let us assume, on 
behalf of the foes of cognitive phenomenology, that the specific what it is 
likeness of reading with comprehension derives from the sensory 
phenomenology that accompanies your internal monologue in which the 
words are present.  The question is whether the derivative nature of the 
phenomenality presents a problem.  What modificationism requires is that 
the phenomenal character of some cognitive episode can constitute, or in 
some way individuate, the intentional content of said episode.   
 
Imagine removing whatever phenomenality arises as a result of your internal 
monologue that occurs when you read with comprehension.  That is, imagine 
that you no longer have any sensory phenomenality arising from your 
internal monologue.  In such a case it is not unreasonable to think that you 
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also lose comprehension.  Bring the phenomenality of one’s internal 
monologue back, and with it comes comprehension.  This suggests that 
phenomenality—whether it be derived from the sensory or not—is in some 
sense constitutive of reading with comprehension.  So even if we accept that 
all phenomenality is in some sense sensory—or derived from the sensory—
that does not necessarily pose a serious threat to modificationism.  What the 
modificationist would require here would be an argument to the effect that 
conscious thought is sensory in the relevant sense.  Prinz (2007) offers 
something like this kind of view.  According to Prinz, all mental 
representations are perceptual in nature, and therefore have perceptual 
phenomenology (Prinz, 2007, p. 348).  Perhaps this perceptual 
phenomenology derives from one’s internal verbal narrative, or mental 
imagery, or some such. What is important is that its being sensory 
(perceptual) does not entail that it cannot constitute or individuate the 
content of the relevant thought.   
 
In summary, our stated purpose in this section was to investigate whether 
modificationism faced some insurmountable challenges stemming from its 
seeming reliance on both the existence, and content determining powers, of 
cognitive phenomenology.  While I admit there is a great deal more work 
required here to vindicate modificationism on the cognitive phenomenology 
front, I also submit that the challenges modificationism faces here are not 
insurmountable.  Indeed, there appears to be promising progress here.    
 
6.2 Unconscious Content 
 
If you recall, modificationism is committed to the view that original 
intentionality is a kind of phenomenality—that (original) intentional content 
is phenomenal.  Non-conscious states that have intentional content thus 
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stand as immediate counter-examples to modificationism.  It would be 
extremely convenient if non-conscious states formed a well-behaved kind 
such that they could all be addressed together.  Unfortunately they do not. 
There are three broad categories of non-conscious states that could pose 
challenges for the modificationist: 1) states of the deep sub-conscious, such 
as those that might make one want to kill his father and marry his mother; 2) 
standing states, such as one’s non-occurrent belief that the Eiffel tower is in 
France; 3) sub-doxastic/sub-personal states, such that those of early visual 
processing.   
 
In what follows, I list several proposals for handling (some) non-conscious 
states (or others).  My suggestion will be that given the disparity in kind of 
non-conscious states, some combination of the following views is the best 
way to handle the cases. 
 
Searle (1992, pp. 155 – 162) argues for what he calls the connection principle.  
The view is that non-conscious states have the intentional content they do in 
virtue of the phenomenal character they would have were they conscious.  
This suggests that the relevant kind of unconscious states are at least 
potentially conscious, and that their intentional content can only be 
determined relative to their connection to consciousness.  In a similar vein, 
Mendelovici suggests a kind of dispositionalism about some non-conscious 
states.  In particular, one’s standing non-occurrent belief that the Eiffel Tower 
is in France is simply one’s disposition to occurently believe that the Eiffel 
Tower is in France (Mendelovici, MS). 
 
Horgan and Graham (2012, p. 341) offer a position dubbed inferentialism by 
Kriegel (2011, p. 194).  The idea here is the intentional content of 
subconscious states is derived from: 
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“…their role in an overall assignment of contents to actual and potential 
states of the cognitive system under which: (i) all phenomenally conscious 
states are assigned the content that they inherently possess by virtue of their 
intrinsic phenomenal character, and (ii) all other states in the system are 
assigned contents in such a way that the overall content-assignment exhibits 
and acceptably high degree of internal rational coherence” (Horgan & 
Graham, 2012, p. 341).   
 
This view emerges within the framework of arguing that only phenomenal 
intentionality (intentionality constituted by phenomenal character) has 
determinate content.  And it is the determinateness of this phenomenal 
intentional content that is supposed to do the work of ensuring that a unique 
content is assigned to the non-conscious states.  The idea is that the 
determinate phenomenal intentional contents act as a network of “anchor 
points” sufficient to infer a unique content to each subconscious state.  
Subconscious states derive their content by inference—inference based on 
the determinateness of phenomenally intentional states and how the 
relevant subconscious states interact with them in the “cognitive architecture 
of competent human cognizers” (Horgan & Graham, 2012, p. 341).    
 
Kriegel’s view, interpretivism, is that non-conscious states derive their 
intentional content by interpretation (Kriegel, 2011, pp. 200-218).  A non-
conscious state, S, has the intentional content that P, if the best interpretation 
of the cognitive system to which S belongs would assign P to S.  Kriegel 
credits this view’s starting place to Dennett (Kriegel, 2011, p.201).  Indeed, 
interpretivism in this sense involves taking the intentional stance towards the 
sub-system that constitutes a cognitive system’s non-conscious states.   
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Another interesting suggestion from Mendelovici (2010) concerns sub-
personal/sub-doxastic states.   Her view is that though such states are not 
intentional in the same sense that conscious states are, nothing stands in the 
way of attributing them a kind of informational/computational content 
(Mendelovici, MS)—call this view informationalism. This content might be 
attributed to them according to certain causal co-variational relations they 
bear to things in the cognitive system’s environment, or by some other 
means. This does not contradict what was discussed back in Part 1.  There, 
the challenges raised against causal covariational theories were based on the 
difficulty of specifying which causal/covariational relation was the one that 
determines the content. To repeat, the informationalist holds that there need 
not be any determinate fact of the matter about what the informational    
content of the relevant state is.  States of the early visual processing system 
might causally covary with several things in a long causal chain, and the 
present proposal is that they can be about one, two, or all of these things 
based on what information we are interested in. As Mendelovici suggests, 
informationalism has the benefit of “freeing-up” informational content from 
certain constraints we place on bonafide intentional content (Mendelovici, 
MS).  Consider the rings on a tree.  The rings on a tree can carry information 
about the age of the tree, the chemistry of the atmosphere at a given point in 
history, the life cycle of certain boring insects, and so on.  The virtue of taking 
sub-doxastic/sub-personal states as having this kind of informational 
content, is that there need not be any determinate fact of the matter about 
what they represent/are about: they can be about one, all, or none of these 
things depending on our interests.  On the other hand, phenomenal 
intentional content does have this kind of constraint (Mendelovici, MS).  
 
As a reminder, there were three kinds of non-conscious states I mentioned 
earlier: 1) states of the deep sub-conscious, such as those that might make 
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one want to kill his father and marry his mother (subconscious states 
hereafter); 2) standing states, such as one’s non-occurrent belief that the 
Eiffel tower is in France; 3) sub-doxastic/sub-personal states, such that those 
of early visual processing.  Each poses a prima facie challenge for 
modificationism—the view that intentionality is a kind of phenomenality—
since non-conscious states are non-phenomenal.  As I said earlier, it would be 
very surprising if a single theory of the non-conscious could account for such 
disparate kinds of non-conscious states.   
 
Again, my goal here is to see whether modificationism faces any 
insurmountable challenges arising from non-conscious states.  I have listed 
several theoretical options found in the literature, and suggested which ones 
are open to the modificationist.   To repeat, I am agnostic about which 
approach best accounts for subconscious states of the sort posited by Freud.  
As for standing states, I favour dispositionalism for reasons of content 
determinacy.  I am inclined to attribute a level of determinacy to my standing 
non-occurrent states, such as my belief that the Eiffel Tower is in France—a 
level of determinacy that that I am not inclined to attribute to sub-
doxastic/sub-personal states.  Dispositionalism helps explain why I have this 
inclination.  My inclination to attribute determinacy to my non-occurrent 
standing belief that the Eiffel Tower is in France arises because that very 
non-occurrent belief just is my disposition to have the occurrent belief with 
that determinate content.  
 
For sub-doxastic/sub-personal states, I am inclined towards 
informationalism.  My reason for doing so is that informationalism seems to 
be the most compatible with the edicts of cognitive scientific research. 
Informationalism holds that there are all sorts of informational states that 
are not accessible to consciousness, but are nonetheless contentful.  The 
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informationalist simply holds that the kind of content such states have is 
different in kind from phenomenal intentional content.  
 
Before moving on, I would like to note that every view we examined—the 
connection principle, dispositionalism, inferentialism, interpretivism and 
informationalism—made the content we attribute to the various non-
conscious states somehow derived.  Non-conscious states derive their 
content from the occurrent states they are disposed to be (Searle, 
Mendelovici), or from an inference based on the determinateness of 
phenomenally intentional states and how the relevant subconscious states 
interact with them in the cognitive architecture of competent human 
cognizers (Horgan et al.), or from the interpretation given them by an ideal 
interpreter (Kriegel), or from our interests (Mendelovici). In short, if we 
insist that these disparate non-conscious states are intentional, they are all 
cases of derived intentionality: they are about what they are about in virtue 
of intentional states distinct from themselves. 
 
6.3 Structural Modifications 
 
Finally, a family of problems—originating from Jackson (1977, pp. 63-72)— 
emerges for the kind of view we are exploring.   Jackson’s concerns are 
directed towards the adverbial theory of perception championed by theorists 
such as Chisholm (1957).  However, Jackson’s worries would seem to apply 
equally to the views we are examining. First, in the case of more complex 
adverbial states such as thinking redly-squarely, it is unclear what the 
relevant adverbs are modifying.  For instance, does redly modify squarely or 
vice versa?  
 
Consider Jackson’s example: 
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1) He speaks impressively. 
2) He speaks impressively quickly. 
 
In 1) ‘impressively’ modifies the speaking, but in 2) it modifies the other 
adverb.  But in the case of thinking squarely, versus thinking redly squarely, 
it is not clear that there is any principled way of determining which adverb 
modifies what.    
 
On behalf of the adverbialist, one is tempted to say that neither adverb 
modifies the other, but both modify the thinking.  When I think redly 
squarely, I am thinking redly and squarely.  Compare: When he speaks, he 
speaks impressively and quickly. Several issues emerge for this way of 
understanding the adverbial properties.  First, when I think white-unicorn-ly, 
it seems like the ‘white-ly’ is somehow connected to the ‘unicorn-ly’. This is 
why I can easily entertain white-unicorn-ly thoughts, as opposed to tree-car-
ly, or table-chair-ly thoughts.  But how can the present view—on which the 
white-ly and unicorn-ly both modify the thinking—make sense of this?  
 
Second and relatedly, imagine thinking about a white unicorn and a hairy 
Bigfoot.  On one adverbial construal, we are to understand this as thinking 
white-ly and unicorn-ly and hair-ly and bigfoot-ly.  But this is precisely how 
someone would be thinking were they thinking about a hairy unicorn and a 
white Bigfoot.  The adverbialist cannot distinguish thinking about a white 
unicorn and a hairy Bigfoot from thinking about a hairy unicorn and a white 
Bigfoot (Jackson, 1977, p. 64).  
 
What to do?  One move is to fall back on the original suggestion that when 
one thinks about a white unicorn and a hairy Bigfoot, one is thinking white-
unicorn-ly and hairy-bigfoot-ly.   The problem here is that while it can be 
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inferred that I am thinking about unicorns from the fact that I am thinking 
about white unicorns, the same does not appear to be true of my white-
unicorn-ly thoughts (Jackson, 1977, pp. 69 – 72).  In a similar vein, it seems 
that when I think about a white unicorn, and then a grey unicorn, my 
thoughts somehow overlap, or have something in common—namely, they are 
both about unicorns (Jackson, 1977, p 67).  However, the adverbial construal 
cannot accommodate this: ‘unicorn’ is no more a part of ‘white-unicorn-ly’ 
than ‘straw’ is of ‘strawberry’.  The problem has to do with the structure of 
thought: Something about the structure of the thought licenses the inference 
from ‘I am thinking about white unicorns’ to ‘I am thinking about unicorns’.  
Likewise, something about the structure of the two thoughts—the one about 
white unicorns and the one about grey ones—makes them similar: Each 
appears to have ‘unicorn’ as a constituent.  
 
What this comes down to is that modificationism seems unable to 
accommodate the fact that our thoughts are structured—being composed of 
simpler parts in a systematic way so as to produce a complex whole.  In short, 
the objection is that modificationism cannot accommodate compositionality. 
 
One move for the modificationist here is to bite the bullet and deny that 
thoughts have compositionality, or have it only derivatively. One might, for 
instance, argue that though thoughts do not have inherent compositionality, 
they somehow manage to derive a kind of pseudo-structure from the 
structure of language.  The idea here would be that language somehow 
contributes to the expressive power of thought so as to imbue thought with 
the requisite kind of structure.  Prima facie, this seems at odds with the idea 
that the intentionality of words derives from that of thoughts, but it need not 
be. For instance, I can use sticks and stones to build a complicated machine 
whose purpose is to manufacture hammers and nails, with which I can build 
  
111 
an even more complicated machine whose purpose is to build air 
compressors and pneumatic nail guns, and so on.  Thoughts (or concepts) 
would be the sticks and stones, and language would be like the machine/s.  
From fairly rudimentary (non-compositional) elements, I can build a more 
complicated (combinatorial) system, which then serves to shape, transform 
and empower the rudimentary elements into exponentially more powerful 
tools. I think it is an interesting view, and one that a modificationist might 
reasonably pursue.   
 
On the other hand, it might be argued that modificationism can indeed 
deliver the relevant kind of structure.  A sketch of such an argument can be 
found in Kriegel (2011, pp. 161-163).  The idea is that perhaps the 
determinate/determinable structure might help the adverbialist answer 
some of Jackson’s challenges. Very roughly, determinables are general ways 
things can be, and determinates are more particular ways things can be.  
Many things in the world exhibit this structure.  Red is a determinable of 
which crimson is a determinate.  Maple is a determinable of which Japanese 
Maple is a determinate.  Stephen Yablo has capitalized on this idea to give an 
account of mental causation (Yablo, Thoughts: Philosophical Papers Volume 
I, 2008), and answer questions about essence and identity (Yablo, 2010).   
 
With respect to Jackson’s challenges, the first was that in cases such as 
thinking redly squarely, it is not clear which adverb modifies the other.  This 
prompted us to amend the adverbial construal so as to make conspicuous 
that the redly and squarely modify the thinking, not each other.  But this was 
problematic since, in cases like thinking white-ly unicorn-ly, the ‘whitely’ 
seems to be connected to the ‘unicorn-ly’. Again, this is merely a sketch of a 
possible solution, so bear with me. First let us take thinking somehow (being 
directed somehow) as the ultimate determinable, of which thinking unicorn-
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ly is a determinate.  Thinking unicorn-ly is also a determinable, of which 
thinking white-unicorn-ly is a determinate, that is, a particular manner or 
way of thinking.  Let us also assume a level of bottom up transitivity so that if 
C is a determinate, or modifier of B, and B is a determinate/modifier of A, 
then C is also a modifier of A, by modifying what modifies A—namely B.  With 
this rudimentary structure in place, we can answer Jackson’s first challenge: 
When I think about white unicorns, I am thinking white-unicorn-ly, which is a 
determinate of thinking unicorn-ly, which is itself a determinate of thinking.  
The ‘white-ly’ modifies the thinking by modifying the thinking unicorn-ly.   
 
But what about thinking red-squarely; which is the determinate or the 
determinable here?  That is, in the case of white unicorns, the order of 
determinable/determinate is obvious, but it is not so obvious in the red 
square case.  Perhaps this is true, but this does not seem like a problem 
particular to modificationism.  One can imagine asking someone to think of a 
red square and then asking her what it is she is thinking of in the first place, 
the redness or the squareness. Sometimes there will be an answer to this 
kind of question, and other times there will not. In cases where there is such 
an answer, the present suggestion is that modificationism can appeal to the 
determinate/determinable structure to accord with it.  I can think of a white 
egg, and I can think of painting my walls egg white.  According to 
modificationism, in the former case, I am thinking white-egg-ly, and in the 
later I am thinking egg-whitely—where the difference is a difference in the 
determinate/determinable structure.   
 
The second concern we looked at was that modificationism could not make 
sense of the fact that, when we think about white unicorns and hairy 
Bigfoots, it is precisely that and not hairy unicorns and white Bigfoots about 
which we think.  I suggested that the modificationism could avoid this 
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particular concern by understanding the relevant thought as a white-
unicorn-ly and hairy-bigfoot-ly thought.  The problem with this move was 
that it seemed to block certain intuitive inferences.  From the fact that I am 
thinking about a white unicorn, it follows that I am thinking about a unicorn.  
This is because ‘unicorn’ is a constituent of ‘white unicorn’.  But the inference 
does not appear to go through for thinking white-unicorn-ly.  This is because 
‘unicorn’ is not a proper constituent of white-unicorn-ly: the latter is 
syntactically simple.  Notice, however, that though the fact that I kicked a 
strawberry does not entail that I kicked a straw, it does entail that I kicked a 
berry (Kriegel, 2011, p. 162).  This is because a strawberry is a determinate 
of the determinable berry. If we assume that thinking white-unicorn-ly is a 
determinate of the determinable unicorn-ly, then the inference that I am 
thinking unicorn-ly from the fact that I am thinking white-unicorn-ly seems 
go through.   
 
Admittedly, this is only slightly more of a sketch than is found in (Kriegel 
2011), but I think it is a promising one.  At some level the demand for 
compositionality is a demand for structure.  To require that thoughts have 
compositionality is to demand that they be structured in a particular way, or 
perhaps, that they be capable of structure. And while the 
determinate/determinable structure is different from compositional 
structure, it is still structure—structure that seems helpful in answering 
some of the most famous objections to adverbialism (and hence 
modificationism).  I think the question of how much work this 
determinate/determinable structure can do for the modificationism is both 
fascinating and a worthy candidate for another monograph.  Stephen Yablo, 
for instance, argues that the determinate/determinable structure can help us 
get some traction on several important issues, including mental causation 
(Yablo, Thoughts: Philosophical Papers Volume I, 2008).  
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I conclude part 2 with a summary and look forward.  Having expressed some 
dissatisfaction with relation views of intentionality (Part 1), I said part 2 was 
going to be dedicated to exploring non-relational alternatives.  I suggested 
that we begin our exploration with views on which the intentional and the 
phenomenal are closely connected.  In particular, I said that I wanted to 
examine what I called the moderate identity view: intentionality is a kind of 
phenomenality. This led me to phenomenal intentionality theory, and I 
examined three different theories that I took to be consistent with moderate 
identity.   Dubbing any account that combines the moderate identity view 
with the thesis that phenomenality is a modifying feature of mental states 
‘moderate modificationism’, I suggested that moderate modificationism 
appears to fit the bill of being a non-relational account of intentionality.  That 
being said, I explained that several challenges arise for this kind of view, 
three of which were the problem of cognitive phenomenology, the problem of 
the unconscious, and the challenge that thoughts are structured.  I discussed 
several options that a modificationist might reasonably pursue in attempting 
to meet these challenges, and explained which, if any, I thought the most 
promising.  I concluded that the challenges considered are not 
insurmountable.  However, there remains a final difficulty for 
modificationism, one that was not addressed in part 2—the problem of 
cognitive contact.  To my mind, it is the most pressing of all concerns, since, 
as will be explained, modificationism seems primed to leave us all trapped 
inside our own heads.  It is to this that I now turn. 
 
Part 3: The Problem of Cognitive Contact 
 
7. Introduction to the Problem 
 
  
115 
So far, we have examined some difficulties with the relational view of 
intentionality, and have been looking into non-relational alternatives.  In 
particular, the view we have been examining, modificationism, takes 
intentionality to be a species of phenomenality.  On this view, the 
phenomenal-intentional content of a phenomenally intentional state is an 
intrinsic modifying property of that state. In Part 2, I considered several 
purported difficulties with this view, but argued that they could be overcome.  
In this final section, I want to address another more serious problem with 
phenomenal intentionality theory in general, and modificationism in 
particular.  The problem is this: it seems like the whole point of having 
intentionality is that this phenomenon puts us in cognitive contact with the 
world outside our skins.  Introspectively our intentional states appear to 
accomplish precisely this.  But how is this possible on the non-relational 
account I have presented?  
 
Put another way: It looks as though, almost by definition, making cognitive 
contact with something involves being related to that thing.  If the ability to 
make cognitive contact with the world is a desideratum on a theory of 
intentionality, and if making cognitive contact with something involves being 
related to that thing, then it looks as though any view that denies that 
intentionality is a relation will, by that very denial, make cognitive contact 
impossible.  Of course, more will need to be said about what exactly cognitive 
contact is supposed to amount to, but it is not difficult to see how cognitive 
contact poses a prima facie problem for the views we have been looking at.  
Indeed, the problem of cognitive contact would appear to make trouble for 
any account that combines the thesis that intentionality is entirely a matter 
of phenomenality with the view that phenomenality is an intrinsic, non-
relational phenomenon.  This is a hard problem, and one that has not been 
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given enough attention within what Kriegel calls the Phenomenal 
Intentionality Research Program (2013).67   
 
Perhaps this lack attention is due to the fact that the problem of cognitive 
contact is considered to be a problem for perception and perception alone.  
After all, it is in perception that our cognitive contact with the world is most 
apparent.  When I have a perceptual experience as of a Japanese maple in 
leaf, my perceptual experience seems to put me in cognitive contact with the 
maple.  However, the problem of cognitive contact cuts much deeper. When, 
for instance, I consider rescuing another dog, it seems as though my thoughts 
are connected to flesh and blood dogs.  
 
To put things in a way more consonant with what has so far been said: the 
non-relational way one is intentionally directed does not appear to be a good 
candidate for securing cognitive contact. So, what to do?  Perhaps a good 
starting place is to concretize the problem a bit:  
1) We are in cognitive contact with the world outside our skins. 
2) It looks as though this contact is established by intentionality. 
3) Being in cognitive contact with X is, or is partly constituted, or 
involves, or consists in, being related to X. 
4) By 2) and 3), it looks as though intentionality establishes a relation to 
the world outside our skins. 
5) Intentionality is not a relation. 
 
                                                        
67 The issue is discussed briefly in (Kriegel, 2011) and (Mendelovici, MS). 
(Montague, 2013) focuses explicitly on what she call The Access Problem, 
which is quite plausibly taken to be the problem of cognitive contact.  
However, she seems to assume a relation view of intentionality—though an 
internalist one.    
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Clearly, we have a quasi-inconsistent set. I call this set “quasi-inconsistent” 
because of my use of the ‘looks’ locution in 2) and 4).  This is not intended to 
leave a theoretical loophole through which a slippery non-relation theorist 
might slide.  My use of ‘looks’ is merely to indicate that introspection appears 
to support these theses.  I do not intend to make looks-can-be-deceiving 
arguments. 
 
So, we have a list of theses that, when put together, appear to be inconsistent, 
since 1), 2) and 3) yield 4), which contradicts 5). Of course, without some 
clearly defined notion of cognitive contact—a task that I will turn to 
shortly—1) lends less to the inconsistency of the set than it might otherwise 
do.  However, even with only the murkiest conception of what cognitive 
contact is supposed to amount to, it is plain that giving up 1) is a 
consequence to be avoided. 2) Is introspectively obvious: If I am somehow in 
cognitive contact with, say, the cardinal at the feeder, then it looks as though 
what is responsible for this contact is my cardinal-at-the-feeder intentional 
episode.  Again, 3) seems almost to follow definitionally from the term 
‘contact’.  I know of no way of contacting anything without being related to it.  
4) Is an implication of the acceptance of 2) and 3).  As for 5), most would 
reject it, but, of course, my view is precisely that 5) is true.  So what to do?   
 
With some careful analysis, I will suggest that the modificationist is not 
doomed by the seeming inconsistency.  In short, I will suggest that 4) and 5) 
can be understood as compatible on a proper understanding of 2).    What is 
required here is a clearer picture of 2), such that we can accept that 
intentionality makes possible our cognitive contact with the world, but is 
itself not the relation that constitutes cognitive contact. More on this in what 
follows.  For now I want to map out how things will proceed. 
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First, I want to spell out exactly what an account of cognitive contact should 
address. Next, I will list some plausible points on which we might evaluate 
theories of cognitive contact—a set of criteria against which we might judge 
the relative merits or demerits of various theories. With these in hand, I will 
go on to examine two views about cognitive contact, evaluating each.  I will 
conclude I will conclude that giving a perfect account of cognitive contact is 
not an easy thing to do regardless of one’s theoretical commitments, and that 
perhaps all we can hope for respect to cognitive contact is a less than perfect 
account.  I will then explain what options a modificationist might have to 
provide a plausible account of cognitive contact and explain my preference 
among these. That being said, I will not claim to have solved the problem of 
cognitive contact for modificationism.  What I hope to do is to show that 
modificationism is not a doomed theory with respect to delivering cognitive 
contact, and gesture at how someone might go about working on the problem 
within the theoretical confines of modificationism.  
 
7.1 What is Cognitive Contact? 
 
Simply put, cognitive contact is the contact that our intentional mental states 
make with certain things.  How, for instance, do my intentional mental states 
make contact with tables and chairs?68 To be sure, some theories’ account of 
cognitive contact will just be their account of intentionality. But on other 
prominent theories of intentionality, intentional mental states are about 
                                                        
68 I will sometimes speak as if it is people who make cognitive contact with 
things.  In a sense, if a particular thought of mine makes cognitive contact 
with the world, then I too have so contacted it.  Strictly speaking, the 
phenomenon I am after is the contact our intentional mental states make 
with the world of ordinary objects, so all talk of our/your/my making 
cognitive contact should be understood as shorthand for intentional mental 
state talk.    
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abstract properties, or propositions, so at least some of the cognitive contact 
we appear to have with concreta stands in need of accounting. 
  
Again, the problem of cognitive contact might seem to bear a family 
resemblance to the problems discussed in Part 1; namely, the problem of 
specifying the nature of the relation between intentional states and their 
contents, and that of specifying what items serve as contents.  While the 
problems are certainly related, they are not identical.  The problem of 
cognitive contact concerns our mental states’ relation to certain objects 
regardless of whether you think that those objects are the contents of 
thoughts, or instantiate abstract properties that themselves are the contents 
of thoughts, or, by some other relation, produce mind dependent sense data 
that serve as contents, or whether you take contents to be 
modifications/determinants of representational states, etc.   We are in 
cognitive contact with certain objects regardless of your stance on the 
abovementioned views, and that is what any given theory must account for.69   
 
That being said, the problem of cognitive contact and the problem of the 
nature of content intersect on some views.70  Direct realists, who take 
contents to be ordinary objects, will presumably not need to provide an 
additional story about cognitive contact, apart from their story about how 
intentional states are related to their contents.  On the other hand, our 
discussion about the abstract objects views of content does not exempt an 
abstract objects theorist from providing some account of cognitive contact. 
 
                                                        
69 There are, of course, exceptions.  A thoroughgoing metaphysical idealist 
will have no problem about cognitive contact since his/her ontology does not 
posit ordinary objects to be in contact with.  
70 That is, the cognitive contact relation just is the intentional relation on 
some views. 
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7.2 A theory of cognitive contact 
 
I suppose the most ideal theory of cognitive contact would have the mind 
somehow extend out in to the world and literally rub itself on the things it 
appears to be directed at.  Assuming the mind is in some way contained in 
the brain, this does not seem possible. 
 
A close second would be if ordinary objects managed to somehow permeate 
the skull and, as it were, rub themselves on the mind.  As stated, this latter 
option may also seem problematic.  However, I take it that a more refined 
version is precisely what many theories aim for.  Direct realists, for instance, 
hold that ordinary objects are the constituents of perceptions, and thus that 
what goes on in perception is partly constituted by ordinary objects and 
states of affairs.  Representationalists, who posit abstract objects as contents, 
also think the external world manages to imprint itself on the mind.71  This 
latter view, however, holds that abstract rather than ordinary objects 
manage to do the imprinting.  This may seem to be an improvement on the 
ordinary objects view: perhaps something about their abstract nature allows 
such things to permeate the skull in a way that ordinary objects certainly 
cannot. However, without some supplemental story about how the 
imprinting of these abstract objects on our minds manages to secure our 
cognitive contact, the abstract object view will need to say more about the 
notion of cognitive contact I am after. 
 
                                                        
71 Again, talk of imprinting on the mind is talk of something over and above 
any causal effects the external world has on the mind.  With the exception of 
some ardent idealists, everyone agrees that the external world causes things 
in us.  But this causing is not what constitutes cognitive contact, since the 
world can cause internal changes in non-cognitive things.   
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7.2.1 Points of Evaluation 
 
One way to understand the problem of cognitive contact is as a problem 
about how we manage to peek outside our heads and access the world 
beyond our skins.72  Understanding the problem this way highlights the 
closely related issue of what the world beyond our skin is like.  That is, being 
in cognitive contact with the external world would seem to imply some 
understanding of that world: cognitive contact would seem to obtain when 
what is going on in the external world and what is going on in the head 
somehow line up, fit or are otherwise congruent.  And that requires a 
substantial view about what the external world is like.  Take, for example, the 
view that mental representation is a matter of forming a picture in one’s 
mind that resembles the aspects of the external world that are represented.  
In this case, cognitive contact would obtain when the mental picture is 
sufficiently similar to the external world (or parts thereof).  Clearly, this view 
assumes a particular view of the external world: It is such that a veridical 
mental picture can resemble it.   
 
These are deep issues that concern not only theories of mentality, but also 
metaphysical issues surrounding realism and idealism, and I cannot possibly 
address everything at issue between realism and idealism on the one hand, 
and what various theories say about cognitive contact on the other.  The 
point here is to highlight that any account of cognitive contact will, either 
overtly or by implication, say something about the external world. Hence one 
way to evaluate theories of cognitive contact is according to how they 
conceive of the external world with which we are in contact.  
    
                                                        
72 I say ‘peek’ but the kind of contact in question is not strictly visual.   
  
122 
Closely related, is what a theory of cognitive contact implies about our 
knowledge of the external world and the mechanisms that secure it. Ideally, 
the kind of cognitive contact we have with the external world should, in some 
way, make possible a relatively robust knowledge thereof.  That is, it would 
be ideal for our theory of cognitive contact to make possible the acquisition 
of bonafide knowledge about the items we are in contact with in such a way 
as to leave the mechanism whereby we acquire that knowledge transparent, 
and clear enough to distinguish bad cases—cases where the failure of this 
mechanism explains why we fail to acquire knowledge in certain cases.73     
 
An ideal account should also either accord with, or give some sort of 
explanation of, the common-sense view that our cognitive contact with the 
external world is immediate and direct.  At the very least, it certainly seems 
that our cognitive contact with the world is immediate and direct.  That being 
said, one’s view need not be that of direct realism.  It should, however, 
explain why direct realism appears to be the unreflective default.   
 
I suppose too that parsimony should be included on our list.  My only caveat 
here is that this last point should figure lower on the list of ideal criteria—a 
final tiebreaker if you will. My reason for this is simply that I think parsimony 
is a good explanatory principle, but is not necessarily the gold standard for 
ontology (Quine and Ockham notwithstanding).    
 
My guess is that there are a whole host of other criteria and ideal cases we 
might add.  For instance, we might want to add that an account of cognitive 
contact should not appeal to any naturalistically problematic entities or 
                                                        
73 This last point is really a corollary of the bonafide knowledge requirement.  
Knowledge should ideally be distinguishable from apparent knowledge.  I 
suppose one might be content just knowing that we can have knowledge, 
even though we might not know we have it. 
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relations.  We would not, for instance, want to count a theory as being ideal if 
it managed to satisfy all other criteria by endorsing divine occasionalism.  A 
theory that appealed to vital spirits, or the ether, or ghosts, too would be out.  
I hesitate, however, to include a naturalism proviso, since, assuming that 
entities that exist outside of space and time, such as Platonic universals, are 
not natural, this criterion would rule out any view on which such entities 
played a role in establishing cognitive contact. 
 
7.3 Summary and a Look Ahead 
 
To reiterate then, our evaluation of how various theories understand 
cognitive contact will be according to the following:  
1) How the theory understands the external world 
2) What the theory says about our knowledge of the external world 
3) How the theory accounts for the seeming directness and 
immediateness of our cognitive contact 
4) A theory’s relative parsimony. 
 
At this point, allow me to recap and reiterate how things are going to 
proceed.  The problem for modificationism—the view that intentionality is a 
kind of phenomenality and that content is a modifying property of 
phenomenally intentional states—is that it seems unable to deliver, or even 
make sense of, this intuitive notion that we are in cognitive contact with the 
world outside our skins. The problem is that it looks like intentionality is 
what delivers the relation of cognitive contact, but modificationism denies 
that intentionality is a relation. Though a serious problem, I think that the 
theoretical confines within which modificationism is bound do not spell 
certain doom for the theory, and that modificationism does have some 
resources for addressing the problem of cognitive contact. Before 
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highlighting these resources, however, I want to examine and evaluate how 
other theories go about addressing the problem of cognitive contact.  My 
methodology for this latter project is, as stated, to see how a given theory 
stacks up with respect to the points of evaluation listed above. The point, 
again, is not to enumerate and evaluate every possible theory that has 
something to say about cognitive contact, but merely to show that the 
problem is a difficult one.   Given this, I will argue that modificationism may 
indeed have some resources for addressing the problem, though it may turn 
out that the kind of solution open to the modificationist is, like its rivals, less 
than perfect.     
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8: Various Accounts of Cognitive Contact  
 
8.1 Taxonomy 
 
In general questions about our cognitive contact with the world outside our 
skins are questions about our connections to that world; or, more precisely, 
about our mental states’ connection to that world.  How are our intentional 
states connected to e.g. tables and chairs, such that, for instance, we are able 
to successfully navigate our environment? How does our cognitive contact 
with the world differ from how introspection seems to have it? 
 
While it is difficult to draw up lines that neatly categorize various views 
about our cognitive contact with the world, a good starting place is perhaps 
to distinguish between what I shall hereafter call directivist theories and 
indirectivist theories.  Directivist theories take our cognitive contact with the 
world to be direct and unmediated by entities such as sense data, 
representations74, percepts, abstract properties, universals, etc.  Indirectivist 
theories posit something in between our intentional states and the world, 
such as sense data, representations or abstract objects/properties; and these 
intermediaries play a role in establishing contact between the mind and the 
world.    
 
                                                        
74My use of ‘representations’ here might be a bit misleading, since not every 
one who endorses a representational/intentional theory of mind is an 
indirectivist.  If, however, representations are things that stand in between 
our minds and the external world of tables and chairs, then a proponent of 
representations in this sense is an indirectivist.   
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Later on, it will be made clear where modificationism fits within this 
taxonomy.75  Setting this last point aside, a little disambiguation is in order 
here. First, everyone agrees that intentionality appears to connect us directly 
to the world of tables and chairs.  The directivist/indirectivist divide is thus 
not about how things seem to an intentional subject.  Nor does holding the 
view that we only see e.g. the table by seeing (some of) its properties 
necessarily land one in the indirectivist camp because the properties of the 
table act as intermediaries between one’s intentional state and the table.76  
No, the directivist/indirectivist divide categorizes views according to 
whether or not what is going on in one’s mind connects directly to the 
everyday things it seems to, or whether it connects to something else that is 
connected to these things via some other relation.  
 
8.2 Indirectivism  
 
As said, indirectivists posit intermediary entities between our intentional 
mental states and the world of ordinary objects.  These intermediaries might 
be representations, sense data, intentional objects, percepts, or some other 
kind of thing.  Different indirectivist views posit different entities for a 
variety of reasons.  Some, like sense data, are thought to be required because 
of a disparity between how things appear and how they are. Others are 
sometimes thought to be required in order to avoid certain complications 
                                                        
75 That is not to say that the details of any given phenomenal intentionalist 
account will not constrain the possibilities here.   
76 The view in question here is not one that takes the relevant properties to 
be abstract universals, but one that takes the properties to be property 
instances.  So, one is not an indirectivist simply because one holds the 
position that we only see the table by seeing its instantiated properties.  One 
is an indirectivist if one thinks the table’s properties cause us to represent 
abstract properties, of which the table’s properties are instances.    
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arising from intentional inexistents, and other such puzzles. Below I examine 
one such indirectivist account, listing its merits and demerits.   
 
Before doing so, I should explain why I have chosen not to discuss a very 
prominent theory that can be understood as an indirectivist theory of 
cognitive contact: Frege’s account of sense and reference.  Roughly put, 
senses, or cognitive contents on Frege’s view (Frege, 1892/1997), act as 
intermediaries between mental states and the world of ordinary objects. On 
Frege’s view, the cognitive contact relation is akin to reference, which obtains 
between a mental state and an ordinary object by means of the object’s mode 
of presentation, or sense (Frege, 1892/1997).  So for Frege cognitive contact 
is a two-step relation: the first between the mental state and its content 
(sense), the second between the sense and its referent (the ordinary object in 
the present case.  My reason for not examining this view of cognitive contact 
is that I have already discussed several challenges for views that take 
contents to be senses: if there are challenges to the view that intentionality is 
a relation to senses, and if this relation to senses is the first of two steps in 
making cognitive contact (reference), then those challenges apply here as 
well. 
  
8.2.1 Indirectivism and Sense Data    
 
The sense data theory takes mind dependent concrete objects to be the 
immediate objects of experience (Russell, 1912/1997, 1927). Though out of 
favour, sense data theories appear to have some advantages. There does not 
seem to be a problem about how to specify the relation between intentional 
states and their contents since the contents with which the intentional states 
are connected are, at least on most sense data views, in direct contact with 
them. On the other hand, one might ask how exactly are we to pair sense data 
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with the ordinary objects a theory of cognitive contact requires.  Perhaps 
some sense data theorists are idealists, but many are not.  Therefore some 
additional story about how we cognitively contact the world of ordinary 
objects by first contacting sense data is required. That is, some account is 
required about which mind-dependent sense datum is linked to which 
external ordinary object, such that when I encounter that object, I have that 
sense datum.  That is how a sense data theory would deliver cognitive 
contact.    
 
One possibility for specifying which sense datum goes with which object is by 
appeal to co-instantiation.  Roughly, round sense data go with objects that 
have the property of roundness. The challenge here is that sense data 
theories came about, in part, because our perceptions seem to involve 
properties that everyday objects do not have, such as perspectival properties.  
More clearly, sense data theories enjoyed the popularity they did precisely 
because they had an answer about how perfectly round coins could appear 
elliptical, how after images could be yellow, etc.   The answer was that in such 
cases, there is indeed something elliptical, or yellow.  It is just that the 
elliptical or yellow thing is a mind dependent sense datum.  This is 
problematic because it seems to preclude the sense data theorist from 
appealing to the co-instantiation of properties to secure cognitive contact, as 
the things that we perceive indirectly (the external world objects) often do 
not, or cannot, instantiate some/all of the properties that the sense data 
appear to have.  
 
Presumably, someone keen on sense data could posit some causal relation 
between ordinary objects and minds such that under certain circumstances, 
encountering object X would cause sense data SDX to happen, token, be 
instantiated, etc. in the mind of the subject.  Whether or not this causal 
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relation is problematic will depend on the nature of the sense datum.  If a 
sense datum is a physical object, then the causal relation does not seem so 
mysterious. If, however, sense data are non-physical objects, then the causal 
relation inherits the problems associated with dualist interactionism: How do 
physical events cause sense data? 
 
However, because sense data are supposed to have the very properties they 
appear to, perhaps they are physical objects.  After all, assuming sense data 
theory to be true, and noting that sense data appear to have shape, color, size, 
etc., they must be physical.  Only physical objects have these kinds of 
properties.  But where, then, are sense data located?  Russell (1912; 1927), 
for instance, thought they were located in the brain.  The problem with that 
view is that nothing in the brain is, for instance, blue.   On Jackson’s (1977) 
view, sense data are precisely where they seem to be, and are indeed caused 
by the material objects to which they belong—where belonging to is cashed 
out in the following way: 
…[A] sense-datum, D, belongs to a material object, M, just if (i) an M-
event causes the having of D, and (ii) that spatial properties of D are 
functionally dependent on those of M as a consequences of the manner in 
which M causes the having of D. (Jackson, 1977, p. 171) 
 
Jackson also endorses the view that sense data can be three-dimensional 
(1977, pp. 102-103), which, according to Jackson, provides an answer to 
Ryle’s challenge that “round plates, however steeply tilted, do not usually 
look elliptical” (Jackson, 1977, p. 103). According to Jackson: 
 
 “[T]he three-dimensionalist has an extra dimension in which to resolve 
this dilemma.  The sense-datum belonging to the round plate held at an 
angle is round at an angle.” (Jackson, 1977, p. 104) 
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Novel though Jackson’s account of sense-data is, one wonders what 
additional benefit there is to calling the posited entities ‘sense data’ rather 
than properties.  They belong to objects, are (or can be) three dimensional, 
have causal influence on our sense organs, and, like the ordinary objects to 
which they belong, can appear round at an angle.   
 
Jackson’s idiosyncratic view aside, sense data are often thought to be non-
physical—or at least to exist in a phenomenal domain, rather than a physical 
one—mind-dependent entities that we are directly aware of when we 
perceive.    This being the case, the question that emerges is how sense data 
theory might deliver cognitive contact.  Our points of evaluation were: 
1) How the theory understands the external world 
2) What the theory says about our knowledge of the external world 
3) How the theory accounts for the seeming directness and 
immediateness of our cognitive contact 
4) A theory’s relative parsimony. 
If sense data exist outside the physical realm, and the ordinary objects that 
we think populate the external world exist in the physical realm, then it is not 
entirely clear whether sense data theory has much to say about the external 
world.  Epistemically, sense data theory also faces some serious challenges: 
our perceptually based beliefs are most plausibly taken to be about ordinary 
everyday objects and states of affairs.  But if perceptions are the justification 
for such beliefs, and our perceptions are always perceptions of sense data, 
then we seem to lack proper justification for believing anything about the 
ordinary objects our beliefs appear to be about—other than, of course, that 
said objects have, or in some way produce, the relevant sense data.   Perhaps 
this complaint demands too much of sense data theory.  The complaint, after 
all, seems to demand that the theory give us a justification for judgments 
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about the things in themselves as it were.  On the other hand, the complaint 
might be taken as merely stating that according to common sense, our 
perceptually based beliefs are about ordinary objects, not sense data.  So, 
sense data theory owes us an account of why things seem this way.  
Moreover, to someone not already committed to sense data, it is unclear how 
positing them would help a theory of cognitive contact.  While sense data are 
concrete particulars on most sense data theories, it is not clear how these 
mind dependent concreta manage to connect us with the world of ordinary 
objects.  This is especially true if, as is commonly held, sense data are not 
physical objects, and therefore have properties of a non-physical nature. 
 
8.3 Directivist Theories 
 
I turn now to directivism.  Perhaps the most widely known directivist view is 
direct realism—of which disjunctivism is one prominent species e.g. (Martin 
1997, 2004). However, some versions of adverbialism might also qualify as 
directivist depending on how the adverbial modifications are construed. In 
any case, what makes a theory directivist is that it posits no entities that 
mediate between our intentional states and the world of ordinary objects.  
The relation between our intentional states and the world is, in this sense, 
direct.  
 
Though direct realism and disjunctivism are theories of perception, I think 
the issues that arise in the theory of perception are equally applicable to a 
much broader range of our intentional mental lives.  If, for instance, there is a 
debate about whether your ice-cream perceptions manage to make direct 
cognitive contact with the ice cream in front of you, then surely the same 
question could be asked about your desire for said ice cream.   
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In general, direct realist theories posit a single relation between our 
intentional states and the world.  When I perceive a chair, I do not indirectly 
perceive it via a sense datum, representation, or set of abstract properties; 
the chair itself is actually a constituent of my chair-perception.  On a very 
simple direct realist view, the real world, mind-independent chair is a 
constituent of my chair-thoughts.  Cognitive contact is thus automatically 
established, as the things with which we are in cognitive contact serve as 
constituents of the very things that are supposed to do the contacting, 
namely thoughts, desires, perceptions etc. This kind of view appears to 
accord with how we (unreflectively) think about our cognitive relationship 
with our environment.  Unreflectively, it really does seem as though when I 
visually perceive the chair, I am in direct contact with it.   
 
8.3.1 Directivist Disjunctivism 
 
In a way, directivist disjunctivist theories—views that claim our veridical 
thoughts are of a different kind than our non-veridical ones—are a natural 
progression of direct realism.  Because direct realism takes actual wood-and-
nail chairs to be constituents of our chair-thoughts, some radically different 
account of our unicorn-thoughts is required: no flesh-and-blood unicorn was 
ever a constituent of anything.   So, concludes the disjunctivist, hallucinations, 
illusions, and thoughts about non-existent/impossible objects are not the 
same kind of thing as veridical thoughts.  On such a view, when a subject 
reports that s/he is currently having a mental episode as of seeing a table, we 
are to understand this report as saying either that s/he is perceiving a table 
or that s/he is in some way hallucinating—where the disjuncts name entirely 
different kinds of mental events/episodes.  The report should thus not be 
taken as indicating that some common mental core is present in both 
veridical perceptions and hallucinations. For disjunctivists, then, the problem 
  
133 
of cognitive contact involves combining direct realism with some plausible 
story about how subjectively indistinguishable hallucinations differ from 
veridical thoughts, perceptions, etc. in such a way as to allow that veridical 
thoughts connect us to the world, but hallucinations, illusions, etc. do not. As 
a subset of direct realists, disjunctivists claim that the ordinary objects we 
appear to be in contact with (e.g. tables and chairs) are constituents of our 
perceptions.  The problem is thus to say how this can be so, when a 
subjectively identical hallucination appears to put us in contact with 
precisely the same things.   
 
Before evaluating how well disjunctivism fares with respect to delivering 
cognitive contact, some theoretical preliminaries are in order.  As I 
understand them, disjunctivists do not deny the possibility of subjectively 
indistinguishable experiences—one veridical, one hallucinatory.  
 
“The disjunctive account of perception really says that there are two quite 
different sorts of oasis experience, which may none the less be 
indistinguishable to their owner” (Dancy, 2009).   
 
“…it is simply mistaken to suppose that there need be anything more in 
common across veridical perceptions and delusive experience, other than 
the fact that all of these states of mind may be indistinguishable for the 
subject who has them” (Martin, 2009). 
 
What disjunctivists deny is that two subjectively indistinguishable 
experiences—one veridical, one hallucinatory—are the same kind of mental 
event.  That is, the disjunctivist is not, if the above passages are any 
indication, denying that a subject may hallucinate a lemon such that, from the 
subject’s point of view, the hallucination is indistinguishable from a veridical 
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case.  The disjunctivist claims that, indistinguishable though the two cases 
seem to be from the subject’s point of view, the two cases are not the same 
type of mental event.   
 
There is something very commonsensical about direct realism, and to my 
mind, disjunctivism is a very natural progression of the view.  If you think 
that the table in front of you is a constituent of your perception, so that your 
perception is partly the perception it is because of the real wood-and-nail 
table, then it follows pretty straightforwardly that a hallucination of a table 
cannot be the same sort of mental event, since there is no table to make that 
mental event a perception of a table.   
 
That being said, disjunctivism is often criticised on the grounds that it lacks a 
satisfactory explanation about what happens in the case of hallucination or 
illusion.  To repeat, disjunctivism is the view that perceiving a lemon, and 
having a subjectively indistinguishable hallucination as of a lemon, are two 
distinct kinds of mental events.  The former is the perception it is (and a 
perception at all) because of the presence of an actual lemon.  The latter is 
something else entirely.  As Mark Johnson puts it: 
 
The Disjunctive View has nothing satisfactory to say in answer to the 
pressing question: What kinds of things can visual experience be a 
relation to so that in a transition from a case of visual hallucination to a 
case of seeing there need be no difference which the subject can discern? 
(Johnson, 2009, p. 216) 
 
While there are numerous arguments in the literature, both for and against 
disjunctivism, my concern is not so much with the viability of the view as a 
theory of perception, but as a possible explanation of cognitive contact.  
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Moreover, what I will have to say is not meant to be devastating to 
disjunctivism.  Rather, what I want to show is that disjunctivism does not 
have a perfect theory of cognitive contact.  My strategy, unlike most critics, is 
not to press the disjunctivist about what happens in the bad (hallucinatory) 
cases, but to focus instead on the good (veridical) ones. 
 
8.3.2 A Worry About Subjective Availability 
 
Take some veridical experience such as that of seeing a table. Remaining 
neutral on what exactly the contents of such an experience are,77 we may ask 
what exactly is available to the experiencing subject.  Intuitively, what is 
available to the subject are the table and its features: its shape, color, size etc. 
Now, imagine a subjectively indistinguishable hallucination.  To repeat, 
disjunctivists do not deny that one might have such a subjectively 
indistinguishable experience.  Again, we may ask what is available to the 
subject here.  Presumably what is available to the subject is precisely the 
same as in the case of veridically perceiving the table.  But, claims the 
disjunctivist, the two experiences are of a different kind: one involves the 
table, the other, obviously, does not.  Let us assume that the term ‘involves’ in 
the previous sentence denotes cognitive contact, so that in the veridical case, 
cognitive contact with the table obtains.  The question that emerges is: What 
about the good case secures the cognitive contact?  
 
According to Byrne and Logue, disjunctivists hold that “…the good case and 
the (hallucinatory) bad case share no mental core” (Byrne & Logue, 2009, p. 
x).  This, combined with the comments from Dancy and Martin above, yields 
the following line of reasoning: 
                                                        
77 Remaining neutral, that is, on the question of the ontology of the contents 
i.e. abstract objects, sense data, ordinary objects and their properties, etc.  
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1) One can have a hallucination as of a table that is subjectively 
indistinguishable from a veridical perception (of a table)—i.e. what is 
available to the subject is the same in both cases. 
2) The hallucination and the veridical perception share no mental core. 
3) What is available to the subject is not part of the mental core in either 
case. 
 
To be sure, a lot will depend on what exactly this notion of a mental core 
amounts to.  However, I think it is fairly natural to understand some mental 
state’s mental core as being something like its identity conditions.  If this is 
right, then disjunctivism seems to divorce what is subjectively available from 
the identity conditions of the relevant mental states.  In other words, one 
should be able to specify that perceiving the table is the kind of thing it is—
namely, a mental state that makes cognitive contact with the table—without 
mention of what is available to the subject of that state. What is subjectively 
available is not a factor in establishing cognitive contact with the table.  
 
Why exactly is this problematic? Consider your visual experience of the table 
in front of you.  Does it not seem as though what is subjectively available to 
you—how the table and its features seem to you—will figure in an account of 
the cognitive contact you have with the table?   Say, for instance, that the 
table is rectangular and brown, and it also seems to you in a subjectively 
available way that the table is such.  I am not alone in finding it highly 
implausible that what is subjectively available to you—how the table 
seems—plays little role in the cognitive contact you have with the table: 
 
One is in causal, sensory, and indeed visual contact with a garden shed, 
but when one looks at it one has—due to a disorder in one’s visual 
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system, or a distortion of the atmosphere in which light-waves that would 
have reached one from the shed do reach one, but profoundly 
rearranged—an experience of a pink elephant.  In this case, too, one can 
locate and track the shed, in spite [of] one’s inaccurate conception of it.  
Does one see the shed?  My intuition is that one does not, because one’s 
apprehension…of it is simply too inaccurate. …[C]ontact with an object, in 
the present sense, is not enough…to guarantee that one sees it, that one 
is in…contact with it… (Montague, 2013) 
 
For Montague then, cognitive contact with an object requires what is 
subjectively available to play an important role in the relation.  What is 
subjectively available must have some degree of congruence with an object in 
order for the subject to be in cognitive contact with it—what is subjectively 
available does some work in making cognitive contact.  And the worry I am 
raising for the disjunctivist is that it is unclear whether s/he can 
accommodate this fact.   
 
I want to stress that the worry I am raising here is not just an appeal to 
internalism.  I am not arguing that disjunctivism is wrong because it cannot 
accommodate certain internalist principles.  The worry about subjective 
availability is consistent with a broadly externalist view.  In the present 
context, an externalist view would be that what is subjectively available is 
not sufficient to determine what item the subject is in cognitive contact with.  
What is required by externalism is that the subject’s relation to her 
environment be partly determinative of what, if anything, the subject is in 
contact with.  When Ed, the earthling, and Ted, his twin earth counterpart, 
are staring at a glass of H20 and XYZ respectively, what is subjectively 
available to them (which is indistinguishable) is insufficient to determine 
that Ed is staring at water, and Ted at twin water.  As the story goes, Ed is 
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staring at water because of the relation he bears to the glass of water in front 
of him, likewise for Ted and twin water.  What externalism claims here is that 
the identity conditions of Ed and Ted’s respective perceptions are not 
exhausted by what is subjectively available to them, the identity conditions 
also include the relevant relations they bear to the things in their 
environment.  In short, externalism does not eschew what is subjectively 
available from the “mental core” of a perception; rather, it says that the 
mental core consists of more that just what is subjectively available—namely 
the actual relations the subjects bear to the things in their environments.  
Disjunctivism on the other hand does seem to exclude what is subjectively 
available from the mental core.   
 
Let us consider how disjunctivism fares with respect to the points of 
evaluation listed above.  The points on which I suggested we might evaluate a 
theory of cognitive contact were: 
 
5) How the theory understands the external world 
6) What the theory says about our knowledge of the external world 
7) How the theory accounts for the seeming directness and 
immediateness of our cognitive contact 
8) A theory’s relative parsimony. 
 
As a species of direct realism, disjunctivism would seem to understand the 
external world as being populated by mind independent objects that are the 
kinds of things that can be directly perceived.   Tables and chairs are 
members of this population and are presumably, according to direct realism, 
as we perceive them; though it is unclear whether the disjunctivist can help 
themselves to this latter claim, given that the notion of ‘as we perceive them’ 
seems tied to what is subjectively available. 
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One might expect a direct realist theory to be among the best contenders for 
delivering the kind of robust epistemology that one might hope for from a 
theory of cognitive contact: what better for securing knowledge of the 
external world of ordinary objects than an account that connects us directly 
to those objects.  The worry here is closely related to the problem of 
subjective availability.  If what is available from the subject’s point of view is 
not involved in establishing cognitive contact, and what is available from the 
subject’s point of view are things such as color, shape, texture, etc., then it is 
unclear how the latter could deliver the kind of robust knowledge it seems 
well positioned to deliver.   
 
Setting aside these kinds of concerns, there is little doubt that disjunctivism 
can easily account for the seeming directness of our cognitive contact with 
the world: it is not just a seeming; the contact really is direct. Disjunctivism 
also surpasses the indirectivist in its explanatory parsimony.  Without 
intermediary entities in the cognitive contact relation, the disjunctivist need 
not provide some extra account of how the contents of our intentional states 
map on to the world of ordinary objects: ordinary objects just are the 
contents.  On the other hand, without some plausible account of what 
happens in the bad cases, that makes intelligible the claim that such cases are 
of a different kind than the good cases, this parsimony may not confer much 
of an advantage.  
 
8.4 Tallying Up the Points 
 
What I have tried to do in this chapter is to show that cognitive contact is a 
difficult problem for both directivists and indirectivists alike.  Neither of the 
views we considered had a perfect theory of how we manage to make 
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cognitive contact with the world of ordinary objects, and I am inclined to 
think that this is due not so much to the shortcomings of the respective 
theories, but to the recalcitrance of the problem.  I chose to look at the two 
views I did because they serve as exemplars of the two approaches to 
addressing the problem—directivism and indirectivism.  In general, 
directivism appears to best accord with the common sense view, but 
disjunctivism in particular, appears not to afford the mind much of a role to 
play in establishing cognitive contact.  Sense data theory, on the other hand, 
appears to have the opposite problem: the mind and its objects, sense data, 
appear cut off from the world of ordinary objects.  All in all, the point of this 
survey was not to refute any particular theory, but rather to show that a 
perfect account of how our minds make contact with the world is perhaps too 
much to hope for.  We should thus accept that what we can have with respect 
to cognitive contact is a less than ideal account.  Given more modest 
aspirations for a theory of cognitive contact, I think the options I will provide 
below will be seen to fare as well as their rivals. 
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9 Modificationism and the Challenge of Cognitive Contact 
 
As mentioned above, modificationism is the combination of the moderate 
identity view—intentionality is a kind of phenomenality—with the view that 
phenomenal character is a way for a mental state to be—a modification of 
that state. While modificationism appears not to make a claim about 
cognitive contact, some analysis ought to at least constrain the view’s 
possibilities.  It is precisely these possibilities that will be the focus of this 
final chapter.  To reiterate, we began with a set of sentences that appear 
inconsistent: 
  
1) We are in cognitive contact with the world outside our skins. 
2) It looks as though this contact is established by intentionality. 
3) Being in cognitive contact with X is, or is partly constituted, or 
involves, or consists in, being related to X. 
4) By 2) and 3), it looks as though intentionality establishes a relation to 
the world outside our skins. 
5) Intentionality is not a relation 
 
As I mentioned earlier, the task for the modificationist is to explain how a 
non-relational phenomenon such as intentionality can in some way establish 
a relation like cognitive contact.  In what follows, I would like to sketch 
several possible ways a modificationist might address this challenge. 
 
9.1 Two Kinds of Intentionality: 
 
One avenue a modificationist might explore in the pursuit of cognitive 
contact is to endorse two kinds of intentionality.  In (Horgan, Tienson, & 
Graham, 2004), a view is sketched according to which there are two kinds of 
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intentionality: phenomenal and externalistic.  As is the case with 
modificationism, “[p]henomenal intentionality is narrow: it is not 
constitutively dependent upon anything outside the head of the experiencing 
subject.  Indeed it is not constitutively dependent on anything outside of 
phenomenal consciousness itself” (Horgan, Tienson, & Graham, 2004, p. 299).  
On the other hand, there is a kind of intentionality, externalistic 
intentionality, which does depend on things in the phenomenal subject’s 
environment.   
 
For the modificationist, this might seem a rather big concession: 
modificationism is a view according to which intentionality is a kind of 
phenomenality.  Since phenomenality is not constitutively dependent on 
anything outside the experiencing subject (i.e. it is narrow), allowing a kind 
of externalistic intentionality seems to give up the thesis that intentionality is 
a kind of phenomenality.   
 
However, I think the modificationist has a plausible reply here. First, this 
notion of externalistic intentionality might be construed as something like 
reference.  The modificationist might therefore argue that there is content on 
the one hand, and reference on the other, and that phenomenal intentionality 
concerns the former, but that cognitive contact concerns both.  The idea, 
according to Horgan et al, is as follows: 
 
“Suppose that you have an occurrent thought that you could express 
linguistically by “That picture is hanging crooked,” where the singular 
thought-constituent expressible linguistically by ‘that picture’ purports to 
refer to a picture on the wall directly in front of you. This thought-content 
involves certain phenomenally constituted presuppositions, which we call 
grounding presuppositions, that must be satisfied in order for…the 
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thought to refer: roughly, there must be an object at a certain location 
relative to oneself …, this object must be a picture, and there must not be 
any other picture in that location that is an equally eligible potential 
referent of ‘that picture’.  If these grounding presuppositions are satisfied 
by some specific concrete particular, then your singular thought 
constituent refers to that very object.  Which object your thought-
constituent refers to, if any, thus depends jointly upon two factors, one 
phenomenally constituted and one externalistic: on one hand, the 
phenomenally constituted grounding presuppositions, and on the other 
hand, the unique actual object in your ambient environment that satisfies 
those presuppositions. ” (Horgan, Tienson, & Graham, 2004, p. 305) 
 
In terms more consonant with modificationism: The grounding 
presuppositions are part of the phenomenal intentional content of one’s 
crooked picture thought, and one’s crooked picture thought makes cognitive 
contact with the picture when the picture satisfies this content.  Of course 
something more is needed here, since my twin earth phenomenal duplicate 
will, ipso facto, enjoy type-identical phenomenally constituted 
presuppositions.  And since there is a twin picture on this twin earth, what is 
it about my and my twin’s respective thoughts that ensures that I am in 
cognitive contact with this picture, and he with that picture?  This is where 
allowing some externalistic elements to figure in the relation of cognitive 
contact is helpful.  It is facts about the actual picture in my environment and 
my relation to it that ensure my cognitive contact with this picture, likewise 
for my twin.   
 
According to Horgan et al, many thoughts have two kinds of truth conditions, 
wide and narrow.  The narrow truth conditions for the thought ‘that picture 
is crooked’ are those you share with your twin earth and brain-in-a-vat 
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counterparts:  “there is a unique object x, located directly in front of me and 
visible by me, such that x is a picture and x is hanging crooked (relative to my 
visual/kinesthetic up/down axis)” (Horgan, Tienson, & Graham, 2004, p. 
313).  The wide truth conditions for this same thought have as constituents, 
the actual satisfiers of the thought.  Since your crooked-picture thought and 
your twin earth duplicates have different actual satisfiers, your respective 
thoughts have different wide truth conditions.   
 
Recall that our inconsistent set of sentences were: 
1) We are in cognitive contact with the world outside our skins. 
2) It looks as though this contact is established by intentionality. 
3) Being in cognitive contact with X is, or is partly constituted, or 
involves, or consists in, being related to X. 
4) By 2) and 3), it looks as though intentionality establishes a relation to 
the world outside our skins. 
5) Intentionality is not a relation. 
 
The kind of two-factor approach advocated by Horgan et al might be co-opted 
by the modificationist as a means of reconciling the seeming inconsistency.  
The modificationist intent on this kind of account would presumably argue 
that cognitive contact is not solely established by phenomenal intentionality 
(as per 2), but by phenomenal intentionality + externalistic factors (call this 
2a).  Phenomenal intentionality sets conditions that externalistically 
determined referents then satisfy.  Or to put things another way, cognitive 
contact is the relation that obtains when both narrow and wide truth 
conditions are satisfied.  In short, cognitive contact is established partly by 
narrow phenomenal intentionality—its narrow phenomenally constituted 
presuppositions and truth conditions—and partly by the wide truth 
conditions.  Modificationism is a story about the former, which, when 
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combined with a suitable account of wide truth conditions and reference, can 
provide a plausible account of cognitive contact.   
 
9.2 Descriptive Space, and Phenomenal Flitting 
 
As a reminder, modificationism holds that my red-table intentional episode 
consists in my being intentionally directed in a red, table-esque way.  This 
kind of view bears some similarity to the adverbial theory of perception, as 
advocated by theorists such as Chisholm (1957).  Adverbialists held that 
intentional experiences are not, as the sense data view claims, relations to 
contents, but instead modifications of the intentional experiencing subject. 
Where the sense data theorist invokes red, round sense data to explain our 
tomato experiences, the adverbialist contends that we are experiencing redly, 
and roundly. Rather than being independently exiting things (properties, 
sense data, etc.), the adverbialist takes redness and roundness to name the 
way a subject is intentionally experiencing. Adverbialism does not make a 
direct claim about how experiencing redly might make cognitive contact with 
the tomato, but there are options.   
 
One avenue a modificationist might take is to provide some story about how 
representing redly, roundly, etc. might, in some cases, determine a kind of 
descriptive space sufficient to establish cognitive contact.  On such a view, 
when I represent redly and roundly, my intentional state sets conditions—i.e. 
determines a descriptive space—that may or may not be satisfied/fit by 
objects in my environment. Here too, modificationism shares some similarity 
to another theory from the recent history of philosophy, namely 
descriptivism.  And given that there are well known challenges to descriptivist 
views of content, if the modificationist is to avail herself of descriptivism in 
her account of cognitive contact, these will have to be addressed.   
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First however, more will need to be said about the kind of determination 
invoked in the phrase ‘determine a kind of descriptive space’.  Moreover, the 
notion of descriptive space—especially to someone who has been at pains to 
argue that intentional contents are phenomenal modifications—stands in 
need of explanation: e.g. What exactly is this descriptive space; is it a kind of 
content; what is its relation to intentional content; is it relational, 
propositional, similar to reference, sense, extension, intension etc.; is it, as 
per indirectivism, something in between our intentional states and ordinary 
objects?  
 
To begin with, I want to try to clarify how intentional content can 
“determine” a descriptive space.  Several theorists, (Kriegel, 2011. 
Mendelovici, MS. Searle, 1983), have noted that just from how things are for 
me when I undergo some intentional experience, I have a pretty good idea 
about how the world would have to be in order for my intentional experience 
to be accurate, true, satisfied, etc. Of course, I do not mean to imply that any 
given intentional experience is sufficiently detailed so as to specify the state 
of the entire world at any given moment.  But then again, intentional 
experiences do not typically purport to be about the entire world.  When I 
think to myself that this was a long winter, when I see my azaleas in full 
bloom, when I desire another rescue dog, I have a pretty good idea how the 
world would have to be in order for these experiences to be satisfied: the 
world would have to be just like how my thoughts have it. Moreover, it is not 
immediately obvious that I need look any further than how things are for me 
from the skin in to determine how the world would have to be.  If, for 
instance, Descartes’ evil demon were to somehow take a mental snapshot of 
what is going on inside me, he would know precisely how to arrange the 
world for me to be veridically encountering it.   
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If we call how the world would have to be in order for my intentional 
episodes to be satisfied the descriptive space determined by an intentional 
experience, then this notion of intentional episodes determining a descriptive 
space becomes clearer.  How things are for me, intentionally, determines how 
the world would have to be in order for my intentional states to be satisfied.  
Or, to put things in a way more consonant with the spatial metaphor, how 
things are for me determines a descriptive space into which the world may 
more or less fit.   
 
Again, this approach bears some similarity to the descriptivist theories 
championed by authors such as Frege, Russell and later Searle.  As developed 
in (Frege, 1892/1997), (Russell, 1905/2008) and (Searle, 1958), 
descriptivism is a theory about proper names and how they function: 
Descriptivists hold that in addition to their reference, proper names also 
have a meaning, sense or descriptive content, and that it is in virtue of this 
that they refer.  Searle, for instance, contends that a name refers by being 
associated with a cluster of descriptions, a vague, unspecified number of 
which are true of the thing referred to (Searle, 1958).   
 
Though modificationism is a theory about the nature of intentionality and 
phenomenality, not language, the current solution to the problem of cognitive 
contact we are examining on behalf of the modificationist is one that avails 
itself of the notion of a descriptive space.  What I have in mind by ‘descriptive 
space’ is similar to what I take Searle to have in mind with his cluster theory.  
For Searle, a proper name refers by being associated with a cluster of 
descriptions that the referent satisfies; for the modificationist, intentional 
episodes make cognitive contact by determining a descriptive space into 
which the world (or objects therein) more or less fit.   
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But how exactly does this descriptive space arise?  How does content 
determine a descriptive space?  Consider the following example: The last 
time I spoke with my sister, our conversation went from the usual greetings, 
to my thesis, to my brother-in-law’s most recent fishing exploits, to the 
puppy my wife and I recently got, to my sister’s kids, etc.  As is always the 
case when speaking with my sister—whose many qualities include ranking 
among the world’s best moms—she asked certain questions that lead me to 
believe she was fishing for a sense of how my wife and I were coping with the 
stress of writing, and for any clue as to how she might help alleviate some of 
it.  Besides appreciating my sister’s concern, the sense that she was fishing 
for such insights led me to ask about any recent fishing adventures her 
husband might have had. At sometime during my realization that my sister 
was fishing for insight into my stress level, there was a brief, phenomenal 
presence of my sister’s husband—owing no doubt to my thinking that my 
sister was fishing for insight—that flitted across my mind and led me to ask 
about her husband’s fishing.  When my sister began asking about our new 
puppy, there were several moments that the thought of her kids flitted 
through my mind.  In particular, for whatever reason, I remember clearly the 
look of awestruck wonder on her son Felix’s face when he was presented his 
first toy wheelbarrow so he could help his uncle garden.  Perhaps this is why, 
when I asked about her kids, I asked whether Felix has been helping my Dad 
do the gardening.  Again, I assume the most plausible explanation here is that 
my sister was asking about the closest thing my wife and I have to kids, our 
dogs, and that led me to think about her kids, Felix and Charlotte.  What I am 
trying to convey is that such phenomenal flittings contribute in an important 
way to the determination of the descriptive space.  
 
Another feature of the descriptive space is its fluidity: It is not some rigid set 
of descriptions, finite and exhaustively expressible in language. It is under 
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frequent modification by the phenomenal flittings that serve to determine it.  
Horgan, Tienson and Graham make similar remarks about narrow content 
and the grounding presuppositions that figure therein: 
 
“…[N]arrow truth conditions…are not compactly formulable linguistically 
in a way that can neatly be plugged into the right side of statements of 
the form “Statement ‘S’ is true iff…” [T]he background presuppositions 
figuring in the narrow content of intentional mental states typically 
cannot be spelled out in any tractable way, and…these presuppositions 
typically are too complex and ramified to be cognitively surveyable…” 
(Horgan, Tienson, & Graham, 2004, p. 314). 
 
Several questions/concerns arise here: First, how well do objects need to fit 
the descriptive space in order for cognitive contact to obtain?  (This concern 
has an analogue in the descriptivist/referentialist debate in the philosophy of 
language: how many of the descriptions must something satisfy to be the 
referent?) Second, though originally about proper names, Kripkean-type 
objections can be adapted to apply here as well.  One of Kripke’s original 
insights was that someone could refer to Gödel by ‘Gödel’, even though none 
of the referrer’s descriptions of Gödel are true of him (Kripke, 1972).  Hence 
description cannot be the mechanism that secures reference.   
 
The same might be said of the modificationist’s descriptive space.  There 
might be cases where, a) though some object does not fit the descriptive 
space determined by a subject’s phenomenal intentional content, we are 
nevertheless inclined to attribute cognitive contact between the subject and 
object, and b) where some object fits the descriptive space, but is not 
something the subject is in cognitive contact with.  Examples of a) include 
imposter cases. Imagine one’s wife is replaced with a cleverly disguised 
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robot.  Though the imposter robot will fit some of the descriptive space—the 
part that involves superficial surface features (e.g. hair color)—it will not fit 
other parts.  The phenomenal flittings that often occur when interacting with 
one’s spouse—including flittings of emotion, past events, etc.—will 
undoubtedly contribute to the determination of a descriptive space into 
which the imposter will not fit.   The point is that, were one to have lunch 
with the imposter robot, there is a pretty clear sense in which one is in 
cognitive contact with the imposter despite it not fitting the descriptive 
space.    Examples of b) might include cases of type identical, twin earth 
artefacts: It could be argued that both the pencil in your hand, and its twin 
earth counterpart, fit the descriptive space that secures the cognitive contact 
between you and the pencil.  But surely you are not in cognitive contact with 
the twin-pencil.   
 
Let us first address a): How might a modificationist address the imposter 
objection?  To repeat, the objection is that there are reasons to think that 
when having lunch with a robot that is cleverly disguised as one’s wife, one is 
in cognitive contact with the robot.  This runs counter to the modificationist’s 
claim that the mechanism by which cognitive contact obtains is fit: objects fit 
the descriptive space determined by phenomenal intentional content 
(including phenomenal flittings).  Since the descriptive space determined in 
this instance would include flittings of emotion, past events, etc., and since 
the robot does not satisfy these flittings (your emotions are not robot-
directed, your wedding did not involve the robot), the robot does not fit the 
descriptive space.  But, the objection continues, one is in cognitive contact 
with the robot.  Ergo, cognitive contact is not, or not just, a matter of 
descriptive space.  
In response, the modificationist might simply deny that one is in cognitive 
contact with the robot.  The robot does not fit the descriptive space, 
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therefore, incredible though it undoubtedly seems, one is not in cognitive 
contact with the robot with which one is having lunch.  Less incredibly, the 
modificationist might contend that the contact one has with the imposter is 
degenerate, or somehow divided.  The idea here would be that the 
descriptive space determined during your lunch with the imposter is 
partially satisfied by the robot, but also partially satisfied by your actual wife.  
That being the case, there is something amiss, cognitively speaking, about the 
contact one has with the robot.  The robot fits certain superficial surface 
features involved in the descriptive space, but fails to fit other elements such 
as those determined by flittings of emotion and past events.  In my view this 
is just the kind of response one would want in this situation: the contact you 
have to the thing you are having lunch with is imperfect:  You take yourself to 
be having lunch with your wife, but are instead having lunch with something 
that satisfies some descriptions of your wife, but not others.   
 
With respect to b), the modificationist also has a couple of possible 
responses.  To repeat, the objection was that a pencil on twin earth would 
equally fit the descriptive space determined during my interaction with the 
pencil on my desk.  But I am in cognitive contact with the pencil on my desk, 
not the type identical pencil that exists in a different world.  Therefore, the 
fitting of a descriptive space cannot be the mechanism that establishes 
cognitive contact.  Again, the modificationist might simply argue that, 
implausible though it seems, cognitive contact can indeed be a trans-world 
relation.  Notice too that the modificationist cannot avail herself of the kind of 
emotional, or past experiential, flittings that are involved in the cognitive 
contact one has with one’s spouse.  Odd fetishes notwithstanding, we do not 
form those kinds of bonds with pencils.  An interesting avenue that a 
modificationist might pursue here is the token reflexive indexical account 
proffered by Searle’s theory of intentionality (Searle, 1983, pp. 218-225).  In 
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some cases, phenomenal intentional content determines a descriptive space 
that includes a token reflexive indexical component.  In our pencil case, this 
component can be glossed as ‘the cause of this very phenomenal intentional 
episode’.  When undergoing a phenomenal intentional episode as of the 
pencil, the descriptive space determined, includes the component ‘the cause 
of this very phenomenal intentional episode’.  Since the twin pencil does not 
fit that part of the descriptive space, one is not in cognitive contact with the 
twin pencil.   
 
But there is a lurking worry here.  The modificationist is committed to 
intentionality being a kind of phenomenality, and being non-relational. 
Phenomenal intentional content is a way for an intentional state to be.  The 
solution (that we are now considering) to the problem that such a position 
engenders—namely, the problem of cognitive contact with the external 
world—is that phenomenal intentional content (including phenomenal 
flittings) determines a descriptive space into which objects in the external 
world more or less fit.  This led us to the present objection that some twin-
world artefacts will fit the descriptive space determined by some 
phenomenal intentional contents.  So by the theory’s own lights, we are in 
cognitive contact with twin-world artefacts.   The current proposal for 
answering this objection is to invoke, as part of the descriptive space, a self-
reflexive indexical component that, in the present example, is something like 
‘is the cause of this very phenomenal intentional episode’.  But how can a 
theory that has been at pains to eschew relations such as causation from 
being constitutive of intentionality (see Part 1) appeal to that very relation to 
get out of twin-world hot water (or XYZ as it were)?  In other words, isn’t the 
modificationist helping herself to something she cannot have?     
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To answer this concern on behalf of the modificationist, let me start by saying 
that I do not think any modificationist denies that the world outside our skins 
can, and regularly does, have a causal impact on us, and that often the 
effect—by complicated psycho-physical processes—of this impact is the 
production of phenomenal intentional content.  What the modificationist 
denies is that this content is constitutively dependent on the causal relation.  
It is contingently true that pencils often cause pencil-esque phenomenal 
intentional episodes, but such an episode could occur in a brain-in-a-vat, and 
the modificationist is committed to the view that the latter is every bit as 
pencil-esque as the former.  What makes it the kind of phenomenal 
intentional episode it is is not that it is pencil-caused (though it may have 
been), but that it has certain phenomenal features that we can gloss as 
‘pencil-esque’ (again, what this actually comes to for the modificationist was 
addressed in part 2).  Now, consider how the modificationist would account 
for having a phenomenal intentional episode as of kicking.  Presumably, she 
would say that what it is to have a kicking-thought is to be intentionally 
directed in a kicking-wise way.  Does this, much to the modificationist’s 
chagrin, commit the modificationist to a relational view? In tamer language: 
Kicking is a relation. A subject can represent kicking.  Does that mean the 
representation is relational?   
 
To come back to b)—the objection that twin-world objects fit worldly 
descriptive spaces—I do not think it is straightforwardly inconsistent for the 
modificationist to contend that, in the case of the pencil, the reason why the 
twin-earthly pencil does not fit the descriptive space is that part of the 
descriptive space determined includes a token-reflexive component. This 
kind of view might also help the modificationist account for the following 
kind of brain-in-a-vat (henceforth, BIV) scenario: Your BIV duplicate’s 
phenomenal intentional contents will determine a descriptive space into 
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which no pencil fits.  This is because his descriptive space will include a token 
reflexive component that may be glossed as ‘the pencil causing this very 
pencil-esque intentional episode’, and nothing fits that space. I find this kind 
of view promising, but my guess is trying to spell out the phenomenal 
intentional content in a coherent way will be challenging.  Again, the situation 
is this: Your current phenomenal intentional episode as of the pencil needs to 
be explicated such that it is clear how it might determine a descriptive space 
that guarantees your cognitive contact with the pencil, and not its twin-earth 
counterpart, and also makes clear how your BIV duplicate’s similar 
phenomenal intentional episode does not make cognitive contact with either 
object.  The modificationist story here is that your current pencil episode has 
certain phenomeno-intentional properties that may be glossed as: yellow-
pencil-causing-this-very-experience-esque.  That is, you are intentionally 
directed in a yellow-pencil-causing-this-very-experience-esque sort of way.  
On the one hand, these kinds of translations always come across as clumsy 
and contrived.  On the other hand, it really does seem like many phenomenal 
intentional episodes—especially perceptual ones—are token-reflexive in this 
way. 
 
Coming back to the question of how well something needs to fit the 
descriptive space in order for cognitive contact to obtain, I want again to 
draw an analogy from the philosophy of language.  According to Searle, the 
criteria for applying a proper name are loose, and unspecified, rather than 
rigid (Searle, 1958, p. 172). By this, I take him to mean that the descriptions 
some object must satisfy in order to be the referent of a proper name is a 
loose set with an unspecified number.  Likewise for the descriptive space and 
the object that fits it. In her account of how exactly we access (perceive/think 
about) external objects, Michelle Montague expresses a similar view:  
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“We achieve access to a material object via perception by correctly 
representing enough of that object’s properties.  It is difficult if not 
impossible to give a principle for determining when there is enough 
matching for perceptual contact” (Montague, 2013, p. 46). 
 
Again, the problem of specifying how well an object must fit the descriptive 
space may be partly due to the fluid nature of the descriptive space itself. On 
the modificationist line we are examining, the descriptive space is being 
frequently modified, adjusted, and revised.  The thing about phenomenal 
flittings is that they flit—making their contribution to the descriptive space 
before giving way to other flittings, which subsequently modify the 
descriptive space too.  When I think of my Pyrenees, Sibyll, on one occasion, 
and then on another, the chances are that some of the phenomenal flittings 
that occur on each occasion will be different.  Sometimes the thought of how 
parental she is with our cat flits through my mind.  Other times, it is the 
maddening frequency with which she insists on rolling in mud (she’s our only 
white dog).  
 
Before moving on, a brief summary of this descriptive space view and how it 
addresses the problem of cognitive contact will be helpful.  According to the 
present line, phenomenal intentional content, which includes phenomenal 
flittings, determines a descriptive space—a way-the-world-would-have-to-
be.  Cognitive contact is achieved when ordinary objects fit, more or less, into 
the space.  How well an object must fit the descriptive space—i.e. how much 
of the descriptive space must be satisfied by the object—is difficult to say.  
This may be due, in part, to the fluid and changing nature of the descriptive 
space.  
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Recall our inconsistent set of sentences: 
 
1) We are in cognitive contact with the world outside our skins. 
2) It looks as though this contact is established by intentionality. 
3) Being in cognitive contact with X is, or is partly constituted, or 
involves, or consists in, being related to X. 
4) By 2) and 3), it looks as though intentionality establishes a relation to 
the world outside our skins. 
5) Intentionality is not a relation 
 
The descriptive space view attempts to address the inconsistency by 
accounting for intentionality in such a way that intentionality is responsible 
for establishing cognitive contact, without thereby being a relation itself. 
Phenomenal intentional content determines a descriptive space into which 
items in the external world fit (more or less).  In this sense, the present line 
understands 2) as saying that phenomenal intentionality establishes the 
conditions that make cognitive contact possible (assuming the world 
cooperates) by determining this descriptive space.  
 
9.3 Descriptive Space, Directivism and the Externalism Issue 
 
Recall that one of the points by which we evaluated theories was how the 
theories account for the seeming directness and immediateness of our 
cognitive contact with the world.  This raises the question of whether the 
descriptive space view is directivist or indirectivist.  In other words, does the 
descriptive space stand in between phenomenally intentional mental 
phenomena and the world of ordinary objects, and in so doing, make the view 
indirectivist?  Though I take it that advocates of something like the 
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descriptive space view would opt for directivism, it is worth examining 
whether the descriptive space view and directivism are really consistent.   
Let us start with an analogy.  A grocery list, though lacking original 
intentionality, seems to determine something like a descriptive space, that 
items in the grocery store more or less fit.  The question is whether the 
descriptive space determined by the list somehow stands in between the list 
and the items that would satisfy it, such that a theory of grocery contact that 
assumes this kind of fit mechanism is necessarily indirectivist.   To my mind, 
there is nothing problematic about endorsing this descriptive space view 
about grocery lists while maintaining directivism about grocery contact; 
likewise for the descriptive space view of phenomenal intentionality.   
 
That being said, the grocery list analogy can serve to highlight what is 
undoubtedly the descriptive space view’s weakest point.  While we have no 
trouble understanding how a grocery list can fully determine a descriptive 
space, nor precisely what would fit that space, the same is not true of 
phenomenal intentional content. Though the descriptive space is fluid, and 
under constant modification, and several theorists recognize that the answer 
as to how well something needs to fit the descriptive space in order for 
cognitive contact to obtain is going to have to be vague and unspecified, and 
probably not something exhaustively expressible in language, this kind of 
view is unlikely to win any converts.  As a phenomenal intentionalist cousin 
of descriptivism, the descriptive space view’s chief opponents will likewise 
be related to descriptivism’s chief opponents—namely externalists of one 
stripe or another.  And just as the externalist who opposes descriptivism 
presses the descriptivist to provide some cogent account of how many 
descriptions a potential referent must satisfy in order for reference to obtain, 
so too will the externalist who opposes modificationism press the 
modificationist for an answer about how well something must fit the 
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descriptive space in order for cognitive contact to obtain.  Consider Kriegel’s 
scant treatment of the issue: 
 
“One way to think of this is that intentionality provides truth conditions, or 
accuracy conditions, which then may or may not be satisfied, depending on 
the world’s cooperation.  When the conditions are satisfied, cognitive contact 
with the world will have been established.  The role of intentionality is only 
to make such contact possible by laying the conditions whose satisfaction 
would constitute the establishment of contact. …I conclude that when the 
connection-to-the-world requirement is properly understood, there is reason 
to expect adverbialism to meet it.” (Kriegel, 2011, p. 166) 
 
Assuming the point of view of an objector, we might ask what exactly counts 
as satisfaction here.  That is, how many of the abovementioned conditions 
must be satisfied for cognitive contact to obtain?  Though I am sympathetic 
towards this kind of descriptive space view, I recognize that solving the 
problem of cognitive contact is not as simple and straightforward as the 
cursory treatment of the issue by the phenomenal intentionalist community 
would suggest: a great deal more work is required here.  Moreover, given the 
shortcomings of many past attempts to ground our contact with the world in 
sensory terms alone, it is clear that phenomenal intentionality theory in 
general, and modificationism in particular, ought to take the problem of 
cognitive contact, and the resources available to address it, seriously.  What I 
have tried to show is that modificationism is not necessarily doomed with 
respect to cognitive contact, but again, more work is required.     
 
9.4 Taking Stock 
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So far, we have considered two possible ways a modificationist might go 
about addressing the problem of cognitive contact.  The first was that there 
are two kinds of phenomena involved in the cognitive contact relation: 
phenomenal intentionality, and wide intentionality.  The second was the 
descriptive space view.  Though not solutions to the problem of cognitive 
contact, each can be seen as a starting place for addressing the problem.  Let 
us now briefly examine how these views stack up with respect to our points 
of evaluation, i.e.: 
 
1) How the theory understands the external world 
2) What the theory says about our knowledge of the external world 
3) How the theory accounts for the seeming directness and 
immediateness of our cognitive contact 
4) A theory’s relative parsimony. 
 
With respect to 1), the two-factor theory proffered by Horgan et al appears to 
be realist in the sense that it understands the external world as populated by 
the kinds of things that can satisfy the truth conditions of intentional states.  
True thoughts about crooked pictures will make cognitive contact with actual 
crooked pictures.  Crooked pictures therefore number among the things that 
populate the external world.  Likewise, the descriptive space view also 
understands in the same way.   
 
Unfortunately, the descriptive space view cannot deliver a robust 
epistemology: nothing about the descriptive space guarantees that the 
ordinary objects we are in fact in cognitive contact with actually do fit the 
descriptive space, nor that we can tell when they do or do not so fit.  On the 
other hand, because the two-factor theory allows some externalistic elements 
to play a role in cognitive contact, it would seem to have an advantage with 
  
160 
respect to condition 2.  Externalism is often admired (or criticised) for its 
anti-sceptical (with respect to knowledge of the external world) implications 
(see, for instance, (Greco, 2004).  Briefly: sceptical arguments often rely on 
calling into doubt what is introspectively available to the subject.  In other 
words, these arguments assume that justification (and therefore the 
knowledge it delivers) is an internal matter—concerned only with what is 
introspectively accessible.  The next step in such arguments is to impugn 
what is introspectively accessible, and thereby threaten justification.  
However, if it turns out that the justification for some belief depends, in part, 
on matters external to what is introspectively accessible to the subject, then 
sceptical arguments that seek to impugn what is introspectively accessible do 
not necessarily threaten justification, and therefore knowledge.  Hence a 
theory that allows certain external factors to play a role in establishing 
cognitive contact with the world might be better positioned to give an 
account of knowledge of that world.  To be sure, this scant treatment of the 
epistemic implications of the two-factor theory is underdeveloped, and blurs 
the distinction between epistemic and semantic externalism/internalism.  
However, at the very least, such considerations confer a prima facie 
epistemic advantage to the two-factor theory.  Both the two-factor theory 
and the descriptive space view are directivist, and so accord with the view 
that our contact with the world is direct and unmediated by things such as 
sense data.  Finally, with respect to parsimony, both theories appear equal.   
 
To summarize, modificationism has at least two possible avenues for 
pursuing a solution to the problem of cognitive contact.  The first is more 
theoretically inclusive because of its invocation of some externalist 
principles.  While some phenomenal intentionalists might be content with 
this first option, the second option—the descriptive space view—is a live 
option for those phenomenal intentionalists in general, and modificationists 
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in particular, determined to provide a non-relational, internalist theory of 
intentionality—one that is, as Katalin Farkas says, without compromise 
(Farkas, 2008). Again, neither option is meant as a decisive solution to the 
problem of cognitive contact, but are instead sketches of how 
modificationists might go about addressing the problem—sketches that I 
think are within the theoretical constraints within which modificationists, by 
their own lights, must work.      
 
9.5 Two More Possibilities 
 
Before concluding I would like to briefly mention two more approaches to 
the problem of cognitive contact that a modificationist might take. The first is 
not so much a possible solution to the problem of cognitive contact as a flat 
denial that it is a theory of content’s job to provide such a solution.  The idea 
here is that phenomenal intentionality theory and its subspecies, 
modificationism, are theories concerned with psychological content, not 
semantic relations such as cognitive contact, reference or truth.  In the words 
of Jerry Fodor: 
 
“Truth, reference and the rest of the semantic notions aren’t psychological 
categories.  What they are is: they’re modes of Dasein.  I don’t know what 
Dasein is, but I’m sure there’s lots of it around, and I’m sure that you and I 
and Cincinnati have all got it.  What more do you want?” (Fodor, 1981) 
 
Again, I will not belabour this point too much because my focus is on the 
possibilities the modificationist has for facing the problem of cognitive 
contact, not how she might avoid it.   
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The final avenue down which a modificationist might venture in pursuit of 
some way to address the problem of cognitive contact is what I dub 
reconstructive realism.  Before going briefly into the view, a caveat:  The 
following is but the barest of sketches—one that I have spent very little time 
on, but one that strikes me as extremely interesting. It was suggested to me 
that what it is to be an object for us is to be something like the locus of 
engagement, or interaction possibilities78.  This view has some intuitive 
force: the reason why the thing in my left hand is a pen is because of certain 
ways I can engage or interact with it.  And for this very reason, the thing in 
my left hand cannot be a pen for my dog.  It can be a fetch toy, a stick (and 
most likely a chew toy to be shredded into inky pieces on my new duvet).  
But it cannot be a pen for my dogs.  Of course, certain logical snafus are 
bound to arise.  For instance, if I throw the pen for my dog, then what I throw 
and what he fetches are different objects.  Perhaps this kind of problem can 
be resolved by appeal to overlapping possibilities.  The pen can also be such 
that I can engage it as a fetch toy for my dog, and so there is some overlap in 
how I can engage the pen, and how my dog can.  At any rate, we are bidden, 
according to this line of thought, to reconstrue the world of ordinary objects 
as loci of interaction/engagement possibilities (Bickhard, 2010).   
 
Undoubtedly, this kind of view smacks of idealism: Ordinary objects are not 
defined independently of our impressions of them, but are defined instead in 
terms of how we might interact with them. Maybe this sounds too far-fetched 
to be a metaphysical account of ordinary objects, but consider the 
phenomena of invention and discovery.  Ancient man needed some way of 
transporting heavy things over great distances.  One day, someone noticed 
that it was easier to move fallen trees by rolling them rather than lifting 
them, and all of a sudden circular objects became more than just sections of 
                                                        
78 By Chris Viger in conversation 
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fallen trees…they became wheels.  What were loci of engagement 
possibilities that included, for instance, fuel for the fire, poles for simple hut 
construction, etc. became new things; they became wheels.  
 
Though this is a mere sketch, it might be further fleshed out along similar 
lines to the enactive approach to perception developed in (Noë, 2004).  
Briefly, Noë’s view is that perception is something we do, not something that 
happens to us.  “Think of a blind person tap-tapping his or her way around a 
cluttered space, perceiving the space by touch, not all at once, but through 
time, by skilful probing and movement” (Noë, 2004 p. 1).  The world, 
according to Noë, “makes itself available to the perceiver through physical 
movement and interaction” (Noë, 2004 p. 1).  To see the tree over there is to 
see something up which one might climb.  “It is to see it, directly, as affording 
certain possibilites” (Noë, 2004 p. 106).   
 
To be sure, modificationism and Noë’s enactive model are incompatible in 
many other ways.  For instance, according to Noë, one implication of the 
enactive approach is that we ought to “reject the idea—widespread in both 
philosophy and science—that perception is a process in the brain whereby 
the perceptual system constructs an internal representation of the world” 
(Noë, 2004 p.2). But that need not prevent the modificationist from adopting 
certain Noë-esque metaphysical views about the nature of ordinary objects.  
The important point is that there is this view of what it is to be an object: To 
be an object is to be the loci of interaction possibilities, or, in Noë’s words, to 
be such as to afford certain possibilities.  And this view might be co-opted by 
the modificationist in her account of cognitive contact.     
 
How exactly could reconstructive realism help the modificationist in her 
pursuit of some account of cognitive contact? Well, all along, the assumption 
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has been that the problem of cognitive contact is a problem about how to 
account for what’s going on in the mind of a cognizer such that what is going 
on there manages to reach out into the world and make contact with things.  
But on the present view, our focus ought to be on how we conceive of, and 
account for, the things we take ourselves to be in contact with, such that they 
can be possible candidates for cognitive contact.   In slightly more earthy 
language: The present line contends that the problem of cognitive contact is 
not a problem about how we fix the mind such that it can contact the world, 
but about how we conceive of the world such that it is the kind of thing that 
could be in contact with the mind.  And indeed, how you might go about 
engaging/interacting with something seems, at least prima facie, to be the 
kind of thing for which one’s phenomenal intentional experiences could play 
a central role.   Perhaps reconstructive realism could even be combined with 
the descriptive space view such that what it is to determine a descriptive 
space is to determine a space of interaction possibilities.  Again, I realize this 
is extremely underdeveloped and exceedingly vague, but for the 
modificationist, it might be worth pursuing.  
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9.6 Conclusion 
 
The central goal of this project was to examine what I find to be an 
interesting family of views that fall under the common head of phenomenal 
intentionality theory.  More specifically, I wanted to examine the strengths 
and weaknesses of a particular species of phenomenal intentionality theory 
advocated by theorists such as Kriegel (2011) and Mendelovici (2010).  This 
species of theory, which I called modificationism, rejects the view that 
intentionality is a relation, but is instead one kind of another pervasive 
mental phenomenon, phenomenality.   
 
Before examining the strengths and weaknesses of modificationism, I 
examined what motivations might lead someone to reject the relational view 
of intentionality.  I looked at what are undoubtedly the most popular answers 
to two questions: 
 
1) What sorts of things does intentionality relate us to? 
2) What kind of relation is intentionality? 
 
Though certainly not an exhaustive vetting of all relational views, I think the 
concerns I raised—which have been voiced throughout the philosophical 
community for some time—made it easier to understand why a 
modificationist might look for non-relational alternatives to the relation view 
of intentionality.   
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Next I examined three views within the phenomenal intentionalist camp—
focusing in on two similar views, and distinguishing them as modificationist.  
I explained the elements of modificationism, and went on to address some 
concerns that arise for phenomenal intentionalism in general and 
modificationism in particular.  I noted several different attempts to address 
these concerns in the phenomenal intentionality literature, and suggested 
that some promising progress has been made.   
 
I then moved on to what I take to be a rather large concern for 
modificationism—one that I have heard described as the elephant in the 
phenomenal intentionalist room: the problem of cognitive contact.  After 
explaining what the problem is, and why it emerges as particularly vexing 
given the theoretical constraints of modificationism, I went on to examine 
two theories that served as exemplars for two different approaches to 
cognitive contact.  The theories were sense data theory and disjunctivism, 
and their respective approaches were what I called indirectivism and 
directivism, respectively.  From my examination of directivism and 
indirectivism, I concluded that a perfect theory of cognitive contact is hard to 
come by, and therefore that we might have to settle for a less than perfect 
account of how we manage to get outside our heads. Keeping these more 
modest expectations in mind, I went on to examine the options a 
modificationist might have to address the problem of cognitive contact.  
Though in need of a great deal more theorizing, I suggested two avenues 
down which a modificationist might pursue a solution to the problem of 
cognitive contact.  My conclusion was that modificationism is not necessarily 
doomed with respect to providing a solution to the problem of cognitive 
contact.  
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In summary, my aspirations were modest:  I wanted to investigate what I 
took to be an interesting theory, highlight some of its central motivations, 
and examine its strengths and weaknesses—the most problematic of which is 
modificationism’s seeming inability to account for our cognitive contact with 
the world outside our skins.  Whether or not phenomenal intentionality 
theory, and modificationism, can deliver a viable account of cognitive contact 
remains to be seen.  All the same, I hope this project serves, at the very least 
to draw attention to the problem; and, at best, gives hope that a solution to 
the problem of cognitive contact, even an uncompromising one, might be 
possible.   
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